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In 1745, the Shengjing military governor (jiangjun), Daldangga, wrote to the Qian-
long emperor (r. 1736–95) to propose building a guard post at the mouth of the 
Yalu (K. Amnok) River. The suggested place was Mangniushao, a sandbank located 
where the confluence of two tributaries of the Yalu River, the Caohe and the Aihe, 
flowed into the mainstream of the Yalu. These tributaries, both originating in 
Changbaishan (K. Paektusan), also led to the Halmin and Elmin areas, the biggest 
ginseng preserve in Shengjing. Daldangga’s predecessors had tried to protect the 
ginseng mountains (shenshan) in their jurisdiction by building outposts and sta-
tioning soldiers on the land routes around the area, but the waterways were poorly 
guarded and open to illegal poachers. Eager to improve the security situation in 
the Shengjing area and to tighten the management of ginseng production in par-
ticular, Daldangga emphasized the necessity of a guard post on the waterways; 
without one, people could easily build boats, transport food grains, and approach 
the prohibited ginseng preserves. He was concerned that, without a guard post, it 
was impossible to prevent, among other things, illegal ginseng poaching. Trained 
naval forces in Lüshun could be mobilized and stationed at Mangniushao, added 
Daldangga, and for their living they could cultivate the empty land available near 
the Yalu River.1
However, it was not his emperor or his rival officials in Beijing who severely 
objected to the military governor’s idea; it was the Chosŏn court that urged the 
Qianlong emperor to reconsider the proposal and eventually succeeded in per-
suading him to drop the plan for an outpost on the Yalu River. Even though 
Qing officials confirmed that the sandbank was located within Qing territory, 
the Chosŏn repeatedly insisted that the two countries had long prohibited any 
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settlement or cultivation in the vast area, as wide as a hundred li, between the 
Willow Palisade and the Yalu River. The Chosŏn king, Yŏngjo (r. 1724–76), 
lauded the ban as “a well-designed plan by the virtue of the imperial court 
[K. hwangjo]” to prevent contacts between Qing and Chosŏn people and thus 
eliminate any chance of trouble with the “small country” (K. sobang). Rejecting 
the Shengjing military governor’s proposal for a new guard post to protect the 
ginseng mountains, the Qianlong emperor finally decided to acquiesce to the 
Chosŏn king’s insistence that the land near the Yalu River should remain empty 
and not be opened to soldiers or civilians. The eighteenth-century Qing emperor 
agreed to keep his territory north of the Yalu River in the state that the Chosŏn 
king preferred.2
The Shengjing military governor’s proposal for a guard post on the Yalu River 
was eminently reasonable in order to protect the Manchurian treasure and the im-
perial estate. But despite his full awareness of this, and even after confirmation that 
the sandbank was located within Qing territory, the Qianlong emperor decided to 
favor the Chosŏn request and reject the opening of the Yalu River to settlement. 
Why did the Qing emperor accept the Chosŏn king’s request over the Manchu of-
ficial’s proposal? What empowered the “small country” of Chosŏn to persuade the 
“imperial court” to change its plans to protect its lands? This study seeks to find 
answers to these questions through the lens of ginseng, whose roots are entangled 
between the Qing and the Chosŏn and which reveals the peculiar nature of the two 
states’ territorial boundaries and political relations.
The jurisdiction of the Qing Shengjing military governor overlapped roughly 
with today’s Liaoning Province in China. It was also the sacred birthplace where 
Nurhaci (1559–1626) had raised himself from the leader of the Jianzhou Jurchens to 
the khan of the Aisin Gurun, also known as the Later Jin (Jinguo, Houjin); his son 
Hong Taiji (1592–1643) consolidated the Manchus, the Mongols, and the Han Chi-
nese into the Qing empire. Even after its 1644 conquest of China proper, the Qing 
never lost its strong interest in Manchuria, including Shengjing, Jilin, and Heilong-
jiang. The Manchu homeland was to be preserved from the Han Chinese, because it 
was arguably the place where the Manchu ethnic identity and military prowess—the 
“Manchu way”—were maintained. In addition to the political and cultural signifi-
cance of Manchuria, the land’s natural resources had huge economic value, since 
they had provided the Manchu ancestors with the material wealth to develop their 
own state and eventually establish the Qing empire. Pearls, sable, and ginseng, all 
growing in the rich mountains and rivers in Manchuria, were widely called the three 
treasures of the northeast. Of the three, ginseng was widely available in the Jianzhou 
Jurchen territory and was also the most valuable commodity in trading with the 
Ming. Well aware of the commercial value of this root, the Qing court paid special 
attention to protecting the ginseng monopoly until the 1850s through strong restric-
tions that allowed only people holding official permits to enter ginseng-producing 
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mountain areas in Shengjing and Jilin. When he proposed the erection of a guard 
post on the Yalu River, the Shengjing military governor sought only to be loyal to 
his emperor by preventing illegal poachers from accessing the ginseng crop and ar-
rogating the profits of the imperial court.
It was their special interest in ginseng that had led the Manchus to be involved 
with Chosŏn Korea from the very beginning of their history, because this precious 
root was primarily available in the region near Chosŏn territory. Throughout the 
years from the initial rise of the Jurchens in Liaodong to their conquest of China 
proper, the issue of Korean trespassers poaching for ginseng and hunting animals 
north of the Yalu and Tumen (K. Tuman) Rivers was a constant source of trouble 
between the Aisin Gurun/Qing and the Chosŏn. Illegal Korean incursions into 
Qing territory brought the Chosŏn court nothing but trouble, in the form either 
of Manchu armies’ attacks or of fines levied by the exasperated emperor on the 
Chosŏn king. In order to avoid conflicts with the great country, the Chosŏn pun-
ished illegal crossing severely and forbade its people to approach the Yalu and 
Tumen Rivers. The Chosŏn kings wanted to have the areas around the two rivers 
empty and off-limits, and so did the Qing emperors. The Manchus built the Wil-
low Palisade, gates, and outposts to curb Han Chinese traffic into the northeastern 
region; the Qing emperors further told the Chosŏn court to reinforce its guards 
on the Yalu and Tumen Rivers and to prohibit Korean subjects from approach-
ing the ginseng-producing mountains in Qing territory. Accordingly, the Yalu and 
Tumen Rivers as well as Changbaishan, as part of the sacred Manchu birthplace, 
were restricted and closed off from civilian access. The Qing, then, was motivated 
by the goal of securing its profits from ginseng, while the Chosŏn sought to avoid 
conflicts over the root with its strong neighbor; but the two countries settled on 
the same solution of clearing the sensitive areas near the two rivers. They pursued 
different aims through this policy, but for both it was ginseng that led them to 
reach the solution.
There is no doubt that considerable powers were required in order to keep 
people out of the vast territory near the Yalu and Tumen Rivers, where lucrative 
ginseng and fertile land were widely available. It was not equal relations between 
the Qing and the Chosŏn that enabled them to achieve this feat; rather, it was the 
asymmetrical tributary relationship that led the two countries to pursue the same 
solution and to endure the problems caused by the restriction of access to the area. 
The Chosŏn found that an empty buffer zone between the two states was more ef-
fective in preventing trespassing and subsequent troubles with the Qing. In order 
to persuade the Qing emperors to keep the land near the Yalu River uninhab-
ited, the Chosŏn, interestingly, emphasized their asymmetrical relationship. The 
Koreans insisted that the benevolent rulers of the great country should embrace 
the inferior subjects of the small country, and therefore the Qing emperor should 
do the Chosŏn king a favor. The Qing was convinced by this argument. Since the 
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Chosŏn suggestion of banning settlement near the Yalu River corresponded to 
Qing restrictions on entry to Manchuria, and since Korean loyalty to the suzerain 
court was proved by its regular dispatch of tributary envoys, the Qing emperor 
was willing to accept the Chosŏn request. In this way, the Qing special interests in 
ginseng and Manchuria, as well as the tributary relations between the Qing and 
Chosŏn courts, contributed to the creation of an empty stretch of land between 
the two countries.
By examining the contacts and conflicts over ginseng in the region of the Yalu 
and Tumen Rivers and Changbaishan, this book explores the territorial boundary 
between the Qing and the Chosŏn and the asymmetrical tributary relationship 
between the two states. It discusses the process by which the two countries recog-
nized and managed their separate realms through an analysis of the Qing policy 
regarding Manchuria, the Qing-Chosŏn tributary relationship, and the two states’ 
ideas about territory and sovereignty. The Yalu and Tumen Rivers and Changbai-
shan were a place where the special Qing interests in Manchuria were well revealed, 
and it was also a location at which the Qing and the Chosŏn clashed and negoti-
ated their respective claims to land and authority. Through the lens of the Qing-
Chosŏn boundary, this study examines the ways in which Qing imperial authority 
sought to safeguard the special status of Manchuria within the empire while pro-
tecting its economic interests in the region’s natural resources and maintaining the 
old relationship with its neighbor. Finally, by exploring the efforts of the Chosŏn 
to preserve its territory and sovereignty within the asymmetrical relationship with 
its more powerful neighbor, the study seeks to highlight the Chosŏn agency in the 
formation and development of the Qing empire.
MANCHURIA,  KOREA,  AND GINSENG
Recent studies of Qing history—most notably those studies that fall under the 
umbrella term of “New Qing History”—have cast light on the centering of the 
Manchus in the Qing period by exploring a variety of themes, including ethnicity, 
cultural diversity, empire, and ruling ideology.3 Among various elements and top-
ics related to Manchu distinctiveness, the Qing northeast has a special importance. 
As earlier studies have pointed out, Manchuria was the homeland of the Manchus 
and thus held very different meanings for the Ming and the Qing, respectively. 
While the Liaodong region during the Ming period was a place where different 
groups of people interacted and prepared the ground for the rise of the Jurchens-
cum-Manchus, the Qing northeast was carefully preserved in order to maintain 
the Manchus’ difference and separation from other ethnic groups. During the 
Ming period, as well as in the early twentieth century, Manchuria was a site of 
“the interacting migrations of peoples and cultures” and, therefore, a “reservoir” 
where people gathered.4 The Liaodong region under Ming rule was a typical zone 
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of “between-ness” and “transfrontier-ness,” where ethnic distinctions between the 
Han Chinese and the Jurchens were not clear-cut.5 Contrary to this trend, Qing 
Manchurian policy sought to keep contact among people to a minimum and to 
protect local ethnic groups from Han Chinese cultural and economic influence—
strategies aimed at maintaining this vital region as a reserve for Manchu identity 
and power.
Many studies written in Chinese have examined the Qing northeast, not neces-
sarily sharing the scholarly interests of the New Qing History in the area of Man-
chu distinctiveness.6 Their discussions of Qing policy in the northeast have mainly 
focused on the Willow Palisade (liutiaobian) and the restriction policy (fengjin), 
the specific institutions that the Qing court reinforced in Manchuria until the late 
nineteenth century. The Willow Palisade was built to divide Manchuria into three 
regions with distinct physical and cultural characteristics: a region of Han Chinese 
settlement in Fengtian, a Manchu preserve to the northeast, and land belonging 
to various allied Mongol princes. This physical barrier was designed to control 
people’s movements in the region and especially to limit Han Chinese immigra-
tion to Manchuria.7
The Qing court sought to preserve its native homeland from its Han Chinese 
subjects as a strategy to maintain its ethnic identity and military prowess in this 
restricted region. Furthermore, natural resources in Manchuria were strictly con-
trolled as a state monopoly. Throughout the Qing years, the state endeavored to 
restrict access to areas of Manchuria that contained economically profitable and 
politically critical natural resources. The eastern part of the Willow Palisade, in 
particular, was designed to exclude civilian exploiters from Shengjing and China 
proper from access to ginseng, furs, and pearls. This restriction policy was “eco-
nomically motivated to aid a politically privileged group,” namely, the Manchus.8 
The nature of the Manchu relationship to Manchuria changed over time, as Qing 
power expanded from the northeastern margin to China proper. However, the 
special interest of the Manchus in their sacred birthplace never diminished. As 
the Qing state consolidated its rule in the economically rich regions of China 
proper, the significance of Manchuria tended to shift from material concerns to 
the cultural preservation of the old Manchu traditions.9 After the 1644 conquest 
and during the Kangxi era, the Qing developed a deliberate state policy to pre-
serve, encourage, and prescribe hunting and gathering culture. The purpose of 
the Qing policy in Manchuria was not merely immediate material sustenance 
but rather “imperial foraging,” as David Bello puts it, which was intended to em-
body and maintain Manchu identity in Qing Manchuria. Given that the practice 
of archery and the activities necessary for foraging required isolated spaces, the 
closing of Manchuria was an appropriate strategy for Qing imperial foraging.10 
In fact, the Qing efforts to define “the nature of the empire’s frontiers” contin-
ued until the late nineteenth century. As Jonathan Schlesinger explains, the three 
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Manchurian treasures—pearls, sable, and ginseng—were the primary items gifted 
by early Manchu rulers to their neighbors and followers, representing “a form of 
intimacy characteristic of Manchu rule.” The Qing court monopolized the three 
precious Manchu treasures after the 1644 conquest, because it needed them not 
only as commercial items but as symbolic objects of Manchu ethnicity. “The na-
ture of this demand insisted upon authenticity, so that ginseng, pearls, and furs 
had to be produced the right way and gathered by the right people.”11 As such, the 
policy of conservation of Manchurian resources reflected the unique position of 
the northeastern region under Qing imperial rule.
These explorations of the special position of the northeastern region and its 
natural resources in the Qing empire can be richly complemented by proper at-
tention to Korean history and its connection to Manchuria. In her recent study, 
Evelyn Rawski correctly stresses the significance of Manchuria and the Korean 
peninsula for the purpose of “de-centering China from the perspective of the pe-
riphery rather than from the core.” She discusses Chosŏn Korea as well as Edo 
Japan in the context of “the geopolitical boundary of China’s northeast Asian fron-
tier,” an approach that challenges the conventional narratives of national history 
and further highlights the Chosŏn agency in the development of the Qing empire.12 
Her analysis of the contemporary debates between Chinese and Korean schol-
ars over Koguryŏ (C. Gaogouli) shows that the close connection of Manchuria to 
the Korean peninsula has been the defining factor in Chinese-Korean relations. 
Scholars of Chinese-Korean history have long emphasized that the triangular re-
lationship among China, Manchuria, and Korea had special importance in East 
Asian international relations. As long as Manchuria was contested, Gari Ledyard 
states, stable Sino-Korean relations were impossible, and even internal Korean 
stability could not be maintained. This lesson was well proven in the early seven-
teenth century, when the rise of the Manchus radically changed the relationship 
among China, Manchuria, and Korea.13 In fact, the history of the Jurchen chieftain 
Möngke Temür (K. Tong Maengga Ch’ŏmmoga; C. Mengtemu) in the early fifteenth 
century also provides a good example of the crucial role of Korea’s connection to 
Manchuria in the development of Chinese-Korean relations. This figure, who was 
revered as the forefather of the Manchu imperial family by the eighteenth-century 
Qing court, was in fact the leader of just one tribal group among many that com-
peted with one another between the Ming and Chosŏn states. The saga of Möngke 
Temür is, above all, evidence of the close relationship between the Manchus and 
the Koreans.14 As Kenneth Robinson describes, various forms of contact between 
the Jurchens and the Koreans in the fifteenth to sixteenth centuries showed that 
the Chosŏn northern region was “an economic frontier, linguistic frontier, status 
frontier, environmental frontier, trans-boundary frontier.”15
Of the three Manchurian treasures, ginseng holds the greatest significance for 
an examination of the special connections between the Manchus and Manchuria, 
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as well as the political relations between Qing China and Chosŏn Korea. The early 
Manchu state initially depended for its very existence on the natural resources 
produced in Manchuria, of which the most important was ginseng. Many scholars 
have shown that Nurhaci was active in the ginseng trade with the Ming, which 
strengthened economic ties between the Liaodong region and China proper. Mili-
tary power was not the only basis on which Nurhaci was able to rise and build the 
Manchu state: he acquired his economic strength from the ginseng trade.16 Most 
studies have emphasized that in contrast to previous dynasties, which had no sys-
tem of rule for ginseng production, the Manchus developed detailed regulations 
for ginseng prior to the 1644 conquest. The specific content and scope of these 
regulations changed over time, but the primary concern was to secure sufficient 
amounts of ginseng for imperial expenses and state revenue. A select group of 
people working for the imperial court and other imperial families were allowed to 
collect a given amount of ginseng; people without official permits were prohibited 
from accessing the ginseng-producing mountains; and traffic through Shanhai-
guan, Tianjin, Lüshun, and other ports on the Yalu River was regulated to limit 
illegal transportation of and trade in ginseng. The Qing court maintained strict 
controls on all aspects of ginseng collection, transport, and marketing well into the 
nineteenth century, since the ginseng monopoly was an important way of preserv-
ing the traditions of the early Manchu state.17 Accordingly, some studies estimate 
that during the eighteenth century ginseng profits still accounted for a substantial 
portion of Qing government revenue.18 For the Manchu rulers, as Van Jay Symons 
points out, “it was crucial to have independent sources of income to assure the 
financial stability of the ruling house.”19
Ginseng was only one of the three treasures of Manchuria, and only one of 
many goods that have at different times been imported and exported from Man-
churia. However, it appears more frequently than nearly any other good in the 
sources related to Qing-Chosŏn relations, whether as a vital diplomatic good 
provided by the Chosŏn court, as an important monopoly of the Qing court, or 
as an attractive target for smugglers. Extremely slow to mature, much valued as 
a medicinal root, but also small and light and easy to transport, it was chroni-
cally subject to overharvesting. The high value of ginseng inevitably brought both 
smugglers and legitimate ginseng diggers ever deeper into remote territories that 
would otherwise have been of limited concern to the Qing and Chosŏn courts. 
Eventually, it shaped, more than any other product, Qing-Chosŏn relations as well 
as Qing policy for the northeastern region.
Japanese scholarship has paid close attention to the connection between 
Qing Manchuria and Chosŏn Korea.20 Inaba Iwakichi and Imamura Tomo, in 
particular, have highlighted the significance of ginseng in Chinese-Korean rela-
tions.21 While explaining that Korean ginseng was primarily paid to the Chinese 
emperors as tribute and therefore symbolized the hierarchy between China and 
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Korea, Imamura also emphasizes that ginseng was the primary reason for illegal 
crossings and poaching between China and Korea.22 The rich natural resources, 
combined with the close connections and interactions between the Koreans and 
the Jurchens, invited ginseng exploiters from both sides to the Yalu and Tumen 
Rivers. The area south of the Yalu River, where the Chosŏn court decided to abol-
ish Korean settlement and cultivation by the mid-fifteenth century, had produced 
a good amount of ginseng and therefore attracted Jurchen poachers. After the 
Manchus moved to China proper, the Changbaishan region was preserved as the 
Manchu birthplace, but its abundant production of ginseng encouraged Korean 
exploiters to risk their lives to intrude into it. As long as Korean exploiters contin-
ued to harvest ginseng in Qing territories, Qing ginseng policy could not be only 
a matter of domestic politics and economy, narrowly applied to Manchuria; it 
had to be discussed as part of foreign relations with the Chosŏn. For this reason, 
ginseng has played an important role in Qing-Chosŏn relations.
TRIBUTARY REL ATIONS AND B OUNDARIES
It is actually the theory of tributary relations, not the idea of Manchu distinctive-
ness or Korean connections to Manchuria, that has long dominated the historiog-
raphy of Chinese-Korean relations. The conventional understanding of the tribu-
tary relationship between the two, based on John K. Fairbank’s interpretation, has 
emphasized the Sinocentric worldview, or “the Chinese world order,” in Qing for-
eign relations.23 The Fairbank model became overwhelmingly influential in studies 
of China and Asia, not only in US academia but in China and Korea as well. Many 
scholars of Qing history, however, have challenged this essentialized interpreta-
tion of China’s foreign relations and stressed that the definition of China has been 
ever-changing, dependent on China’s current relations with its neighbors.24 Recent 
studies of the Qing relationship with nomads on its own northwestern margin 
highlight the variety of ways in which the Qing dealt with its neighbors, including 
political marriages, religious patronage, commerce, diplomacy, and war.25 Nicola 
Di Cosmo states that the tribute trade in the northwest “was not a system, but 
rather a political, ritual, and economic environment that enabled the Qing to in-
teract with native peoples.”26 As Peter Perdue puts it, tributary relations in the Qing 
period were therefore “a kind of intercultural language, serving multiple purposes 
for its participants.”27 Diversity in Qing foreign relations is also found in the court’s 
contacts with various countries in Southeast Asia. Anthony Reid emphasizes that 
“each of China’s relationships with neighboring countries was unique and these 
relations changed radically over time; none can be said to have been understood 
in the same light on both sides.”28
Among the many neighbors of China, the Chosŏn, in particular, has long 
maintained a reputation as the preeminent and ideal tributary. Proponents of 
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the Sinocentric thesis have stressed that political powers in China and Korea 
have always maintained markedly hierarchical relations with one another and 
that the Chosŏn court dutifully preserved the practice of paying tribute to the 
Qing emperors during the period from 1637 to 1895.29 However, recent stud-
ies of Korean history have begun to explore a new way of looking at Qing-
Chosŏn relations from the perspective of Manchu distinctiveness. In contrast 
to the Sinocentric understanding, which tends to erase stories of the violent 
beginnings of Qing-Chosŏn history, this new research highlights the history of 
conflict and tensions under the disguise of tributary rituals. Anti-Manchu sen-
timent was prevalent at the Chosŏn court and was expressed in various ways, 
including the movement for a “northern expedition” (K. pukpŏl) to avenge the 
Manchu invasions and the establishment of a shrine for the Ming emperor in 
memory of his support for the Chosŏn against the Japanese invasions. As a 
way of overcoming the shame of their submission to the Qing and of dealing 
with a crisis of legitimacy, the Chosŏn literati began to claim that they were 
the last true heirs to the Ming and Chinese culture and, indeed, to civiliza-
tion itself, which they believed the Manchus took away from China.30 As Kye 
Seung explains, “Even though the Manchus ruled China, the Chosŏn elites 
lived in an imaginary Ming order, [by means of which] they [prolonged] Ming 
times under the reality of Manchu dominance.”31 The Chosŏn elites privately 
despised the Manchus as barbarians, even though the Chosŏn court continued 
to participate in the same tribute practices with the Qing that it had engaged in 
with the Ming. The practice of paying tribute and receiving rewards—although 
maintained for centuries between China and Korea—had notably different im-
plications at different times.
Appreciation of Manchu distinctiveness in Qing history can also be traced back 
to a new understanding of the status of the Chosŏn in the Qing world order. By 
challenging the conventional placement of the Chosŏn among the societies of the 
southeastern crescent,32 Ku Pŏmjin stresses instead that Qing policies concern-
ing Chosŏn affairs showed some similarities with those concerning Mongolia, 
Xinjiang, and Tibet in the northwest. While the Ryukyu and Vietnam, two other 
southeastern crescent societies, built a peaceful relationship with the Qing after 
the 1644 conquest, the Chosŏn joined the Qing imperial order as a result of violent 
wars. The Qing emissaries visiting the Chosŏn were, in fact, selected from among 
bannermen, not Han civil officials, and the same practice was followed for impe-
rial envoys dispatched to the northwestern region of the empire. In addition, the 
copperplate “Map with a Complete View of the Imperial Territories” (Huangyu 
quanlan tu), made in 1719, displayed the place names of China proper in Chinese 
characters but those of Manchuria and Korea in Manchu script.33 All these features 
demonstrate that Qing-Chosŏn relations under Manchu rule differed from those 
of the preceding era.
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Among the various issues that affected the two countries, their geographi-
cal adjacency—and the consequent debates over the movement of people—was 
a defining characteristic of Qing-Chosŏn relations. In fact, the name of the river 
between the respective realms of the Manchus and the Koreans, Yalu, means “the 
boundary between two fields” in the Manchu language.34 After the first Manchu 
invasion of Korea in 1627, Hong Taiji articulated a territorial division in their peace 
agreement with the Koreans, saying, “We two nations have now established peace. 
From today onward, let us each respect this agreement, each should observe the 
territories [geshou fengjiang], and refrain from disputing small matters and exces-
sive requirements.”35 The Aisin Gurun/Qing and the Chosŏn were separated by 
the Yalu and Tumen Rivers, an agreement that the two states mutually recognized. 
Despite Hong Taiji’s statement, however, the Qing-Chosŏn boundary would be 
subject to debate from the beginning to the end of their relations. Scholarly discus-
sions of the Qing-Chosŏn boundary have largely focused on two related events: 
the 1712 investigation of Changbaishan, and the surveys of the Tumen riverhead 
in the 1880s. The Kangxi emperor sent his Manchu official, Mu-ke-deng, to inves-
tigate the Changbaishan region together with Chosŏn officials, and they set up a 
stone stele at a place that they estimated to be the origin of the Yalu and Tumen 
Rivers. By the late nineteenth century, however, Korean immigrants north of the 
Tumen River argued that they actually lived in Chosŏn territory because there 
were two different Tumen Rivers. This debate over the Tumen riverhead—and 
thus the exact location of the Qing-Chosŏn territorial boundary—led the Qing 
and the Chosŏn to launch two surveys of the region in 1885 and 1887.
Gari Ledyard has analyzed in detail the dispatch of the Kangxi emperor’s emis-
sary Mu-ke-deng, his joint survey of the mountain ranges with Chosŏn officials, 
and the discussions that took place at the Chosŏn court after the survey; how-
ever, his analysis is situated in the context of the history of Korean cartography.36 
Andre Schmid explores the survey in the wider historical context of Korean ter-
ritoriality and sovereignty, emphasizing “the territorial limits of the Qing em-
pire together with the rather ambiguous, and contested, position of the Chosŏn 
within that empire.”37 By connecting the investigation of 1712 with the boundary 
debates of the 1880s, Schmid reveals an active interaction between nationalist 
and prenationalist discourses on Korea’s spatial understanding. Earlier investi-
gations of Changbaishan had already developed Korean ideas about territorial 
sovereignty, and the later debates over the Kando territory show that late nine-
teenth-century Chosŏn officials used the same vocabulary of sovereignty as had 
early eighteenth-century Korean scholars.38
Scholars of China and Korea have examined these events in detail, but they 
still contest the boundaries and claim territorial losses suffered by one or the 
other side. Zhang Cunwu argues that the Kangxi emperor and his Manchu of-
ficial were ignorant about history and geography: they did not know that the 
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Tumen River, where the Jurchens had lived, should be part of Qing territory, and 
they were unaware of the fact that Chosŏn territory was limited to areas south of 
Changbaishan, not demarcated by the rivers on the mountaintop. These mistakes 
on the part of the emperor and his man led to a substantial loss of Qing territories, 
Zhang argues, since the Chosŏn had always sought to expand north of the Tumen 
River and took advantage of the 1712 investigation of Changbaishan for territo-
rial extension.39 Li Huazi explains that the survey of 1712 confirmed the Yalu and 
Tumen Rivers as the Qing-Chosŏn boundary, but its failure to identify the cor-
rect location of the Tumen riverhead brought on a series of territorial debates 
and diplomatic conflicts in the late nineteenth century.40 Yang Zhaoquan and Sun 
Yumei discuss in detail the Qing-Chosŏn boundary surveys of the 1880s, noting 
that after the inspections, Korean immigrants and the Chosŏn court agreed that 
there was only one Tumen River. Korean immigrants in Qing territories changed 
their hairstyles and clothing and were registered as Qing subjects. In 1909, China 
and Japan reached an agreement that the Tumen represented the Chinese-Korean 
boundary. In spite of such clear historical evidence, Yang and Sun argue, some 
Korean scholars and newspapers have raised false claims on the Kando territory 
north of the Tumen, an area that has always been “an inseparable part of China’s 
territory since the ancient time,” where “various nations [gezu renmin] in China, 
such as the Manchu, Han, Korean, Mongol, and Hui peoples, have developed 
together.”41
Equally, some Korean scholars have insisted that the Chosŏn lost its northern 
territories as a result of the surveys and agreements of the nineteenth century.42 
However, Kim Hyŏngjong criticizes such Korean claims on the northern lands as 
a nationalist argument and instead stresses the need for a more careful analysis of 
the processes involved in the Chinese-Korean boundary investigations of the 1880s 
on the basis of relevant documents issued by the Qing and Chosŏn courts.43 Recent 
Korean studies have, in fact, considered the 1712 investigation in the context of the 
Chosŏn court’s and elites’ perceptions of their territory. Kang Sŏkhwa explains 
that for the eighteenth-century Chosŏn, the investigation of Changbaishan did not 
necessarily imply clear demarcation of the boundary with the Qing; instead, the 
Koreans saw it as official confirmation by the Qing that the south of Changbaishan 
was Chosŏn territory. Only after the erection of the stone stele on the mountain-
top, nearly a hundred years after Hong Taiji’s statement that “each should observe 
the territories,” did the Chosŏn court finally begin to pay delayed attention to its 
northern provinces.44 By analyzing a variety of Korean maps, Pae Usŏng has also 
examined how the Chosŏn court and literati understood their northern provinces 
after the 1712 investigation and how the Koreans described the geography of the 
boundary in visual images. The eighteenth-century Chosŏn had increasing inter-
est in Qing Manchuria as well as in its own northern provinces, and it sought to 
import new geographic knowledge from China. As Pae Usŏng points out, some 
12    Introduction
Korean maps from this period, evidently influenced by Qing geographic refer-
ences, are a reflection of Korean conceptions of territories and boundaries, which 
were shaped by their understanding of Qing-Chosŏn relations and the place of the 
Chosŏn in the world.45
The responses of the Chosŏn court and literati to the 1712 Changbaishan inves-
tigation show that a seemingly unexceptionable statement—“The Yalu and Tumen 
Rivers serve as the Chinese-Korean boundary”—was not taken for granted by the 
courts or the people of the Qing and the Chosŏn, and that therefore their ideas 
about territoriality require more careful scrutiny. Since Nurhaci and Hong Taiji 
built the Jurchen/Manchu state, the Aisin Gurun/Qing and the Chosŏn agreed 
that the Yalu and Tumen Rivers separated the two states. However, the exact ways 
in which their spatial realms and limits of rulership were to be conceived, man-
aged, and enforced were open to interpretation. Furthermore, their discussions 
about how to control the movement of people in the areas near the Yalu and 
Tumen Rivers and how to maintain security at the boundary varied depend-
ing on the specific locations and contexts of their concerns. The Qing-Chosŏn 
conversations about their shared boundary had always followed the norms and 
rhetoric of the tributary relationship; however, their ideas about how to protect 
and maintain their territories and sovereignty, masked by the words of the tribu-
tary relationship, were not the same. The ways in which the Qing and Chosŏn 
courts discussed and managed the Yalu and Tumen Rivers and Changbaishan in 
the eighteenth century differed from those in the late nineteenth century, when 
the two states’ relations were undergoing significant change. Consequently, the 
nature of the Qing-Chosŏn boundary needs to be explored within the specific 
context of Qing-Chosŏn relations, which were distinct from Jurchen-Chosŏn re-
lations as well as from the Chinese-Korean relations of modern times.
TERRITORIALIT Y AND SOVEREIGNT Y
The debate over the Mangniushao guard post in 1745 provides an excellent illus-
tration of the respective conceptions and practices of territory and sovereignty of 
the Qing and the Chosŏn. Conventional studies have explained restrictions on 
access to the boundary (C. bianjin; K. pyŏn’gŭm) and the creation of the empty 
space (C. outuo; K. kut’al) at the Yalu River as an outcome of either Qing impe-
rial benevolence toward the inferior Chosŏn court or the two states’ negligence 
in securing the boundary. As for the failed attempt to erect a guard post on the 
Yalu River, Zhang Cunwu, Li Huazi, and Zhang Jie and Zhang Danhui all contend 
that the emperor’s well-intentioned decision became a misguided precedent that 
constrained Qing efforts to open up the Yalu River and invited only confusion 
regarding the boundary with the Chosŏn. As a consequence, they argue, the Qing 
lost control over its own territory, while the Chosŏn succeeded in protecting its 
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territory against the Qing.46 Sun Chunri explains that the empty space was a good 
reflection that the Qing imposed a tolerant policy in the Qing-Chosŏn boundary 
and respected the concerns of the Chosŏn in many aspects.47 In contrast, Inaba 
Iwakichi has described the empty land as a result of undefined boundaries, claim-
ing that “the boundaries at that time were not a clear line but something similar 
to a zone.” Inaba further argues that Hong Taiji endorsed the uninhabited zone at 
the boundary as a way of protecting his territory from Korean trespassing and that 
the Qianlong emperor’s decision to reject the Mangniushao post was not only due 
to “the favor of the emperor in Beijing” but also related to “the capability of the 
Chosŏn” to safeguard their territory.48
As for the guardpost at the Yalu River, Pae Usŏng addresses the particular na-
ture of Qing and Chosŏn ideas about their boundaries and territories. The primary 
strategy of the Chosŏn in boundary negotiations with the Qing was to emphasize 
the hierarchical nature of their tributary relations and to remind the great country 
of its obligation to protect the small country. As Pae points out, “Today it is gener-
ally considered unacceptable for a modern nation-state to solve issues related to 
territorial boundaries through petitions to its neighbor.”49 The two states agreed 
that the imposition of an uninhabited zone at the boundary neither undermined 
Qing imperial authority nor violated the territorial sovereignty of either party; 
instead, both concluded that the restrictions on access to the boundary would pre-
vent people from trespassing and eventually help protect their territories and rela-
tions. This idea of territory and sovereignty cannot be fully explained only by the 
rhetoric of the tributary relationship, such as imperial benevolence toward a small 
tributary state. The creation and maintenance of an empty space at the boundary 
should be seen as a reflection of Qing and Chosŏn conceptions and practices of 
territorial boundaries, which differ from those that we find among modern states.
The history of Siam provides a useful example of how different conceptions 
and practices of territory and sovereignty emerged, confronted, and negotiated 
with each other. Nineteenth-century Siam experienced a clash between its tradi-
tional ideas about boundaries and those of the British. While the modern bound-
ary, as the British understood it, lay between neighboring countries, the boundary 
of sovereign authority in premodern Siam was well inside the margins. If modern 
boundaries must be clear-cut and leave no space between states, premodern mar-
gins of states were often “a thick line with a broad horizontal context,” “ambiguous 
and overlapped.” Therefore, “sovereignty and border were not coterminous.  .  .  . 
The political sphere could be mapped only by power relations, not by territorial 
integrity.”50 Different conceptions of boundaries are also found in nineteenth-
century Japan. Bruce Batten explains that the boundaries of modern societies refer 
to clearly demarcated lines, whereas premodern societies such as Tokugawa Japan 
had zonal frontiers with poorly defined territorial limits.51 David Howell has also 
explored Japan’s transition to a modern state by analyzing the transformation of 
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the Ainu ethnicity and its boundaries. While the Tokugawa shogunate treated its 
peripheries, such as Hokkaido and the Ryukyu Islands, as something between a 
subordinate part and an independent entity, the Meiji government claimed full 
sovereignty over these areas and therefore “redefined Japan’s political boundar-
ies in terms of Western notions of international laws.”52 The cases of Siam and 
Tokugawa Japan demonstrate that a country’s conceptions and practice of bound-
aries can be different at different times and that new ideas about territory and 
sovereignty reflect changes in relations with its neighbors.
In order to clarify the nature of Qing-Chosŏn territorial boundaries and po-
litical relations, it is useful to refer to the various terms for boundaries that have 
been applied to different times and places.53 Bradley Parker and Lars Rodseth 
define a border as “a legally recognized line, fixed in a particular space, meant to 
mark off one political or administrative unit from another—a boundary between 
sovereign polities such as states and empires.” “Frontier” is different from “bor-
der,” because the former is “a vaguely defined boundary—a region rather than 
a line, and a zone of transition between two core areas.”54 Jeremy Adelman and 
Stephen Aron put forward the terms “borderland” and “bordered land” in an ef-
fort to revise old frontier narratives: “While frontiers are cultural meeting places 
where geographic and cultural borders were not clearly defined, borderlands 
were zones of interaction and rivalry among empires and contested boundaries 
between colonial domains.” With the rise of modern nation-states, the fluid and 
inclusive space of borderland became the more bounded and territorialized space 
of bordered land.55 In the context of imperial China, Peter Perdue points out that 
the term bianjiang was frequently used to mean both a broad zone (bian) and a 
defined border (jiang). This term shows “a consciousness both of remote zones 
beyond the realm of orderly rule, and the awareness of the need to construct for-
tified borders to defend against attacks by rival states.”56
Throughout their long relationship, the Qing and the Chosŏn agreed that the 
Yalu and Tumen Rivers constituted the boundary between them. The bound-
ary was not necessarily vaguely defined, given that the two states tried to con-
duct a field survey, as shown by the 1712 Changbaishan investigation, and also 
dispatched soldiers to patrol the riverbanks, as suggested by the debates over the 
Mangniushao guard post at the Yalu River. However, their efforts to investigate 
and control the boundary, though similar to those of modern states, did not make 
their territorial limits into clearly drawn lines. The exact location of the Tumen 
riverhead remained unclear largely because of the Chosŏn court’s reluctance to 
clarify it; the vast expanse of land at the Yalu River was kept off-limits and empty 
by the agreement between the two states. The Qing-Chosŏn boundary thus had 
features of both a vague zone and a distinct line. Some parts of the boundary were 
clearly demarcated; other parts, especially the upper Tumen River, remained un-
clear. The nature of the Qing-Chosŏn boundary was shaped by the deliberate plans 
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and mutual agreement of the two states for the purpose of protecting the territory 
and rulership of each.
In order to stress the particular characteristics of the Qing and Chosŏn con-
ceptions and practice of boundary and sovereignty, this study differentiates the 
Qing-Chosŏn borderland from the Jurchen-Chosŏn frontier as well as from the 
modern Chinese-Korean border. “Frontier” refers to an undefined zone between 
distinct political or social entities, such as the Jurchen tribes and the Chosŏn or the 
Jurchens and the Ming, whose power relations were often asymmetrical, with one 
being more powerful and tending to extend its influence over the other. “Border” 
is a defined boundary between two neighboring powers, such as modern China 
and Korea, a product of the emergence of the nation-state with its attendant con-
sciousness of sovereignty and territory. “Borderland,” the term I use to denote the 
nature of the boundary between the Qing and the Chosŏn, includes features of the 
frontier and of the border.57 “Borderland” in this book refers not to the concrete 
strip of land between the two countries but to the significance of this area as a 
zone of demarcation, a site at which the two neighbors encountered one another 
and clashed but nonetheless recognized their mutual boundary. Beyond the spe-
cific meanings and contexts of frontier, borderland, and border, “boundary” in 
this study is a general term for the territorial limits of a country, and “trespassing” 
means a violation of a neighboring country’s territory.
• • •
This book explores the ways in which the Qing-Chosŏn borderland was managed 
under the dual principles of Qing restrictions in Manchuria and the Qing-Chosŏn 
tributary relationship. The special status of Manchuria in the Qing empire and 
the attendant constraints on entry to the region, together with the active agency 
of the Chosŏn court within its asymmetrical relationship with the powerful Qing, 
created an uninhabited stretch of land at the Yalu River and unclear territorial 
claims on the upper Tumen River. These two defining features of the Qing-Chosŏn 
borderland were the source of persistent confusion and disagreement regarding 
the two neighbors’ territorial sovereignty over the next century. First, the study 
explores the transition from frontier to borderland, which took place in the early 
seventeenth century. It then analyzes three topics in close detail to highlight the 
characteristics of the Qing-Chosŏn borderland: the 1712 investigation of Chang-
baishan, control of areas to the north of the Yalu River, and the Chosŏn embassy’s 
trade at the Fenghuangcheng gate. Finally, it examines the process through which 
the Qing-Chosŏn borderland was replaced by a border, as the two states faced a 
new political situation in the late nineteenth century.
The first chapter, “From Frontier to Borderland,” addresses the early history 
of Qing-Chosŏn relations. By the late fourteenth century, various groups of Ju-
rchen tribes had settled near the Yalu and Tumen Rivers and the Changbaishan 
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mountains. Ming authority beyond the Liaodong region was largely symbolic; the 
Chosŏn established its own hierarchical relationship with the Jurchens and shared 
with the latter the territory and its natural resources, most notably ginseng. By the 
end of the sixteenth century when the Jianzhou Jurchens emerged, the triangular 
relations among the Ming, the Chosŏn, and the Jurchens were no longer main-
tained, and their unclear frontiers were in need of redefinition. As a result of its 
two military campaigns against Korea in 1627 and 1637, the Aisin Gurun/Qing suc-
cessfully imposed a hierarchical tributary relationship on the Chosŏn and agreed 
to make the Yalu and Tumen Rivers the boundary between the two. The Manchus 
were no more the uncivilized “wild people” but rather became the rulers of the 
imperial court; the Koreans, on the other hand, were no longer allowed to cross 
the rivers in search of ginseng and animals. Manchuria and its natural resources 
came to belong exclusively to the Manchus, a monopoly that remained intact until 
the mid-nineteenth century.
Manchuria in general, and the special interest in ginseng in particular, largely 
defined Qing policy in the northeastern region and shaped Qing ideas and plans 
for its boundary with the Chosŏn. The second chapter, “Making the Borderland,” 
explains that the Kangxi emperor’s interest in Changbaishan was part of his ef-
forts to preserve Manchuria and its ginseng for the Manchus only. Commercial 
profits from Manchuria’s natural resources and its political significance as the 
Qing court’s sacred birthplace granted Changbaishan special status in the Qing 
empire. Korean trespassing for the purpose of ginseng poaching in Qing terri-
tory prompted the Kangxi emperor to launch the investigation of Changbaishan 
as well as of the Yalu and Tumen Rivers. The investigation left an unclear area on 
the upper Tumen River. This outcome enabled the Qing emperor to demonstrate 
his imperial authority at the margins of his empire, while the Koreans received 
confirmation of Chosŏn territorial sovereignty over areas to the south of the Yalu 
and Tumen Rivers. Chapter 3, “Managing the Borderland,” shows that the ginseng 
monopoly continued to define Qing restrictions in the northeast as well as the 
boundary with the Chosŏn throughout the eighteenth century. The Yongzheng 
and Qianlong emperors initially agreed with their Manchu officials who sought to 
build a military guard post on the Yalu River in order to strengthen security in the 
ginseng-producing preserves. However, the Qing emperors eventually decided to 
clear the vast territory to the north of the Yalu River and to maintain the empty 
buffer zone that separated the Qing realm from that of the Chosŏn. This uninhab-
ited and restricted land made the Qing-Chosŏn boundary a thick demarcating 
line. Chapter 4, “Movement of People and Money,” describes the unexpected ways 
in which the empty space at the boundary attracted people and goods and became 
a meeting place between local Qing people and Chosŏn visitors. The gate into 
Qing territory was officially opened to the Chosŏn tributary embassy, and Korean 
merchants took advantage of the enforced vacuum at the boundary to increase 
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opportunities for trade with the Qing. As a consequence, the tributary relations 
disruptively commercialized the Qing-Chosŏn borderland.
Until the end of their tributary relations in 1895, the Qing court stressed the 
inferior status of Chosŏn Korea in order to demonstrate the emperor’s promi-
nence and legitimacy as the Son of Heaven. The Chosŏn government, in turn, 
used this relationship to protect its territory, sovereignty, and commercial profits. 
The Chosŏn court relied on the rhetoric of the tributary relationship in every dis-
cussion with the Qing. When the Kangxi emperor sent his emissary to investigate 
the Changbaishan mountain range, the Chosŏn court complimented the emperor 
on his care for the small country, on the one hand, but intentionally left the source 
of the upper Tumen River unclear, on the other. During a series of efforts on the 
part of the Yongzheng and Qianlong emperors to strengthen security at the Yalu 
River, the Chosŏn court again employed the language of the tributary relationship 
and eventually succeeded in preventing Qing soldiers from approaching Chosŏn 
territory. The development of trade in the area near the Yalu River was the direct 
result of regular and frequent visits by Korean embassies to Beijing. The Chosŏn 
king was not intimidated into letting the Qing court rule his country. Instead, 
by repeatedly stressing the fundamental principle of the tributary relationship—
namely, the great country’s unlimited benevolence toward the small country—the 
Chosŏn court actually endeavored to secure the Qing empire’s recognition of 
Chosŏn authority in Korea.
As long as the Qing court saw a complementarity between the empty space at 
the Chosŏn boundary and its policy of restricting entry to Manchuria, the potential 
of confusion over territorial limits and the concrete difficulties in boundary control 
were not a serious concern. That the origin of the Tumen River was left unclear, that 
the vast terrain between the Willow Palisade and the Yalu River remained off-limits 
and uninhabited, and that Korean merchants were actively engaged with Qing mer-
chants in Fenghuangcheng were not overly threatening to Qing-Chosŏn relations. 
In fact, a certain level of confusion and ambiguity was acceptable if it served the 
asymmetrical relations between the two countries. Chapter 5, “From Borderland 
to Border,” traces the changes that took place at the Qing-Chosŏn boundary in the 
nineteenth century. After centuries of exploitation, wild ginseng became scarce in 
Manchuria; instead, people multiplied and occupied the land. A massive influx of 
Han immigrants circumvented Qing restrictions and settled in the supposedly re-
stricted areas of Manchuria, including those at the Chosŏn boundary. Later, increas-
ing numbers of Korean immigrants crossed the Tumen River in order to inhabit 
Qing territory. Before, the ambiguity inherent in the empty space between the great 
country and the small country had been endured and perhaps even respected. But 
it was no longer acceptable in the late nineteenth century, when the two countries 
had to redefine their relations based on the modern international order. The Qing-



















In the summer of 1595, Nurhaci received a three-day visit from a Ming official 
and a Korean interpreter who had come to Fe Ala to discuss Jurchen transgres-
sions into Chosŏn territory that had happened three years earlier.1 At the time 
of these transgressions, Nurhaci had complained to the Chosŏn court that when 
Korean soldiers arrested Jurchens for poaching ginseng in Chosŏn territory, they 
beheaded and even skinned them as punishment. In response to Nurhaci’s com-
plaint, the Chosŏn king, Sŏnjo (r. 1567–1608), had asked the Ming general, Yang 
Hao, who was in Korea at the time to deal with the Japanese invasion, to send the 
Jianzhou Jurchens a letter stating firmly that “the boundaries [K. ponggang] under 
heaven should be clearly demarcated and therefore you should not dare to co-
vertly communicate with Koreans without the permission of the Heavenly Court 
[K. ch’ŏnjo].”2 Three years later, when Nurhaci received his visitors in Fe Ala, he 
admitted that he still sought revenge for the Korean soldiers’ excessive behavior. 
But he also added that “since the Ming persuaded the Chosŏn to send an official 
to me, I hope to maintain a friendly relationship with you.” He blamed the twenty-
seven Jurchens who had violated Chosŏn territory for risking their own lives and 
promised that in the future Jurchen trespassers would be most severely punished 
at his own hand. Then he treated his Korean guests to a good meal.3
Nurhaci had to put up with his own people being treated as “barbarous wild 
people,” but his successor, Hong Taiji, did not tolerate such humiliation in his re-
lations with the Ming or the Chosŏn. After establishing his superior standing to 
the Chosŏn with the successful military campaign of 1627, the khan of the Aisin 
Gurun began to press the Chosŏn to stop Koreans from entering Jurchen territory 
to collect ginseng. In his letter to the Chosŏn king Injo (r. 1623–49) in 1633, Hong 
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Taiji complained that ginseng poaching by Koreans caused significant damage to 
the Jurchen ginseng trade:
The price of ginseng used to be set at sixteen liang per jin. However, you are now 
saying, “Since we Koreans do not use ginseng, we can pay only nine liang per jin. If 
you Jurchens do not agree with this price, we will not trade.” You are simply breaking 
your previous promise for the purpose of letting the price fall. You say that Koreans 
do not use ginseng. Then what makes your people collect useless ginseng by trespass-
ing on and stealing from our land?4
By analyzing the incidents of trespassing and the competition for ginseng be-
tween the Aisin Gurun and the Chosŏn, this chapter addresses the transition of 
the Jurchen state to the Qing empire from three perspectives. First, the history 
of the Jurchens needs to be discussed in terms of their dual relations with the 
Ming and the Chosŏn, each of whom they had been subservient to and depen-
dent on, both politically and economically. Ming authority had reached beyond 
China proper to Liaodong and the Korean peninsula, so both the Jurchens and the 
Koreans had paid tribute to the Ming emperor. While serving the Son of Heaven, 
the Chosŏn court simultaneously strove to subjugate the Jurchens under its own 
influence. It was, in fact, trade relations that enabled the Ming and the Chosŏn to 
control the Jurchens. The underdeveloped economy of Jurchen society made it 
very dependent on commercial exchanges with the Ming Chinese and the Chosŏn 
Koreans, who in turn used trade as a means of curbing the unruly Jurchens. Un-
expectedly, however, the resulting close economic ties helped the Jurchens grow 
beyond the reach of the Ming and the Chosŏn, eventually breaking up their trian-
gular relationship.
Second, this chapter emphasizes that ginseng came to hold different mean-
ings as the Jurchens transformed themselves into the Manchus. Ginseng used to 
be just one of many commercial items that the Jurchens traded with the Ming 
Chinese for products from China proper. Later, as the commercial value of gin-
seng rose, the areas where it grew became more important for Jurchen society, 
politics, and diplomacy. Ginseng became the symbol of the Jurchens themselves, 
as well as a physical marker to indicate the limits of Jurchen territory. When Hong 
Taiji founded the Qing dynasty and defeated the Chosŏn, he enforced the Qing 
monopoly on ginseng production at the Chosŏn boundary. After having estab-
lished clear suzerainty over the Chosŏn court, the Qing was able to forcefully 
prohibit Koreans from harvesting ginseng in the areas near the Yalu River and the 
Changbaishan area in a manner that had previously been impossible.
Lastly, this chapter describes the transformation of the Jurchen-Chosŏn fron-
tier to the Qing-Chosŏn borderland. The Liaodong region under Ming rule offers 
a typical case study of a frontier at which the ethnic lines between people were not 
clearly defined. The establishment of the Aisin Gurun, however, put an end to the 
tolerance for such vagueness at the Liaodong frontier. Hong Taiji sought to build 
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a country whose boundaries with its neighbors were clearly marked. Nonetheless, 
he did not manage to establish a clear line between Chosŏn territory and his own; 
instead, his successors inherited a borderland, a site of more pronounced demar-
cation but still with a certain ambiguity.
THE LIAOD ONG FRONTIER AND GINSENG
During the Ming dynasty, various Jurchen groups lived scattered throughout a 
vast region stretching from the Heilongjiang River in the north to the Liaodong 
and Korean peninsulas in the south, and from Shanhaiguan in the west to the East 
Sea in the east. This region, better known to contemporary readers as Manchuria,5 
is surrounded by three mountain ranges: the Great Xing’an in the west, the Lesser 
Xing’an in the north, and Changbai in the east. The Argun River flows from the 
northwest of the Great Xing’an Mountains, passing Inner Mongolia to meet the 
Heilongjiang and merging with the Ussuri River to flow into the Sea of Okhotsk. 
The Heilongjiang divides Manchuria from Russia, and the Tumen serves as its 
boundary with Korea.6 This huge region is also divided into four zones by geo-
graphic features and primary economic characteristics. The first zone is the lower 
Liao River plain, a region with rich and fertile soil suitable for agriculture and 
primarily populated by Han Chinese. This plain is linked to northern China by 
Shanhaiguan at the eastern end of the Great Wall. The second zone is the western 
steppe of the Liao River (Liaoxi), the area near the Great Xing’an range and the 
western part of Jilin and Liaoning. It is a semiarid region, with twelve inches of 
precipitation per year. This region is the home of pastoral nomads, who originated 
on the Mongolian steppe but later established a close relationship with the farmers 
of the Liao River plain. The third and largest zone includes the heavy forests bor-
dering Korea and Siberia, where the local people developed a mixed economy of 
stock raising and agriculture. Hunting fur-bearing animals was also an important 
business in the forest areas near the mountain ranges. Lastly, there is a maritime 
coastal zone in the far north, near the Heilongjiang and the Ussuri. This northern 
region has rich land, but its severe winters allow only hunting and fishing, not 
agriculture.7
Another name for the Jurchen homeland was Liaodong, literally meaning “east 
of the Liao River.” The geographical boundaries of Liaodong had, in fact, changed 
over time, reflecting the historical development of relations between the people in 
China proper and those living on the frontier. During the Warring States period 
(403–221 BCE), when the Yan dynasty established an administrative site in Liao-
yang and sought to check raids by the local people, the name Liao indicated the 
contemporary Liaoning Province. In 668, when the early Tang ruler subjugated 
the Koguryŏ, one of the three kingdoms in Korea, the northeastern frontier, in ad-
dition to the northern part of the Korean peninsula, was put under the control of 
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the Andong commander (Andong duhufu). At this point, Liaodong encompassed 
a broad swath of the northeast frontier beyond Shanhaiguan, not just the narrow 
district of Liaodong. When the Liao (916–1125) and successive Jin (1114–1234) dy-
nasties ruled this area, the name Liaodong became widely used to indicate a broad 
region comprising three contemporary northeastern provinces. During the Yuan 
period (1206–1391), the name Northeast (Dongbei) first came to signify not only 
a geographical direction—the northeast of the center—but also a region with its 
own characteristics and significance. Under Ming rule, the Liaodong frontier was 
set apart from China proper by Shanhaiguan and was therefore often called “east 
of the pass” (guandong), “outside the pass” (guanwai), or “east of the Liao River” 
(Liaozuo).8 The Liaodong frontier discussed in this chapter generally refers to the 
southern part of Manchuria.
Of the many natural resources available in Liaodong, the most prominent 
was ginseng. Growing between 30 and 48 degrees north latitude, it is found in 
Changbaishan, Jilin, and Heilongjiang in China, in present-day Primorsky Krai 
in Russia, and throughout the entire Korean peninsula. It is all the more valuable 
when found in the wild, where it grows much more slowly than cultivated ginseng.9 
Ginseng lives indefinitely, with only its leaves dying at the end of every season. After 
the leaves die, a bud scar is left on the neck of the root; this marker serves as the ba-
sis for estimating the plant’s age. Age is the defining factor in determining the value 
of ginseng: the older it is, the more expensive it will be.10 The shape of the plant is 
another important characteristic. The significant resemblance of ginseng to the hu-
man figure, especially the torso and legs, gave it names such as “man-shaped root” 
or “man-root.” The Annotated Collections of Materia Medica (Bencao jing jizhu), a 
Chinese medical book written in the late fifth century, emphasizes the visual simi-
larity of ginseng and the human body as the key element of the root’s medical effi-
cacy: “Ginseng is also called the mysterious root [shencao] or the energy of the earth 
[tujing].  .  .  . The one that resembles the human figure is particularly miraculous 
[youshen].”11 Folklore holds that the more the root resembles a human shape, the 
more potent its healing properties and the greater its worth.12
The medical efficacy of ginseng has a long reputation in East Asia.13 It is well 
known that the first emperor of the Qin dynasty, who sought longevity and im-
mortality, dispatched a group of three thousand young men and women to the 
mountains of a remote eastern area that produced the “divine herb.” This area was 
later assumed to have been located either in Japan or on Cheju Island in Korea, 
and the herb they were searching for was ginseng. Taoism and Buddhism, both 
having great influence, considered the medical effects of ginseng a great mystery. 
An early Chinese medical book, the Compendium of Materia Medica (Bencao 
gangmu), introduced the medical potency of ginseng in this way:
In order to test for the true ginseng, two persons walk together, one with a piece of 
ginseng root in his mouth and the other with his mouth empty. If at the end of three 
Figure 1. Ginseng. From Li Shizhen, Bencao gangmu (Compendium of Materia Medica), 
(Taipei: Shangwuyin shuguan, 1968), juan 2, tu, juan shang, 24.
24    From Frontier to Borderland
to five li, the one with ginseng in his mouth does not feel himself tired, while the 
other is out of breath, that is genuine ginseng root.14
By the seventeenth century, knowledge of ginseng’s medical efficacy had also 
spread to Europe via Jesuit missionaries. Notably, the French priest Pierre Jartoux 
(1680–1720), who accompanied an imperial tour to Manchuria, reported on the 
antifatigue properties of ginseng as “a sovereign remedy for all weakness occa-
sioned by excessive fatigues either of body or mind.”15
Due to its medical efficacy, mysterious age, rarity, and physical features, ginseng 
has always been a favorite subject of folktales and legends.16 According to these 
tales, ginseng can transform itself into a human being or an animal such as a tiger 
or a bird. Ginseng is believed to have various means of self-protection in order to 
evade discovery by humans, such as the ability to multiply the number of plants 
that look similar to it. Folktales also connect ginseng to tigers, which are thought 
to protect the roots, a story that makes sense because ginseng and tigers are the 
two symbols of Manchuria.17 All of these legends about ginseng’s medical efficacy 
and extreme rarity demonstrate the high respect ginseng has commanded over 
the centuries.
By the Song period (960–1126), the ginseng consumed in China proper came 
largely from the area of Shangdang in Shanxi or from the Korean peninsula. It was 
not until the Liaodong people founded the Liao and Jin dynasties that Liaodong 
ginseng became more widely known. The Jurchens lived in the areas surrounded 
by deep forests—in particular Changbaishan—where ginseng mostly grew, so they 
gathered it to pay as taxes or to trade. Especially during the Jin dynasty, ginseng 
gathering was extended to the areas of Kaiyuan and Liaoyang. When the Mongols 
defeated the Jin in 1234 and the Jurchen trade in ginseng also declined, ginseng 
consumers in China proper had to depend on the Korean supply.18 Later, in the 
Ming period, ginseng from Shangdang was overexploited and replaced with roots 
from Liaodong, which were considered to have higher medical potency. Manchu-
rian ginseng subsequently achieved its greatest fame during the Ming and Qing 
periods, and all the state policies regarding ginseng production, collection, and 
trade were directed at this region.19
THE JURCHENS IN MING CHINA’S  NORTHEAST
When the Ming dynasty defeated the Mongols and claimed China proper, Liao-
dong was largely occupied by Jurchen and Mongol populations.20 The Ming 
distinguished between three groups of Jurchens—the Wild Jurchens, the Haixi 
Jurchens, and the Jianzhou Jurchens—but collectively called them “wild people” 
(yeren).21 The Wild Jurchens, whose name arguably came from their inferior cul-
tural status vis-à-vis the two other groups, included various tribes such as the 
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Hūrha, the Weji (or Udike), and the Warka. The Haixi Jurchens were named after 
the Sungari (Songhua) River, which was previously called the Haixi River. They 
were scattered south of the Heilongjiang, east of the Nonni River, and along the 
various tributaries of the Sungari River, where the Mongols’ cultural influence re-
mained strongest.22 The last group, the Jianzhou Jurchens, occupied the area near 
the Mudan River, Ningguta, Sanxing (Yilan), and Changbaishan, making their liv-
ing through pearl and ginseng gathering, spinning, and weaving. They mixed with 
Han Chinese and Koreans and were therefore more exposed to agriculture and a 
sedentary lifestyle.23
The Jurchen populations in Liaodong were placed under the loose control of 
the Ming regional military commission of Liaodong (Liaodong duzhihui shisi), 
which was established in Liaoyang after the Ming armies defeated the Mongols 
in Liaodong in 1371.24 The Ming authorities established Jurchen guards (wei) and 
posts (suo) and granted Jurchen tribal rulers a variety of official titles, such as re-
gional military commissioner (duzhihuishi) and battalion commander (qianhu), 
along with certificates (luyin) that allowed these individuals to visit Beijing to pay 
tribute. The Jianzhou Jurchens were one of the early Jurchen groups who were in-
corporated into the Ming guard and post system in 1403.25 The local peoples living 
along the Heilongjiang, Sungari, and Ussuri Rivers, falling outside the jurisdiction 
of the Liaodong military commission, were put under the Nurgan regional mili-
tary commission (Nurgan duzhihui shisi), which was established in 1409. After the 
first quarter of the fifteenth century, however, the Nurgan military commission 
existed in name only. By the late sixteenth century, the number of Jurchen guards 
and posts under the Liaodong military commission had increased to as many as 
384 guards and twenty-four posts.26
The Liaodong Frontier Wall (bianqiang) served as the physical barrier separat-
ing the Liaodong military commission from the areas outside of its control. The 
wall stretched from Shanhaiguan to Kaiyuan and southward to the Yalu River, with 
a total length of two thousand li and the shape of the roman letter M. The west-
ern side of the wall was built first, with the purpose of fending off the Uriangkha 
(Wuliangha) and other Mongol tribes; the eastern length was built later to control 
the Jianzhou and Haixi Jurchens. Seven passes (kou) and ninety-two posts (bao) 
were built along the wall for the purpose of designating areas for Han Chinese, 
Mongols, and Jurchens and to protect China proper from the frontier tribes. Each 
group of Mongols and Jurchens was assigned a specific location and a time for its 
visit to Ming territory.27 In fact, as Inaba Iwakichi has pointed out, it is doubtful 
whether the Ming authorities were truly capable of ruling the whole area in which 
they granted titles; it is more likely that Han Chinese had largely lived in the areas 
between Fushun, Qinghe, and Lianshanguan, so the Ming people considered Lian-
shanguan “a boundary between the civilized and the uncivilized.”28 As this remark 
explains, the presence of Ming guards and posts did not necessarily mean that 
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the Ming had full authority over the Jurchens or Mongols in the area. Instead, the 
tribal leaders presented tributes and followed the proper rituals at the Ming court 
in exchange for receiving official titles, which in turn provided them with access to 
Ming markets and commercial privileges. Beyond the Liaodong Frontier Wall lay 
the outside of the Ming realm (bianwai), and the wall was a visible indicator of the 
limits of Ming power in Liaodong.29
The primary reason for Jurchen and Mongol recognition of Ming authority in 
Liaodong was the economic benefits that accompanied the tributary relationship 
with the Ming. Every year, a thousand Haixi Jurchens and five hundred Jianzhou 
Jurchens traveled to Kaiyuan to present to the Ming emperor their local products, 
including horses, sable skins, gyrfalcons, wax, walrus teeth, and ginseng.30 In re-
turn, they were awarded silk and gifts, whose amounts depended on their ranks 
and official titles. These presents from the Ming court were usually more valuable 
than the tributes offered by the Jurchens, so the Jurchen rulers were able to realize 
huge profits from their visits to Beijing. By the late sixteenth century, the presents 
were given in silver, not in kind, an important change that brought even more 
benefits to the Jurchen visitors and thus further fueled competition among tribal 
rulers for an invitation from the emperor.31
Private trade at frontier markets was another type of economic benefit that the 
Jurchens enjoyed as a result of their relationship with the Ming. Since the number 
of Jurchen visitors to Beijing and the value of the Ming presents they received were 
always limited, the Jurchens wanted access to markets near their residence. The 
first market for the Jurchens was opened in Ming Liaodong in 1405. It was often 
called the “horse market” (mashi) or “timber market” (mushi), although trading 
items also included Chinese iron products and agricultural tools, Jurchen ginseng 
and furs, and Mongol horses and oxen.32 By the end of the Ming era, there were a 
total of fourteen such markets, of which those in Guangning, Kaiyuan, and Fushun 
were the biggest. Each tribal group was assigned a specific place to trade.33 All of 
these markets were built at strategically important passes along the Liaodong Fron-
tier Wall; they were placed near fortresses, with city walls and a watchtower, and in 
locations where grass and water were available for animals. Special “officials of the 
horse market” (mashiguan) were appointed to three-year positions and commis-
sioned to manage the trade. Able to speak both Chinese and local languages, these 
officials were usually appointed from among local tribal leaders and were given a 
Ming title. The Ming thereby sought to regulate the duration of the markets; for 
example, once a month for five days in Kaiyuan, and twice a month for five days 
each time in Guangning. However, by the mid-sixteenth century, such regulations 
were not respected at all. The Kaiyuan market, for instance, was open every three 
days or even every other day, and the number of visitors was not limited.34
It was Manchurian natural resources that the Jurchens brought to the markets 
for trading with Ming Chinese. Starting with the reign of Chenghua (1465–87), an 
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increasing number of records attest to Jurchen leaders visiting the Ming court and 
paying tribute in furs. As the popularity of and demand for furs increased among 
Han Chinese, the Ming Board of Rites assigned a certain amount of fur tributes to 
officials in Liaodong, who checked the Jurchen visitors and allowed them to pro-
ceed to Beijing only after their fur tributes had been approved. Chinese demand 
for furs grew to the point that the Ming court decided to prohibit lower-class peo-
ple from wearing furs. At the end of the Ming period, fur consumption continued 
to increase; the Ming court was estimated to use ten thousand sable pelts and 
sixty thousand fox pelts per year.35 In addition to furs, Liaodong ginseng was very 
popular, and by the late Ming period it became the most sought-after Jurchen 
product at the markets. As ginseng prices continued to go up in the late sixteenth 
century, the Ming court directed the Liaodong commissioner to take responsibil-
ity for ginseng tributes to Beijing. This move pushed Han Chinese to go and collect 
ginseng in Jurchen land. Strong complaints from the Jurchens about Han Chinese 
ginseng exploiters led the Ming court and the Liaodong commissioner to give up 
their attempt to collect ginseng in Jurchen territory, but Han Chinese trespassing 
for ginseng remained one of the main reasons for Ming-Jurchen conflicts.36
China’s high demand for furs and ginseng led to rapid growth in the number 
of Jurchen merchants and to substantial changes in the tribal societies. The devel-
opment of frontier markets allowed the Ming authorities to amass a significant 
amount of tax revenue, a big portion of which was in turn gifted to Jurchen visi-
tors. Kim Kujin’s analysis of Ming records of tax collection in Liaodong shows that 
the value of commodities traded at frontier markets totaled 21,000 to 24,000 liang 
of silver.37 Ming officials in Guangning spent 4,500 liang of silver from 1599 to 1601 
on various presents for Jurchen visitors, such as textiles, foodstuffs, salt, and iron 
products; by 1605, this amount increased to 17,400 liang of silver. The increasing 
wealth of Jurchen merchants caused social differentiation among the local tribes.38 
As a result, “competition for the privilege of accessing [Ming] markets led to strug-
gles among the Jurchens, conflicts that became worse when the Ming intervened 
to play one tribal ruler against another.”39 The rise of Nurhaci provides a good ex-
ample of how rivalries for commercial profits led to the unification of local tribes 
at the Liaodong frontier.
THE JURCHENS IN CHOSŎN KOREA’S  NORTH
The Jianzhou Jurchens in Liaodong benefited from their contacts with another 
sedentary neighbor—Chosŏn Korea (1392–1910). Chosŏn T’aejo Yi Sŏnggye 
(r. 1392–98) was born and raised in Kyŏnghŭng, where his ancestors had served the 
Yuan as local officials. As Songs of Flying Dragons (K. Yongbi ŏch’ŏn’ga) mytholo-
gizes, Yi Sŏnggye’s great-grandfather and grandfather mingled with the Jurchens, 
both in trade and in war, and Yi Sŏnggye himself achieved his military reputation 
28    From Frontier to Borderland
after defeating Nahacu’s Mongol armies in Liaodong.40 When he established the 
Chosŏn dynasty, many Jurchen tribes scattered to live around the Yalu and 
Tumen Rivers. Unlike the Ming division of the Jurchens into the Wild, the Haixi, 
and the Jianzhou, the Chosŏn called them by Jurchen names, such as Uriangkha 
(K. Ollyanghap), Odori, and Udike.41 The Uriangkha and the Odori used to live 
at the convergence of the Sungari and Mudan Rivers, also known as Ilan Hala or 
Sanxing; later, when one of the tribal leaders, Ahacu, led his people to move to the 
upper Suifenhe, the Ming Yongle emperor (r. 1403–24) appointed him the Jian-
zhou Guard commander.42 In 1424 Ahacu’s grandson, Li Manzhou, settled at the 
Tunggiya River, and in Chosŏn records his group is called Uriangkha. The Odori 
people, for their part, moved to the east and settled south of the Tumen River. The 
leader of the Odori was Möngke Temür, whom the Chosŏn called Tong Maengga 
Ch’ŏmmoga or Kyaon Mŏngge t’emul.43 He paid visits and tribute to the Chosŏn 
court in 1395, and in 1399 he was introduced as the head of the Odori in Omohoi 
(Hoeryŏng) in Hamgyŏng Province. In 1404, he was given the honorary military 
position of first deputy commander (K. sanghogun) by the Chosŏn court.44
By the time Möngke Temür was receiving the Chosŏn court’s titles, the Ming 
Yongle emperor, who also sought to subjugate the Jurchens in the northeast, began 
to approach the Odori leader to offer him Ming printed patents (chishu) and ma-
terial rewards. Yongle’s open ambition to extend Ming power to the Tumen River 
surprised the Chosŏn court, which implicitly advised Möngke Temür not to fol-
low the Ming, because peace in the Chosŏn realm’s north was impossible without 
the cooperation of powerful Jurchen leaders. The close relationship of the Chosŏn 
with the Jurchens, however, led Yongle to doubt Korean loyalty to the Ming em-
peror. After serving the Chosŏn court for two decades, in 1405, Möngke Temür 
finally paid tribute to the Ming court and was appointed the Ming commander of 
the Jianzhou Left Guard (Jianzhou zuowei).45 However, as Chosŏn soldiers subse-
quently attacked his Odori people in revenge, Möngke Temür moved to Fengzhou 
and joined Li Manzhou in the Jianzhou Main Guard. In 1423 Möngke Temür man-
aged to return to Omohoi (Hoeryŏng), but ended up being killed during internal 
fighting among Jurchen tribes in 1433. After Möngke Temür’s death the Jianzhou 
Left Guard became weak and scattered, and in 1440 his brother Fanca likewise had 
to move to Li Manzhou of the Jianzhou Main Guard at the Tunggiya River, a place 
that later became the base of Nurhaci’s grandfathers. Later eighteenth-century 
Qing court records refer to Möngke Temür as Mengtemu and describe him as the 
progenitor of the Manchu imperial family.46
The Unified Gazetteer of the Great Ming (Da Ming yitongzhi), published in 1461, 
explains that “Jurchen [territory] reached the sea in the east, Uriangkha [territory] 
in the west, the Chosŏn in the south, and Nurgan in the north.”47 Some studies ar-
gue that the Ming lost the territory to the south of the Tumen River when Möngke 
Temür and his Jiangzhou Left Guard moved to the west, a retreat that made the 
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Yalu and Tumen Rivers the Ming-Chosŏn boundary.48 However, it is doubtful 
whether the Jurchen residence could be claimed as an exclusive part of Ming terri-
tory. The Jurchens were dispersed across the Chosŏn northern provinces, an area 
that should be seen as an economic, political, cultural, and linguistic frontier be-
tween the Jurchens and the Koreans.49 Various other Jurchen tribes, including the 
Morin Uriangkha and the Udike, were spread over the vast area between the Tu-
men River and the Possiat Bay and had more contacts with the Chosŏn than with 
the Ming. They made their living through fishing, hunting, and partial agriculture, 
as well as food donations that they requested from the Chosŏn.50 The boundaries 
between the Ming, the Chosŏn, and the Jurchens were not clear-cut but rather 
unbounded and ambiguous; sovereignty over the Jurchen territories was overlap-
ping and multilayered.
The Ming establishment of the Jianzhou Left Guard in 1405 did not stop 
Chosŏn efforts to expand northward in the area of the Yalu and Tumen Rivers. 
After the Morin Uriangkha and the Udike also paid visits to the Ming court in 
1405–6, following the example of Möngke Temür, the Chosŏn decided to avenge 
their betrayal and ceased the practices of gift-giving and trading with the Jurch-
ens. In 1410, when the Odori, the Udike, and Morin Uriangkha, feeling threat-
ened, attacked Chosŏn territory, the Chosŏn raided their bases and killed their 
leaders.51 King Sejong (r. 1419–50) took even more aggressive action by building 
military garrisons in the north, near Jurchen territory.52 During the years 1416 to 
1443, the Chosŏn established four counties (K. sagun) on the upper Yalu River: 
Yŏyŏn, Chasŏng, Much’ang, and Wuye. Additional garrisons on the Tumen River 
were founded between 1434 and 1449, including Hoeryŏng, Chongsŏng, Onsŏng, 
Kyŏngwŏn, Kyŏnghŭng, and Punyŏng. The six garrisons (K. yukchin) on the 
Tumen River were deemed successful, as the fortresses “are strong and affluent; 
soldiers’ horses are fast and tough. They may not be enough to raise armies, but 
they are good enough for defense.”53 However, the counties on the Yalu River were 
not as successful as those on the Tumen because they were located very close to 
Jurchen bases; also, the land was barren and not suited to settlement and agricul-
ture. By 1459, the Chosŏn court finally decided to close the counties on the upper 
part of the Yalu River, and this region came to be known as “the Four Closed 
Counties” (K. P’yesagun).54 The Chosŏn expansion toward the north was, in fact, 
constantly opposed by the Ming, which was wary of the possibility of Korean-
Jurchen collaboration and the potential threat to Ming control over Liaodong.55 
Ming-Chosŏn tensions over the Jurchens in Korea’s northern region remerged in 
the mid-fifteenth century, when the Ming found many Jurchen tribal leaders in 
the Changbaishan region receiving Chosŏn court titles and paying visits to Korea. 
The Chosŏn king Sejo (r. 1455–68) was particularly eager to invite the Jurchens 
into his country, an action that inevitably attracted Ming attention. In 1458, when 
the Chosŏn court granted official titles to two of the Jianzhou Jurchen leaders, the 
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Ming Tianshun emperor (r. 1457–63) accused the Chosŏn king of violating the 
imperial order to refrain from making contact with the Jurchens. The following 
year, when the Ming court discovered that the Morin Uriangkha leader, Lang-
bo-er-han, had received an official Chosŏn title, the Ming emperor criticized the 
Chosŏn king for being disobedient:
The [Chosŏn] court has been a tributary [fanguo] in the east of China, being loyal 
and respectful since the previous court and never making contact with foreigners 
without permission. Then how did this happen in the current court? . . . Even though 
[the Jurchens] approached [the Chosŏn] on their own, [the Chosŏn] should refuse 
[their overtures] and admonish them to do their duty, keep their boundaries, and not 
create any trouble or cause of regret for the future.56
Sejo was apparently angry with the Ming intervention but had to order the Ju-
rchens not to visit Korea, because “it is not necessary to violate what the Ming has 
prohibited.”57 Such Ming interventions in Chosŏn-Jurchen relations demonstrate 
that the geographical fact of the Chosŏn north’s adjacency with Ming Liaodong—a 
crucial location for the security of China proper—played a decisive role in the for-
mation of Ming-Chosŏn relations. In other words, the Chosŏn was able to main-
tain a peaceful relationship with the Ming court only by respecting the imperial 
authority and by keeping its distance from the Liaodong frontier.
As in their dealings with the Ming, the Jurchens expected to gain trade oppor-
tunities through their interactions with the Chosŏn. The Chosŏn policy toward 
the Jurchens in the north followed the Ming model, which entitled tribal rulers 
to visit the capital and frontier markets in exchange for the payment of tributes. 
The Northern Guest House (K. Pukp’yŏnggwan) was built in 1438 in the Chosŏn 
capital to receive Jurchen visitors, evidence that Chosŏn contact with the Jurchens 
had become more frequent despite the constant Ming warnings.58 The number of 
visitors was, however, limited: in a good harvest year, 120 people could visit on 
seventeen occasions; otherwise, only ninety people were to come on twelve oc-
casions. In order to avoid trouble with Beijing, the Jurchens were not allowed to 
enter Chosŏn territory at times when Ming emissaries were visiting Seoul.59 The 
Jurchens presented the Chosŏn court with their local products, which included 
horses, leopard skins, bear and deer skins, and hawks; Chosŏn return gifts were 
mostly cotton fabrics.60 Just as the Ming opened markets for tribespeople in Lia-
odong, the Chosŏn created markets for the Jurchens in the north. Markets for the 
Jurchens (K. yain muyŏkso) were opened in Chongsŏng and Kyŏngwŏn in 1406,61 
only a year after the Ming established its first market for the Jurchens.
The Chosŏn court deemed the Jurchens living near the Tumen River Korea’s 
“subordinate barbarians” (K. pŏnho), a name for those who lived in Chosŏn ter-
ritories, submitted to Chosŏn authority, volunteered to report about the move-
ments of other tribal peoples, and protected local Koreans from threats posed by 
other tribes.62 This name reveals the nature of the Chosŏn policy on the Jurchens, 
From Frontier to Borderland    31
which aimed to foster peace in the north by embracing the Jurchens under 
Korean rule. By the early sixteenth century, the Chosŏn court praised its own be-
nevolent practices, claiming that “the barbarians living near [Chosŏn] towns have 
lived in our territories for generations; they have been fed and clothed whenever 
they suffered from hunger and coldness, and they have received Chosŏn titles 
and rich rewards, thanks to our generosity.”63 As Kenneth Robinson puts it, “The 
Chosŏn court sought to restore peace and security to Korea’s northern regions 
through a combination of diplomatic, naturalization, and trade policies.”64 It is 
important to note here that Chosŏn views on the Jurchens were largely based on 
the Ming model, which required foreign rulers to recognize Chinese superiority. 
As Chŏng Taham explains, the Chosŏn court attempted to apply its own version 
of a Sinocentric ideology to its inferior neighbors, namely, the Jurchens in the 
north, a practice that demonstrated “the construction of a multilayered hierarchy 
among the Ming, the Chosŏn, and the Jurchens.”65 In this tripartite relationship, 
the Jurchens and Koreans were both under Ming authority, while the Koreans 
claimed their own superiority to the Jurchens. This multilayered hierarchy pro-
vided the Jurchens with more opportunities to interact with Ming Chinese and 
Chosŏn Koreans and, in time, to grow to the extent that they could challenge 
these two neighbors.
THE RISE OF NURHACI
Compared with other tribal groups in Liaodong, the Jianzhou Jurchens enjoyed 
geographical advantages in waging war against their rivals. First, they had close 
access to profitable natural resources such as ginseng, sable, and pearls. And sec-
ond, unlike the Haixi Jurchens and the Uriangkha Mongols, the Jianzhou Jurchens 
lived close to the Ming and the Chosŏn, which “gave them the leverage to demand 
and gain more concessions.”66 The great potential for profit at the frontier mar-
kets led Jurchen leaders to compete with one another for the privilege of access, 
until one of them succeeded in securing a monopoly on the entire profit from 
trade with China. In fact, the rivalries among the Jurchen tribes in Liaodong re-
sulted from the Ming divide-and-rule policy, which sought to divide the frontier 
tribesmen and prevent any one of them from becoming too powerful. The rise of 
Nurhaci and the subsequent unification of the Jurchen tribes were a direct result 
of the failure of the Ming Liaodong policy.67
Before Nurhaci established his dominance, it was the Ming military command-
er of Liaodong, Li Chengliang (1526–1615), who controlled the rivalries among 
the frontier tribesmen.68 While the Jianzhou Guard lived in the east of Liaodong, 
the Haixi Jurchens were forced by the Mongols to move to the area known as the 
four Hūlun confederations, which included the Ula, the Hoifa, the Yehe, and the 
Hada.69 By 1548, the Hada chieftain Wang Tai had succeeded in subjugating all 
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four Hūlun confederations and had expanded his power over some of the Jianzhou 
Jurchens as well. When Wang Gao, a leader of the Jianzhou Guard, allied with the 
Mongols and attacked the Ming fort in Fushun in 1573, he was captured by his 
rival Wang Tai and executed by Li Chengliang. Wang Gao’s son, Atai, succeeded 
his father as ruler of the Jianzhou Jurchens; among his followers were Giocangga 
and Taksi, descendants of Möngke Temür and the grandfather and the father, re-
spectively, of Nurhaci. While serving Atai, Giocangga and Taksi are also believed 
to have made an alliance with Li Chengliang, but they were eventually killed in the 
battle between Atai and Li Chengliang.70
Just like his grandfather and father, Nurhaci is believed to have been very fa-
miliar with the Ming Liaodong commander. Giocangga and Taksi were official 
delegates of the Jianzhou Jurchen and also merchants who frequently visited the 
Ming market at Fushun. Nurhaci had visited Fushun often with his grandfather 
and father to trade horses and other products from Jurchen territories. After the 
deaths of Giocangga and Taksi, Nurhaci rebuked the Ming officials in Liaodong, 
Figure 2. Hetu Ala and its surrounding area. From Manzhou Shilu (Manchu Veritable 
Record), 1779. Manuscript, 26.2 × 15.7 cm. Korea University Library. Used with permission.
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calling them “the enemy who should not share the same heaven.” At the same time, 
however, he demanded compensation from the Ming authorities, who eventually 
offered him thirty printed patents and thirty horses along with the title of assistant 
commander in chief (dudu).71 Despite his constant criticism and condemnation 
of the Ming, Nurhaci continued to have access to Ming markets. In 1592, Nurhaci 
offered to send his Jurchen troops to join the Ming in their fight against the Japa-
nese invasion of Korea.72 The Ming did not accept his offer but praised his loyalty 
by granting him the title of dragon-tiger general (longhu jiangjun). Nurhaci con-
tinued to hold this title, which allowed him to send his people to Beijing and to 
access frontier markets, until he finally renounced the relationship with the Ming 
court in 1608.73
Close relations with the Ming authorities and frequent access to Ming markets 
gave Nurhaci wealth and power. Around the middle of the sixteenth century there 
were many Jurchen leaders who traded at Ming markets, but Nurhaci successfully 
competed with the others and established his base around Fushun and Qinghe. 
His desire to monopolize the huge profits available at the frontier markets led him 
to defeat other tribes and seize all trading rights with the Ming. The Hada were the 
first to be subjugated, between 1599 and 1601; the Hoifa followed in 1607, the Ula in 
1613, and finally the Yehe in 1619. By defeating the Hada and the Ula, Nurhaci de-
prived them of their pearl and sable trade, closed the road to Kaiyuan, and instead 
opened a new market under his own control in Qinghe.74 Even before he defeated 
the Ula tribe, Nurhaci tried to intervene in Chosŏn-Ula relations, suggesting that 
the Chosŏn should send Korean cotton fabrics to his Jianzhou Jurchens rather 
than to the Ula, who had been receiving this Chosŏn gift.75 Nurhaci’s trading ac-
tivities are well described in a Ming record, the Illustrated Writings on Kaiyuan 
(Kaiyuan tushuo):
The profits from ginseng, sable, and horse are all produced by the Jurchens. Some of 
the Jurchen merchants are coming far from the distant Sungari River and the Hei-
longjiang. . . . Ever since Huang-hu-tai and others constructed a fort at the mouth of 
the Sungari River, the profits have all fallen into the hands of Nurhaci. The cause of 
disputes among the Jurchens every year is that they are fighting over printed patents, 
that is, they are fighting over commercial profits.76
The primary customers for sable fur and pearls from Liaodong were a limited 
number of wealthy people in Beijing and Jiangnan, while ginseng was more widely 
circulated thanks to its light weight. There was strong demand for this expensive 
commodity in China proper; one liang of ginseng cost more than one liang of 
silver.77 From the beginning of Nurhaci’s career, the ginseng trade was very impor-
tant for him. According to a folktale of his early days, Nurhaci had lost his birth 
mother and allegedly escaped his stepmother’s abuse by fleeing to Changbaishan, 
where he learned about ginseng gathering and later made his living through the 
ginseng trade at the Ming markets.78 Another story tells us that Nurhaci taught 
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his men a new method of preserving ginseng. The Jurchens usually added water 
to ginseng in order to make it heavier to get a higher price for it at the market. 
However, when Chinese traders refused to buy the soaked ginseng, Nurhaci’s men 
lost all of the profits for ten thousand liang of ginseng. Nurhaci is believed to have 
found a new way of preserving ginseng by steaming and drying it, and he thus 
taught his people to wait for a longer time to get a good price.79 However, this 
story of ginseng preservation suggests that the practice of steaming and drying 
was already known to the locals and that Nurhaci may have merely introduced it 
to a broader audience among the Jurchens.80
These stories may have been created to highlight Nurhaci’s enormous interest 
in and familiarity with the ginseng trade at the time when he became the ruler 
of the Jianzhou Jurchens. Nurhaci was well known for seeking exclusive profits 
in the trade with the Ming: “If any tribal leader was found to have traded a tiny 
amount of sable, pheasant, rabbit, pearls, or ginseng without Nurhaci’s approval, 
he was executed. All the profits from trading were monopolized by Nurhaci.”81 The 
significance of the ginseng trade for the Jurchens is also described in Qing court 
records: “Our country produces pearls, ginseng, and sable, and all of them are so 
precious that [their value is high enough] to meet our demands. [We trade them] 
at the four markets of Fushun, Qinghe, Kuandian, and Aiyang, contributing to the 
development and affluence of our people in Manchuria.”82 With regard to the value 
of the ginseng trade, Nicola Di Cosmo has analyzed a sample of Ming records 
to estimate that the amount of ginseng Nurhaci traded in two years at the Ming 
markets was possibly as high as one hundred thousand jin, which “corresponded 
in value to approximately a quarter of the total foreign silver imported in China 
in a single year.”83 As Imamura Tomo puts it, Nurhaci’s ability to amass power was 
based not only on his military superiority but also on commercial profits from the 
ginseng trade.84
Nurhaci’s monopoly on the Ming markets caused fundamental changes in 
relations among local tribes as well as tensions with the Ming authorities. The 
frontier markets posed a severe financial burden to the Ming authorities, who 
had to give gifts to the tribal leaders and purchase Jurchen products at steep 
prices. In 1607, when Nurhaci brought several tens of thousands of liang of gin-
seng to the passes near Kuandian, Aiyang, Qinghe, and Fushun, the Ming had 
to push Chinese soldiers and merchants to buy the Jurchen ginseng by spending 
their salaries or even using up their property, out of fear that the Jurchens would 
otherwise make trouble.85 Despite this huge burden, the Ming could not close the 
markets, because this would likely have triggered Jurchen raids on Ming cities. 
As Ming court officials lamented, “It is too much of a burden if we continue to 
bestow gifts on them, but it will possibly bring troubles if we [stop this practice 
and] fight with them. We have regretted this situation and endured it for such a 
long time.”86 The Ming managed the markets as a defensive method of pacifying 
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the frontier people, not as an aggressive means of making profits. For Nurhaci, 
it was the other way around: the Ming markets were the primary source of his 
power in Liaodong. As Iwai Shigeki puts it, “The Ming-Qing transition could be 
regarded as an outcome of the growth of interregional trade and the mobilization 
of frontier society.”87
Gertraude Roth Li finds the reason for Nurhaci’s contentious behavior and at-
titudes in his political ambitions: “Aware that both the Ming and Chosŏn govern-
ments considered the Jurchens politically as well as culturally inferior, Nurhaci, 
an aspiring leader, rethought his goals and decided that being a Ming official in 
charge of the Jianzhou Guard was not good enough.”88 However, Jurchen eco-
nomic concerns played an equally significant role in the formation of Nurhaci’s 
political consciousness. As Di Cosmo points out, “From the very beginning 
Nurhaci’s strategy aimed to control the flux of commercial products moving to-
wards the market towns.” Furthermore, “[Nurhaci’s] tribute visits to the Ming 
court constituted important occasions to consolidate his power and retain trad-
ing privileges.”89 When the Ming court sought to tighten its grip on the Jurchens 
for the purpose of frontier control, Nurhaci found it impossible to continue to 
submit to Ming supremacy. In order to maintain both the economic profits and 
the political power that he had achieved, he now had to challenge the Ming in 
Liaodong.
JURCHEN B OUNDARY MAKING
By 1589, Nurhaci had completed the unification of the Jurchen tribes and fur-
ther expanded his power westward of Liaodong. He began to seek to promote 
the status of the Jianzhou Jurchens in relation with their neighbors, among 
whom the Chosŏn were the most suitable for validating his newly elevated 
power. In 1595, Nurhaci attempted to make direct contact with the Chosŏn, 
despite the Ming court’s warning not to do so. In a letter written to the Manp’o 
commander (K. ch’ŏmsa), Nurhaci suggested that the Jurchens and the Koreans 
should not violate the boundary nor harm each other.90 When a Korean inter-
preter, Ha Seguk, visited Fe Ala in the summer of that year, Nurhaci proposed 
an official letter exchange to the Chosŏn court.91 Later, when the Manp’o com-
mander, Sin Ch’ungil, visited Fe Ala, Nurhaci again expressed his desire to 
establish an official relationship with the Chosŏn. Sin Ch’ungil assumed that 
Nurhaci simply wanted to “demonstrate his close relations with the superior 
country [the Ming] and with us [the Chosŏn] in order to subjugate [his ri-
val] barbarians [K. hoin].”92 A decade later, however, Nurhaci began to indicate 
greater distance from the Ming by discarding his previous title as the head of 
the Jianzhou Jurchen guard.93 In a letter to the Manp’o commander in 1605, he 
called himself “King of the Jianzhou region, Tong” (Jianzhou dengchu difang 
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guowang Tong). In this letter, Nurhaci warned the Chosŏn king to adhere 
strictly to his boundaries:
Since the Koryŏ [Chosŏn] is known for its richness in ginseng, people ride horses 
and go around the mountains looking for ginseng. . . . If you Koreans cross the river, I 
will arrest and kill you. If our people cross the river, you can arrest and kill them. This 
will make things even. If you arrest our people who cross the river and send them 
back to me, I will kill them. It will be my fault if I do not kill them.94
By 1607, Nurhaci’s power reached further toward Chosŏn territory, as he had 
conquered the Weji tribe in the East Sea region (Donghai woji) north of the Tumen 
River. In 1609, Nurhaci’s forces launched a major attack on the Ula in the battle 
of Munam near Chongsŏng, a move that positioned the Jianzhou Jurchens much 
closer to Chosŏn territory.95 The same year, Nurhaci claimed that the Warka tribe, 
which lived in the northern part of Chosŏn territory, should be under his com-
mand, and he therefore asked the Ming emperor to force the Chosŏn court to send 
these people back to him. In the end, the Chosŏn had to send one thousand Warka 
households to Nurhaci.96
Nurhaci’s efforts to expand his power led him to seek clear divisions between 
Jurchen territory and its neighbors. The agreement reached in 1608 between the 
Ming and Nurhaci was, in fact, a temporary consensus regarding the boundar-
ies of the Jurchen tribes. After watching the Jianzhou Jurchens subjugate the 
Hada and the Hoifa, the Ming Liaodong officials were eager to confirm the 
boundaries of Nurhaci’s power. The agreement, which entailed the erection of a 
stone marker and the sacrifice of a white horse, stipulated that the two groups 
should not violate each other’s territories: “Whether they are Jurchens or Han 
Chinese, any trespassers caught should be killed without pardon. Local officials 
who do not kill trespassers should also be punished.”97 The inscription on the 
stone marker that Nurhaci and Ming Liaodong officials had built states, “You are 
China [Zhongguo], and we are a foreign country [waiguo]. The two big coun-
tries [daguo] are as close as one family.”98 This message shows that by the early 
seventeenth century Ming officials recognized that they now shared Liaodong 
with Nurhaci.
In 1616, Nurhaci finally announced the creation of the Jurchen state, the Aisin 
Gurun. When the Ming closed its markets as punishment for this challenge to 
the emperor, Nurhaci proclaimed a list of seven vexations with the Ming before 
launching a series of attacks on Ming fortresses in Liaodong.99 He succeeded in 
capturing Tieling and Kaiyuan in 1619, Fushun in 1620, and Shenyang and Liao-
yang in 1621. In the 1620s, Nurhaci announced that limits of his country “reach the 
sea in the east, the Liaodong boundaries with the Ming in the west, the Korchin 
Mongols near the Nonni River in the north, and Chosŏn boundaries in the south.” 
Of people living within this area, “those who share the same language as the Jurch-
ens are all subjugated [to us].”100
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Being surrounded by the Ming, the Mongols, and the Chosŏn, the future of 
the Aisin Gurun relied on how well they built relationships with these neighbor-
ing powers. When Nurhaci died, this daunting task was left to his son, Hong Taiji 
(1592–1643). When the new khan took the throne in 1627, he immediately recog-
nized that a serious crisis faced his country. The Manchu records describe the 
desperate conditions of the late 1620s: “The country had been starved . . . so that 
people were even pushed to eat human flesh. The country had much silver but few 
commodities, because there was nowhere to conduct business.”101 Hong Taiji him-
self had to confess in a letter to the Chosŏn king that his country was facing severe 
economic problems: “I have enough grain to feed my own people. But, as you may 
have heard, many Mongol princes, along with their people, are coming to follow 
me, fleeing from the misdeeds of [the Chakhar] Ligdan Han. There is not enough 
grain to feed all of these new subjects.”102 This economic shortage pushed Hong 
Taiji to contact the Ming Ningyuan commander, Yuan Chonghuan (1584–1630), 
Figure 3. Nurhaci receiving the honorary title of Genggiyen Han of the Aisin Gurun in 1616. 
From Manzhou Shilu (Manchu Veritable Record), 1779. Manuscript, 26.2 × 15.7 cm. Korea Uni-
versity Library. Used with permission.
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and to send the latter a stream of letters proposing the exchange of gifts.103 What 
he in fact needed was the resumption of the frontier markets, which he expected 
to follow from the gift-giving ceremony: “If Ming officials agree to make peace, we 
Jurchens, Han Chinese, and Mongols will collect ginseng and develop silver mines 
to trade with the Ming.”104
Trade with the Ming was surely important for Hong Taiji, but it was a lesser 
issue than securing the territory of the Jurchen state. In 1627, Hong Taiji sent a 
letter of complaint to Yuan Chonghuan enumerating seven annoyances, three of 
which were related to Jurchen boundaries with Ming China. He emphasized that 
the Ming court had repeatedly violated the agreement of 1608:
We agreed that if Chinese violate the boundary they should be killed, just as Jurch-
ens stealing into Ming land are to be killed. . . . However, in 1613, Chinese soldiers 
crossed the boundary to protect the Yehe and stationed themselves [in our Jurchen 
land]. . . . In 1608, we agreed that those who tolerate trespassing are to be punished in 
the same way as the trespassers. . . . However, when we punished Chinese trespassers, 
the Ming, blaming us for killing innocent people, arrested our envoy and killed ten 
Jurchen people in revenge. . . . Chinese soldiers burned the houses of Jurchen people 
and forced them to leave their land just before harvest. They also moved the stone 
marker standing at the boundary thirty li toward us, an action through which they 
could take that much land from us. They also plundered ginseng, furs, grain, and 
timber, all of which we Jurchens depend on for our lives. These are only the major 
grievances. How could I count all the minor problems?105
When Yuan Chonghuan insisted in his reply that all of the Liaodong fortresses 
and Han captives held by the Aisin Gurun should first be returned to the Ming, 
the khan’s response was firm:
You [Yuan Chonghuan] say, “The khan should respect our Mighty Emperor to en-
hance his great grace and do his best to keep the peace at the boundaries.” However, 
it is for you, not for other countries, to enhance the grace of your emperor. As for 
security at the boundaries, you control your territory, and we control ours. How 
could we control your territory?106
Later in the same year Hong Taiji reiterated to Ming officials who visited him, 
“A peace agreement between two countries should discuss boundaries, settling 
where the limits of your territory are and where those of mine are. Only after 
the boundaries are set can peace come.”107 In his letters to Yuan Chonghuan, the 
khan emphasized that the Ming and the Jurchen state were physically divided and 
that each should respect and protect its own territory. As Pamela Crossley notes, 
Hong Taiji’s emphasis on Jurchen territorial claims was related to his bid for “the 
credibility of the new khanate.” He hoped that “the Later Jin and the Ming could 
divide the present Chinese territories, with the Ming presumably retreating from 
Liaodong and surrendering it to the jurisdiction of the Later Jin.”108 In fact, Hong 
Taiji was enraged that the Ming had repeatedly violated the boundary agreement 
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of 1608 made between his father and Ming officials, seeing the violations as evi-
dence that the Ming did not acknowledge the sovereignty of the Jurchen state. For 
the khan of the Aisin Gurun, territory and sovereignty were inseparable.
In his letter to the Chosŏn king Injo (r. 1623–49) in 1634, the khan sought en-
dorsement of the Aisin Gurun as a power independent of the Ming and asked the 
Chosŏn to persuade the Ming to recognize Liaodong as Aisin Gurun territory:
Recently I have several times tried to reconcile with the Ming, but they are now sud-
denly asking back the land of Liaodong [Liaoyang] and Guangning. Those people 
from Liaodong [Liaoyang] and Guangning whom heaven allowed us to rule and 
those Mongols who came to follow us are so numerous that our previous small ter-
ritory cannot embrace all of them. . . . It is out of the question for so many people to 
live together in a house or to be fed [within our previous territory]. The old Liaodong 
[Liaoyang], which the Ming is now asking to have back, is not even as good as their 
current land. Beijing is not only safe and comfortable, but also spacious. This is not 
an overstatement; I would just try to follow the right path [wangdao]. If you, Chosŏn 
king, agree with me and mediate a peaceful negotiation between the two countries 
[the Aisin Gurun and the Ming], how wonderful it would be!109
While negotiating the boundary with the Ming, Hong Taiji also sought to sub-
jugate the Eastern Mongols. He finally acquired from the Chakhar the legitimate 
seal of the Mongol khan in 1636, when he ascended the throne of the emperor 
of the Great Qing (M. Daicing gurun), who ruled all of the Manchus, the Mon-
gols, and the Han Chinese.110 By 1642, Hong Taiji, as the Chongde emperor, suc-
ceeded in his military campaigns against the Chosŏn and the Eastern Mongols 
and subjugated all of Liaodong and the nearby Zhili Province to his rule. Once 
again, he proposed boundary making with the Ming. He demanded that the Ming 
exchange envoy visits, send gifts of ten thousand liang of gold and one hundred 
thousand liang of silver, and repatriate all Manchu, Han Chinese, Mongol, and 
Korean Qing subjects. He also proclaimed the specific location of the boundaries: 
“Your boundary is at Tuling between Ningyuan and Shuangshubao, and ours is 
at Tashan. Lianshan shall become a meeting place for trade between the two par-
ties. If anyone from the two countries enters the area from the north of Tuling to 
the north of Ningyuan and Shanhaiguan, he should be executed.”111 By this time it 
was obvious that the Qing emperor intended to claim the mandate of heaven, but 
before launching into China proper, the Manchu ruler first needed to complete his 
boundary making with the Chosŏn.
THE CHOSŎN AND TRESPASSING
It is not surprising that people other than the Jurchens longed for the precious gin-
seng. The high value of ginseng attracted Koreans to the Yalu and Tumen Rivers 
and Changbaishan, where trespassing was not easily detected. The Ming Chinese, 
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the Jurchens, and the Koreans often trespassed in one another’s territory. As a 
Chosŏn official reported in 1446, “The place where the Jurchens hunt and fish is 
within only two to three hours’ walking distance from Chosŏn territory.”112 There 
were occasional reports that Ming soldiers in Liaodong approached the Yalu River 
searching for ginseng and animals, but Chosŏn soldiers were instructed not to 
attack “Chinese [K. Tangin] ginseng collectors” or make any contact or commu-
nicate with them.113 However, they were also aware that “those intruders, if they 
find that Korean soldiers do not attack Han Chinese, may pretend that they are 
Han.”114 The Chosŏn court’s obvious discrimination against Jurchen intruders re-
flects the hierarchical order between the Ming, the Jurchens, and the Chosŏn in 
the fifteenth century. Han Chinese, Jurchen, and Koreans all violated one another’s 
territories, but their actions were treated unequally depending on who they were. 
More importantly, at this time, ginseng gathering in others’ territories was gener-
ally overlooked as long as the intruders did not commit crimes or cause trouble. 
The Chosŏn policy was therefore aimed primarily at controlling the “northern 
barbarians,” not at enforcing a general restriction at the frontier. If the Jurchens 
did not cause serious problems in Korean territory, the Chosŏn preferred to ignore 
their trespassing for the sake of peace.
Jurchen violations of Chosŏn territory increased during the sixteenth century. 
Kanggye in P’yŏngan Province reportedly became a no-man’s-land that attracted 
many Jurchens in search of ginseng. There was a report about some Jurchen gin-
seng poachers who fought back with swords when they encountered Korean sol-
diers.115 Still, the Chosŏn court maintained the principle that Jurchen intruders 
should be treated carefully and not punished severely. In 1529 the court cautioned 
that “some Koreans on the frontier despise the Jurchen intruders and kill these 
ginseng poachers in the mountains. It is not an appropriate thing to do.”116 It is 
clear, however, that not all listened to royal commands to treat the Jurchens well, 
for in 1548, this demand had to be repeated: “Jurchens entering Chosŏn land for 
ginseng gathering should not be randomly killed unless they cause trouble. . . . If 
soldiers take lightly the killing of innocent people, it may cause problems at the 
frontier.”117
It was not until the late sixteenth century, when Nurhaci unified all the Jurchen 
tribes and emerged as a contender for control of Liaodong, that he began to com-
plain about the cruel behavior of Chosŏn soldiers. In 1592, when several Jurchens 
were arrested for ginseng poaching and killed in unusually brutal ways, such as 
by beheading and skinning, Nurhaci was upset with this abuse of Jurchens at the 
hands of Koreans and protested to the Chosŏn court, threatening to bring the mat-
ter to the Ming authorities. Three years later, when a Ming Liaodong official and 
a Chosŏn interpreter visited Fe Ala, Nurhaci promised his visitors that he would 
impose stricter regulations on his people in order to discourage them from enter-
ing Chosŏn territory. In return, he requested that the Chosŏn do the same: “In the 
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future, if any Jurchen intruder into Chosŏn land is arrested and sent alive back to 
us, we will execute him. But when we arrest a Korean trespasser in our territory 
and send him back to the Chosŏn, you should do the same. Then there will be no 
resentment between us.”118
As the Jurchens became more powerful, they began to raise their voice to the 
Chosŏn concerning trespassing. It was the ginseng that grew at their frontier that 
continued to strain the relations between the Aisin Gurun and the Chosŏn, es-
pecially once Hong Taiji took power. As the new khan put pressure on the Ming 
authorities in Liaodong, it became more difficult for Ming Chinese to steal into 
Jurchen territory to gather the precious root. In contrast, Koreans continued to 
cross the Yalu River in search of ginseng, which caused incessant trouble with the 
Aisin Gurun. The issue of illegal ginseng poaching was, in fact, not related solely 
to territorial violation. At this time, Hong Taiji was desperate to open trade with 
the Chosŏn, because the Jurchens were blockaded from accessing Ming markets as 
punishment for their offensives against Ming fortresses in Liaodong. The Jurchens 
needed the Korean market, where they could exchange various products, includ-
ing ginseng, for products from China as well as from Korea. Therefore, Hong Taiji’s 
efforts to stop Koreans from poaching ginseng in his territory were aimed at both 
the establishment of Aisin Gurun boundaries and the protection of the Jurchen 
ginseng trade.
Jurchen-Chosŏn relations were aggravated by the Ming general Mao Wenlong, 
who was stationed with his army on an island belonging to the Chosŏn. Mao’s 
soldiers enticed Ming Chinese farmers in Liaodong to escape from the Jurchens, 
which posed a serious threat to Hong Taiji, who planned to build an agrarian 
state in Liaodong. Mao’s presence in Korea also indicated the perpetual respect 
of the Chosŏn for the Ming court and, simultaneously, its hostility toward the 
Aisin Gurun.119 Only a war could solve these problems. On February 23, 1627, in 
the first year of his reign, Hong Taiji ordered his cousin, Amin, and other princes 
(M. beile) to lead armies to Korea to defeat Mao Wenlong.120 Two months later, the 
Chosŏn court surrendered to Amin and promised a treaty of brotherhood with 
the Aisin Gurun. By establishing an official relationship with the Chosŏn, Hong 
Taiji could expect to receive an annual tribute and gifts, as well as the opportunity 
to finally open regular trading markets (K. hosi) with the Koreans.
More importantly, the first military campaign of 1627 empowered Hong Taiji 
to make further complaints about Korean trespassing. In 1628 he issued a warn-
ing to the Chosŏn king: “It should be thoroughly prohibited for people from the 
two countries to cross the boundary at will.”121 Under such pressure from the Aisin 
Gurun, the Chosŏn court had to punish Koreans stealing into Jurchen territory. 
In 1631, two Koreans collecting ginseng on Jurchen land were executed in Seoul in 
the presence of Hong Taiji’s envoy.122 Korean trespassing provided the khan with 
a good excuse to accuse the Chosŏn on other contentious issues, such as the poor 
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conditions at the trading markets and the maintenance of Chosŏn relations with 
the Ming. Markets at Zhongjiang (K. Chunggang) were not producing as much 
profit as Hong Taiji had anticipated because Korean traders, afraid of being bullied 
by Jurchen visitors, were not willing to come to them. The Chosŏn court also con-
tinued to acknowledge and serve the Ming as the superior court, with no apparent 
intention of changing their long-established relationship. In addition, Hong Taiji 
was not satisfied with the amount and quality of Chosŏn tribute and gifts for his 
court.123 As his relations with the Chosŏn court were generally not progressing 
as he had expected, Hong Taiji made Korean trespassing into a bigger issue in 
order to impose more pressure on the Chosŏn court. Korean ginseng collecting in 
Jurchen territory could certainly have been treated as minor trespassing, but the 
khan wanted to discipline the Chosŏn and therefore turned these infractions into 
serious crimes.
In the 1630s, discussions between the Aisin Gurun and the Chosŏn were all 
about Korean trespassing for hunting and poaching, low ginseng prices, and slow 
trading. In 1633, Hong Taiji sent Inggūldai and Daisongga with two hundred jin of 
ginseng to trade in Korea. Bringing eighty people with them, Hong Taiji’s envoys 
asked to open a market “in order to borrow grain from Korea.”124 In the same year, 
Hong Taiji blamed the Chosŏn for lowering the ginseng price from sixteen to nine 
liang per jin, adding complaints about the constant intrusion of Koreans into Aisin 
Gurun territory:
[All of these intruders] escaped your country and entered our territory. Only some of 
the cases have been reported to me. Who knows how many Koreans are trespassing 
on our land? You have broken your promise to us and let your people come into our 
land to collect ginseng and hunt animals. Your country is also full of animals, but 
were any of our people stealing into your land to get them?125
To prevent further Korean intrusions, Hong Taiji decided to push the Chosŏn 
court to punish not only intruders but also local officials administering the area 
in which the trespassing had occurred. In 1635, when thirty-six Koreans in Wiwŏn 
were arrested for poaching ginseng on Jurchen land across the Yalu River, Hong 
Taiji insisted that the Korean prefect and other local officials should also be jailed. 
While the Chosŏn court officials were anxiously defensive, arguing that local of-
ficials had never been disciplined for trespassing before, the Chosŏn king, who 
wanted to avoid the Jurchen khan’s reprimands, agreed to punish the local ad-
ministrators for negligence of their duties.126 Gradually, the Chosŏn lost its power 
to argue its case regarding trespassing. The Chosŏn king Injo could only ask for 
pardon when Hong Taiji blamed Koreans for constantly stealing into his country: 
“It is a pity that our [Chosŏn] people have sought ginseng profits and violated 
boundaries. From now on I will surely impose strict regulation to eradicate such 
crimes.” While asking for Hong Taiji’s forgiveness, Injo also bribed the khan’s en-
voy to repatriate the Korean trespassers who were held.127 In Injo’s language, there 
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was no longer any trace of dismissing Jurchens as “wild people” or as uncivilized 
barbarians who Koreans once believed deserved to be killed or skinned.
GINSENG FOR QING MANCHUS
As the Jurchens asserted their right to rule Liaodong, the significance of ginseng 
evolved. In addition to being a valuable commodity and a physical indicator of 
Jurchen territorial boundaries, ginseng also became a unique symbol of Jurchen 
identity.128 Ginseng, along with pearls and furs and as a gift equivalent to gold, 
silver, and silk, was often sent as an official gift of the Aisin Gurun to foreign rul-
ers and envoys. In 1627 Hong Taiji suggested in his letters to Yuan Chonghuan 
that “we [the Aisin Gurun] would send ten tana pearls, one thousand sable pelts, 
and a thousand jin of ginseng to the Ming; the Ming would return ten thousand 
liang of gold, one million liang of silver, a million bolts of silk, and ten million 
bolts of cotton linen.”129 Ginseng was also sent to the Chosŏn court as a gift from 
the khan. Even while blaming Koreans for poaching ginseng in his country, Hong 
Taiji presented the coveted root to the Chosŏn envoy who was visiting his court to 
discuss Korean trespassing.130 These actions show that Hong Taiji considered gin-
seng not only a special resource growing in Jurchen territory but also a symbol of 
the Jurchens themselves. This view reinforced the idea that non-Jurchens should 
not be allowed access to it. As the Aisin Gurun continued to expand its territory, 
its neighbors, especially the Koreans, were further restricted from collecting gin-
seng and trespassing was even more severely punished. The Jurchen monopoly 
on ginseng, Hong Taiji believed, would be firmly ensured only when the Jurchens 
succeeded in establishing the superiority of their status vis-à-vis the Chosŏn and 
in preventing Koreans from approaching their ginseng and their territory at all.
Ascending the Qing imperial throne and renaming his people the Manchus, 
Hong Taiji, now the Chongde emperor, formally announced his intention to chal-
lenge Ming supremacy. He first sought to enhance his status by transforming his 
relationship with the Chosŏn, the neighbor with whom he had had so many dis-
putes over trespassing, captive repatriation, annual tribute, and trade. Above all, 
the Chosŏn court’s official recognition of his imperial authority would constitute 
important political capital for the Qing in waging war against the Ming. To at-
tain such recognition, military action was inevitable.131 On December 29, 1636, the 
Chongde emperor himself led armies to attack Korea, and in less than two months 
the Chosŏn court surrendered to him without condition.132 Following the military 
success, the Qing was able to impose an onerous and humiliating peace treaty 
upon the Chosŏn. The Chosŏn had to end its relationship with the Ming and in-
stead use the Qing title in its official documents and receive the calendar issued 
by the Qing court. Chosŏn royal princes and high officials’ sons were also to be 
sent to Shenyang as hostages. In the event of future Qing attacks on the Ming, the 
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Chosŏn was required to provide soldiers and weapons for the Qing. The Chosŏn 
must send tribute embassies to the Qing court for the emperor’s birthday, the New 
Year, and the winter solstice, among other occasions. These embassies were to fol-
low the same regulations as those observed when visiting the Ming court. Run-
away captives were to be sent back to their Manchu owners. The Chosŏn could 
no longer trade with the Uriangkha Mongols in Liaodong but were allowed to 
continue to trade with Japan. In addition, the Qing made a long list of specific 
items—gold, silver, furs, tea, dye, paper, cotton fabrics, and grain, among others—
that the Chosŏn court was to present to the Manchu emperor.133
There was one significant omission in the Chongde emperor’s list of required 
gifts: it did not include Korean ginseng, which had been the most important 
item in Chosŏn tributes to the Ming emperors. Among the various rulers in 
China, the Ming court was the most eager to receive Korean ginseng; the court 
even listed ginseng as one of the Korean tributes in the Statutes of the Great 
Ming Dynasty (Da Ming huidian). Given that the Jurchens occupied most of the 
ginseng-producing area, Korea was the most reliable provider of ginseng for 
the Ming court. Indeed, throughout the Ming period, the best-quality Korean 
ginseng was carefully selected and sent to Beijing.134 The omission of ginseng 
from the Chosŏn tribute to the Qing court did not mean that Chongde had no 
interest in this precious root. On the contrary, not requesting Korean ginseng 
emphasized that the Manchus did not consider ginseng a local Korean product, 
a specialty of a vassal’s domain (fangwu). As James Hevia explains, a local prod-
uct paid as tribute, as regulated in the Qing imperial guest ritual, was in fact “a 
means for differentiating one domain from another.”135 Unlike the Ming court, 
which had considered ginseng a unique local product of Korea, the Manchus saw 
it as a product of Manchu lands and a symbol of the Manchu people. In addition, 
as a fangwu symbolizing the division of distinct domains, ginseng, the Manchu 
product, indicated Qing separateness from the Chosŏn. Ginseng was defined as a 
local product of the Manchus, and therefore, the Chosŏn presentation of ginseng 
in tribute was no longer accepted.
After the second military campaign of 1637, Korean transgressions and ginseng 
poaching evoked even harsher criticism from the Qing court. The Chosŏn prince 
Sohyŏn (1612–1645), who was held hostage in Shenyang, received frequent com-
plaints from Manchu officials about Korean trespassing and the poor control of 
the Chosŏn over their boundaries.136 In 1645, when local people from Kanggye in 
P’yŏngan Province were arrested for crossing the Yalu River into Qing territory to 
poach ginseng, the Qing envoy went to Pyŏngyang and took a local Korean official 
there into custody, putting him in a cangue.137 It became a regular rule that Korean 
intruders, arrested for trespassing and poaching ginseng in Qing territory, would 
be beheaded on the shore of the Yalu River and, in addition, that local officials in 
the responsible Korean district would be dismissed or banished.138
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In 1642, the Chongde emperor may not have anticipated that within two years 
his son would enter Beijing to rule China proper, but he was well aware of the ter-
ritorial limits of his country:
I have succeeded to the great enterprise of Taizu and ascended the throne with heav-
en’s help. All the people living from the eastern sea to the northwestern sea have 
been subjugated, including the tribes of Dog Keeper [Shiquan] and Reindeer Herder 
[Shilu], and those who make their living by fishing and hunting, not through agri-
culture, in the region where black foxes and black sables live; the Oirats [E-lu-te] and 
others who live far away near the origin of the Onon River. The Mongols and the 
Chosŏn have also been incorporated [ru bantu].139
After the war of 1637, the two countries continued to deal with trespassers, most 
of whom now came from the Qing side into Chosŏn territory. Facing the aggres-
sive Qing expansion, the Chosŏn king insisted that Chosŏn territory should be 
respected. Injo pleaded with the Qing to do something about disturbances caused 
by Qing soldiers and civilians within Chosŏn territory that Chosŏn authorities 
were finding difficult to control. Injo’s conciliatory 1641 request to the Chongde 
emperor was markedly different in tone from Sŏnjo’s condescending letter in 1592 
asking Nurhaci to stay within his limits:
Even though this small country [the Chosŏn] is deemed by the great court [the Qing] 
to be as close as a family, it is also true that each has its own territory. These days it 
is necessary to check people coming and going, whether or not they possess written 
or spoken permission, because otherwise arbitrary crossings and trade get out of 
control. If [trespassers] are not firmly curbed now, territories [K. kangyŏk] will not 
be clearly fixed and the towns within them will not be stable. If crossing [the rivers] 
were prohibited except for those having an official document and proof, we believe 
that local people will be relieved and future problems prevented.140
In the same way that Nurhaci had underlined the significance of territorial lim-
its in order to protect his fragile Jurchen state from the neighboring Ming and 
Chosŏn, the Chosŏn king Injo stressed the boundaries that divided his kingdom 
from Qing lands in order to protect Chosŏn territory and authority. Just as the 
emerging Jurchen power had wanted to defend its land from the great Ming, the 
tributary Chosŏn court now sought to distinguish its territory from the suzerain 
Qing empire. All of these calls for respecting boundaries and sovereignty were 
efforts to survive the severe competition around Liaodong in the late sixteenth to 
early seventeenth centuries.
• • •
Ginseng carried high economic, political, and cultural value during the period of 
transition from the Aisin Gurun to the Qing empire. During the Jurchens’ initial 
rise, ginseng was one of the most valuable commodities from which Nurhaci made 
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the huge profits that enabled him to consolidate his power. In the second stage, 
when Nurhaci had succeeded in unifying the Jurchens and began to challenge 
Ming power, ginseng gradually came to be used for the purpose of indicating the 
territorial boundaries between the Ming and the Aisin Gurun. In the third phase, 
once Hong Taiji ascended the throne, ginseng came to bear a more political sig-
nificance in foreign relations. Hong Taiji attacked Korea in order to achieve two 
goals: the economic goal of protecting ginseng profits from Korean intruders, and 
the political goal of enhancing the position of the Qing state as a contender for 
control of Liaodong. However, the tributary relationship, established as the result 
of the military campaign of 1637, failed to resolve permanently the perennial chal-
lenges of sharing natural resources near the Yalu and Tumen Rivers. Despite two 
devastating wars, Koreans soon resumed the practice of crossing the rivers to col-
lect ginseng. Throughout the Qing period, the Manchu rulers had to renegotiate 
their tributary relationship with the Chosŏn, which required them to maintain the 
borderland with the Chosŏn, as discussed in chapter 2.
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In the fall of 1685, acting upon the Kangxi emperor’s (r. 1662–1722) orders, a gar-
rison officer (zhufang xieling), Le-chu, and his men began to survey Changbaishan 
and to map the topography of the region near the Yalu River.1 Their field investiga-
tion was part of an ambitious project to create The Unified Gazetteer of the Great 
Qing (Da Qing yitongzhi). When they approached a place named Sandaogou on 
the western bank of the Yalu River, they encountered a group of Koreans who 
had illegally crossed the river and were searching for ginseng. This illicit expedi-
tion had been organized by a local Korean official who had assembled a group 
of thirty-one “vagabonds and wanderers,” all natives of Hamgyŏng Province. The 
Qing officials began to shoot arrows at the illegal intruders to drive them away. 
This frightened the Koreans, who fired back with their rifles, killing a Qing official 
and twelve horses and injuring two other people. The Korean intruders managed 
to escape from the area, but because the Shengjing military governor reported the 
incident to the Board of Rites in Beijing, the incident soon escalated into a serious 
diplomatic issue between Beijing and Seoul.2
The respective responses of the Qing and Chosŏn courts to this incident dra-
matically illustrate the complexities of the relationship between the two states. 
Shortly after the incident, the Kangxi emperor’s emissary went to Seoul to inves-
tigate the case and forced the Chosŏn court to execute all of the offenders and the 
local officials involved. The Chosŏn king Sukchong (r. 1675–1720) was also asked 
to write a long and apologetic memorial to the Kangxi emperor and to pay a fine 
of twenty thousand liang of silver. As a short-term measure to prevent further tres-
passing for illegal ginseng gathering, the Chosŏn court forbade the Korean tribute 
embassy from engaging in private ginseng trading during its missions to Beijing 
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and banned the ginseng trade with Japan via Pusan. But this was not the end of 
the matter. The Kangxi emperor’s second response came in 1711 in the form of an 
investigation into the Changbaishan area, a place that traversed the Qing-Chosŏn 
boundary. The emperor announced:
The Huntong [Sungari] River flows north from Changbaishan, goes northeast along-
side Jilin [Chuanchang] and Dasheng Wula, and then meets with the Heilongjiang 
flowing into [the sea]. All of this is Chinese territory [Zhongguo difang]. The Yalu 
River flows southeast from Changbaishan, then to the southwest between Feng-
huangcheng and Ŭiju and on to the sea. Northwest of the Yalu River is all Chinese 
territory, and to its southeast is Korean territory [Chaoxian difang]. The Tumen River 
flows east along the perimeter of Changbaishan, then southeast to the ocean. South-
west of the Tumen is Korean territory; northeast of it is Chinese territory. All of these 
[boundaries] are already known, but the area between the Yalu and the Tumen is 
still unclear. . . . Now I am sending the Butha Ula superintendent [Wula zongguan] 
Mu-ke-deng to survey [the area]. . . . You must take this chance to examine the area 
thoroughly in order to investigate the boundaries and report what you find [wu jiang 
bianjie chaming laizou].3
The last sentence in the emperor’s order suggests that China and Korea were 
about to start the project of examining their mutual boundary for the first time in 
their long shared history.
This chapter analyzes the 1712 investigation of Changbaishan from three dif-
ferent perspectives. First, it points out that this survey project initiated by Kangxi 
was closely related to Qing empire building. After successfully defeating the rebel-
lion of the “Three Feudatories” (Sanfan) in South China and the Zheng family 
in Taiwan, Kangxi was able to turn his attention north toward Russia, which had 
been a source of worry to the Qing in Manchuria. Alongside military defense, the 
emperor also launched a series of projects to research the geographical contours 
of the empire and lay out its boundaries on maps. The survey of Changbaishan 
was just one part of this larger plan. Second, this investigation of the northeastern 
region was also necessary and useful for the purpose of promoting the status of the 
Manchus in the empire. As the birthplace of the Manchu ancestors, Changbaishan 
would receive special attention and respect. In addition to political considerations, 
the natural resources growing in the region’s mountains—most notably ginseng—
needed to be protected for the imperial court. The emperor had, therefore, every 
reason to desire more information about this area.
Finally, the process and outcome of the imperial investigation provide excellent 
evidence of how the Qing and Chosŏn courts understood one another, especially 
with regard to territories and sovereignty, and how the asymmetrical relation-
ship between them actually worked when they discussed important issues such as 
boundaries. The Qing court—representing the “great country”—supposed that it 
controlled the mountains at the boundary with the Chosŏn, whereas the Koreans 
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believed that they enjoyed at least partial sovereignty over these same mountains. 
The area was Golmin šanggiyan alin or Changbaishan for the Manchu emperor, 
but it was also Paektusan for the Chosŏn royal family. Despite its symbolic signifi-
cance, both the Qing and Chosŏn courts had only limited geographic knowledge 
about Changbaishan, largely because of the area’s deep forests and tough terrain. 
When the Qing rulers attempted to clarify the empire’s boundaries, especially the 
area between the Yalu and Tumen Rivers, however, the Chosŏn court fell back on 
the rhetoric of the age-old tributary relationship to fend them off. As this chapter 
shows, this rhetoric did not favor the Qing efforts; instead, it allowed the unclear 
limits of the two neighbors’ territories on the upper reaches of the Tumen River to 
stand, thus creating the Qing-Chosŏn borderland.
QING EMPIRE BUILDING
Hong Taiji died in 1643, before the Qing armies crossed Shanhaiguan. It was thus 
his son, the Shunzhi emperor (r. 1644–61), who entered the Ming capital to an-
nounce that the mandate of heaven had transferred to the Qing. But although 
the imperial court settled in Beijing, China was not actually quite conquered. Li 
Zicheng and other rebels were still alive, and important cities and towns in the 
north remained in the hands of former Ming commanders or local elites. In the 
1640s, the ultimate success of the Qing empire could not have been predicted. 
However, Prince Regent Dorgon (1612–1650) and a group of commanders and 
banner officials survived the political intrigues during the early years of the con-
quest and eventually succeeded in consolidating Manchu power by incorporating 
Han Chinese officials into the Qing empire.4
Domestic consolidation and military stability at the empire’s margins were 
largely achieved during Kangxi’s reign, a period that has been considered “not 
only the longest but also one of the most vibrant and complex in the history of im-
perial China.”5 Holding onto Qing rule, however, required Kangxi to wage a series 
of wars against domestic rebels and external rivals. The first and the most serious 
disruption to his rule was caused by the Three Feudatories, who had been given 
extraordinary powers and enormous domains in southern China as rewards for 
serving the conquering Qing court in the 1640s and 1650s. In Yunnan, Guizhou, 
Guangdong, Guangxi, and Fujian, these former Ming soldiers were granted civil 
and military authority to police, tax, and trade largely outside of Beijing’s control. 
By 1672, the Kangxi emperor determined that the main threat to the survival of the 
Qing was the independent military power of these Three Feudatories and decided 
to curtail their power. The most powerful of the three, Wu Sangui, responded to 
Beijing by revolting, but Kangxi eventually succeeded in defeating the rebels and 
establishing centralized rule in the south. In addition to the Three Feudatories, 
Zheng Chenggong, who captured Taiwan in 1661 and supported the Ming cause, 
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posed another threat to the shaky foundations of the Qing. The presence of the 
Zheng family in Taiwan also hampered trade along the Fujian coast as well as in 
Zhejiang and Guangdong. However, the last members of the Zheng family sur-
rendered to Qing forces in 1683, and Taiwan was finally incorporated into the 
Qing empire.6
Even before defeating these domestic rebellions in South China, the Kangxi 
emperor had to deal with the northeastern region, where Russian settlers clashed 
increasingly with Mongol and Manchu residents. He was agitated in particular 
by the growing number of Russian settlers who promoted agriculture along the 
Heilongjiang and had won the local tribes around Nerchinsk and Albazin over 
to their side. Qing armies were dispatched to destroy the Russian settlements at 
Albazin, but Russia and the Qing court eventually reached a diplomatic solution, 
resulting in the signing of the Treaty of Nerchinsk in 1689. This important agree-
ment between the Qing emperor and the Russian tsar granted Russians access 
to Chinese markets but, more importantly, helped the Qing prevent the Zunghar 
Mongols from making an alliance with Russia. The Zunghar leader, Galdan, had 
been trained as a lama under the Fifth Dalai Lama and therefore possessed great 
spiritual authority among the Zunghars and other Mongol tribes. With an am-
bition for another Mongol empire in the steppe, Galdan began to get involved 
in rivalries among the Khalkas, thereby posing a serious challenge to Qing rule 
in Mongolia. Solidifying his position with Russia with the Treaty of Nerchinsk, 
Kangxi was determined to put an end to Galdan’s ambitions. From 1690 to 1697, 
Kangxi led personal expeditions to defeat Galdan, who died hopelessly surround-
ed by Qing forces. By the time Kangxi died in 1722, the Qing empire had not yet 
reached its greatest size, but its boundaries were generally secure, and Manchu 
rule was firmly established in China.7
Qing empire building was envisioned through cartographic investigations that 
were rigorously promoted by the Qing rulers.8 These mapping projects were, in 
fact, closely linked to the broader context of the rise of powerful and expansionist 
empires in Eurasia during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, when sover-
eignty was gradually becoming tied to territorial integrity. Before the seventeenth 
century, the rulers of European and Asian states did not have clearly delimited 
conceptions of the boundaries of their domains. During the seventeenth century, 
however, the major states of Eurasia negotiated fixed linear boundaries in order 
to stake out their territories against competitors. Multiple sovereignties, which 
allowed small states to pay tribute to more than one neighboring country, be-
came impossible as maps gradually came to demarcate fixed boundaries between 
states. The Qing emperors shared with the rulers of European empires such as 
France and Russia a common awareness of the need to establish their territorial 
boundaries, and like their European counterparts, they used maps as a vehicle to 
this end.9
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The Kangxi era was a crucial moment in the Qing cartographic and boundary-
making project. As the Jesuits at the Kangxi court recorded in their memoirs, the 
emperor clearly recognized the potential threat from his neighbors, in particular 
the future threat posed by the Russians to the Qing empire.10 The prospect of a for-
midable Russian challenge from the north and the repeated defection of nomadic 
tribes into Manchuria indicated to the Kangxi emperor that there was an urgent 
need to clarify the empire’s territorial limits. It was the lack of a clear boundary in 
the Heilongjiang region that had led to the conflict with Russia, so resolving the 
ambiguity of the boundary in that area was an essential precondition of the Treaty 
of Nerchinsk. This agreement helped the two parties eliminate cross-boundary 
mobility and fix loyalties along the boundary, forcing local tribes to submit to 
clearly defined states occupying demarcated territories.11
The Kangxi emperor’s desire to map the boundaries of his expanding territory 
was satisfied thanks to the timely arrival of cartographic techniques developed in 
Europe. When he began to promote his mapping project, he found that some of 
the Jesuits visiting his country possessed the necessary measurement technology, 
and he allowed them to accompany him on his northern campaigns against Gal-
dan. Most of the foreign surveyors who participated in map making for Kangxi 
were from France, Europe’s leader in cartography. The first commission for the 
Jesuit cartographic project was to survey and map the environs of Beijing in 1707. 
Kangxi was pleased with the results and requested a second survey of portions of 
the Great Wall in 1708.12 Later, when the survey of the whole of the northern Zhili 
region was completed in 1710, the emperor finally commissioned the production 
of an atlas of the entire empire, later known as the Jesuit Atlas or Map with a Com-
plete View of the Imperial Territories (Huangyu quanlan tu). The map was pro-
duced in woodblock twice, in 1717 and 1721, and in copperplate in 1719. As Peter 
Perdue explains, the name of the atlas indicated Kangxi’s desire to encompass the 
entire realm in his gaze: “The compilation of the atlas was just one component of 
a broader project to systematize and rationalize the ruler’s knowledge of space and 
time.”13 The Jesuits surveyed the homeland of the Manchus around Mukden, Jehol, 
and the Ussuri and Heilongjiang Rivers. In fact, many Qing officials, including 
those who had participated in surveys of the boundaries with the Chosŏn, devel-
oped technologies for cartographic investigation while working with the Jesuits.14
These mapping projects helped the Qing emperors both promote their power 
within the empire and clarify the territorial limits of the imperial domains. Maps 
provided better knowledge of the realm and offered concomitant military advan-
tages for conquests as well as for subduing revolts. Since “representing territory 
cartographically was one way to lay claim to it,” the Huangyu quanlan tu defined 
what China was territorially to the rest of the world.15 Furthermore, the Kangxi 
emperor’s mapping of the Manchu homeland was clearly linked to his desire to dis-
tinguish Manchu identity from Han Chinese culture. It was intended “to enhance 
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Manchu identity by inscribing Manchu place [and] to define the extent of Qing im-
perial space.”16 Later, in the mid-eighteenth century, the mapping of the northwest-
ern region helped to systematize and clarify the Qianlong emperor’s knowledge 
of his empire’s territory. Therefore, military conquests alone did not complete the 
process of incorporating new territory into the Qing empire (ru bantu). As James 
Millward notes, “Mapping and research into the geography were instrumental in 
making this area [the northwest] part of a new, expanded conception of China.”17 
In other words, it was the map that completed the process of Qing empire building, 
in both the northeast and the northwest.
THE QING NORTHEAST AND GINSENG
The northeastern region carried special meanings for the Qing imperial court. 
First, the area was the sacred birthplace of the Manchu court. Called the “land 
from whence the dragon arose” (longxing zhi di), the “cradle of the Manchus” (fax-
iang zhi di), and the “place of Manchu origins” (genben zhi di), this vital region 
was considered a reserve for the conservation of Manchu identity, which included 
martial prowess and nomadic resilience. These were important traits for securing 
Qing political power and distinguishing the Manchus from other ethnic groups 
in China. Even after settling in Beijing, the Qing court built an auxiliary capital 
(peidu) in Shengjing, the old capital of Nurhaci and Hong Taiji—evidence that the 
Qing rulers gave the northeast significant attention.18 Second, it was a geopolitical-
ly crucial location for stabilizing the boundary with Russia, pacifying the Mongols 
in eastern Mongolia, and controlling the Chosŏn in the south. The northeast was 
also the gateway for entry into China proper and Beijing. The Kangxi emperor’s ef-
forts to negotiate the boundary with Russia clearly show this strategic significance 
of the northeast in the Qing empire. It was also considered the last refuge to which 
the Qing imperial court could retreat and from which it could defend itself against 
the Han Chinese.19
The Qing court’s special concern with the northeast was well expressed in “im-
perial eastern tours” (dongxun) to the region. Inspecting the realm is an ancient 
feature of leadership in China, but the practice reached full fruition during the 
Qing period.20 Imperial touring was emphasized, especially by Kangxi, as a useful 
opportunity to strengthen Qing rule over the domain. Kangxi visited the north-
east three times, in 1671, 1682, and 1698.21 Despite their official stated purpose of 
“visiting ancestral tombs and fulfilling filial duty,” such tours to the Shengjing area 
had more important motivations. For the Qing emperors, the sight of a ruler on 
horseback was a sign of vitality and strength as well as a demonstration of power-
ful affinity to Inner Asian precedents—evidence of “Qing ethno-dynastic rule,” as 
Michael Chang puts it.22 Accompanied by Manchu and Mongol princes, nobles, 
and bannermen, the emperors often participated in hunting expeditions during 
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these journeys. The necessity of coordinating great numbers of people into an en-
tourage and organizing the logistics of encampment made the tours very similar to 
military campaigns, thereby also providing a good opportunity to check military 
preparations and improve the martial skills of the bannermen.23 The eastern tours 
were also intended to serve the political interests of the emperor. Kangxi made 
his first visit to Shengjing right after he took charge of his court in person. For the 
young emperor, who needed to verify his imperial status to Manchu aristocrats 
and Han officials, the eastern tours provided a proper occasion to perform the role 
of the emperor, such as by making sacrifices at the tombs of Nurhaci and Hong 
Taiji. Conducting this ceremony in the old capital helped connect Kangxi with the 
ancestors of the dynasty and confirm his political status as the legitimate ruler of 
the Qing empire.24
In addition to their political and military value, the lands of the Qing northeast 
provided the ruling house with important sources of the imperial court’s privy 
Figure 4. Changbaishan. From Manzhou Shilu (Manchu Veritable Record), 1779. Manuscript, 
26.2 × 15.7 cm. Korea University Library. Used with permission.
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revenue. As explained in chapter 1, the rich natural resources of the northeast were 
a crucial factor in the initial development of the Jurchen state and the formation 
of Manchu political identity. Once Qing rule was consolidated in China proper, 
greater emphasis was put on Manchuria, the cultural reservoir of the old and pure 
Manchu traditions. The Qing policy on Manchuria after the 1644 conquest was 
not aimed merely at immediate material sustenance, but rather at the purpose of 
“imperial foraging.” As David Bello explains, the Qing court sought to develop 
a strategy to preserve and promote Manchu cultural identity and military skills 
in their sacred birthplace. Both hunting and gathering were considered integral 
elements of a distinct Manchu identity. This Manchu tradition required the Qing 
court to preserve a separate space isolated from the Han Chinese population, and 
the northeast provided a perfect location for this project. A great number of impe-
rial estates were built in eastern Fengtian and southwestern Jilin. These enclaved 
spaces and the practice of imperial foraging in Manchuria are evidence of the 
Qing strategy to maintain the spatial and cultural conditions for the preservation 
of the dynasty’s pre-conquest ethnic identity endangered by Han acculturation 
pressures.25
Once Qing rule was consolidated in China proper, the court developed a more 
complicated system of ginseng monopoly. The Imperial Household Department 
(Neiwufu) took responsibility for providing various natural resources, including 
ginseng, for imperial demands. The Imperial Household Department was sepa-
rate from the regular bureaucracy and solely managed the extraction of wealth 
for the imperial court. It was exclusively staffed by bannermen from the Three 
Upper Banners (Shangsanqi), namely the Plain Yellow, the Bordered Yellow, and 
the Plain White, which were directly controlled by the emperor.26 Among a num-
ber of its subsections, the Office of the Imperial Hunt (Duyusi) was in charge of 
hunting and gathering of ginseng, pearls, honey, and furs, and provided these 
tributes to the imperial court. In Manchuria, the Imperial Household Department 
built two institutions to manage ginseng monopoly: the Shengjing branch of the 
Imperial Household Department (Shengjing Neiwufu) and the Butha Ula super-
intendent (Dasheng Wula zongguan).27 The Shengjing branch, previously called 
the bondservant captains of the Three Upper Banners in Shengjing (Shengjing 
Shangsanqi baoyi zuoling), managed imperial estates and ginseng mountains 
scattered around in the region.28 By 1667, the Shengjing branch took over respon-
sibility of the ginseng monopoly and dispatched fifty people from each banner 
to collect ginseng on specified mountains every year, along with officers and 
soldiers who watched the movements of these collectors.29 The Butha Ula su-
perintendent was directly supervised by the Imperial Household Department, 
even though it was physically located within the jurisdiction of the Jilin military 
governor. During the mid-seventeenth century, the Butha Ula superintendent 
was at first a lower official of the sixth rank, but by 1698 it was promoted to the 
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third rank, a position being selected by the emperor and inherited for genera-
tions.30 During the Kangxi era, when the management of imperial foraging in 
Manchuria became more important for the Qing court, the roles of the Butha Ula 
superintendent continued to increase. Ginseng mountains (shenshan) as well as 
battue hunting grounds (weichang), scattered all around from the Sungari and 
Mudan Rivers to Changbaishan, were under jurisdiction of the Butha Ula super-
intendent.31 Ginseng tribute from Butha Ula was sent to the Imperial Household 
Department in Beijing, where it was carefully reviewed and divided by quality 
for imperial usage.32 Ginseng management was removed from the responsibility 
of the Butha Ula only in 1745, when the Qing court established a special office 
for ginseng management in Shengjing, Jilin, and Ningguta in order to further 
strengthen the state monopoly of ginseng.33
Besides the ginseng management of the Imperial Household Department, 
the Eight Banners (baqi) had long participated in ginseng gathering. Prior to the 
1644 conquest of China proper, the right to hunt and gather pearls, sable pelts, 
and ginseng was reserved for the Manchu imperial families and their banners. 
The court announced an equal division of the right to collect ginseng among the 
eight banners and enforced a prohibition on violations of other banners’ allocated 
ginseng mountains. This practice of dividing ginseng collection among the ban-
ners showed that Hong Taiji continued to acknowledge the principle of the equal 
privileges of the eight banner houses (bajia junfen).34 After moving to Beijing, the 
Shunzhi emperor continued to allocate specific ginseng-producing mountains 
to each banner and allowed only those with imperial princely rank to dispatch a 
given number of men to harvest a given amount of ginseng within a designated 
area. Unauthorized bannermen and civilians were punished if found gathering 
ginseng.35 Cong Peiyuan explains that the ginseng gathering of the Eight Banners 
differed in some ways from that of the Butha Ula superintendent. While the Eight 
Banners dispatched a large number of soldiers irregularly, the Butha Ula had a 
set number of butha soldiers (dasheng zhuangding), who were obliged to pay a 
given amount of ginseng for the imperial court on a regular basis. The number of 
soldiers that the Eight Banners and the Butha Ula superintendent dispatched for 
ginseng gathering was constantly changing depending on their demands.36
Systematic ginseng management became particularly pronounced during the 
Kangxi period. In 1684, the emperor reduced banner privileges for exclusive gin-
seng gathering by ending the allocation of specific ginseng mountains to each ban-
ner. He also limited the number of gatherers and the amount of ginseng permitted 
for each of the princes and aristocrats, who had to pay taxes at Shanhaiguan for the 
surplus ginseng that they collected beyond the set amount.37 In 1709 the practice of 
allocating ginseng-producing mountains to the Eight Banners finally ended. This 
decision shows that by this time the Qing efforts to manage the ginseng monopoly 
within the framework of the traditional banner organization were failing, because 
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wild ginseng was overharvested and rapidly declining, while state regulations to 
tackle widespread illegal poaching were ineffective.38 The court temporarily closed 
overexploited ginseng-producing areas at the boundaries of Liaoning and Jilin, 
while seeking to develop new ginseng mountains in northern Jilin and to the east 
of the Ussuri River. However, the Elmin and Halmin areas in Shengjing were still 
open every year for ginseng gathering.39 Importantly, even after the abolition of 
banner privileges for ginseng gathering, the Qing court did not ease the prohibi-
tion on Han Chinese entering and gathering ginseng in these protected locations. 
In 1709, the Kangxi emperor warned: “Ginseng has an important use at the court 
and thus should not be in shortage. Ginseng gathering is allowed for Manchu sol-
diers but not for Han Chinese. [Illegal Han Chinese ginseng pickers] should be 
arrested.”40 Kangxi considered ginseng in Manchuria to belong exclusively to the 
Manchus, just as his grandfather Hong Taiji had done.
CHANGBAISHAN AND PAEKTUSAN
Changbaishan, located at the boundary with the Chosŏn, was respected as the 
birthplace of the Manchu imperial family. The mountain was called by different 
names, including Golmin šanggiyan alin (“long and white”) by the Manchus, 
Changbaishan (“long and white” or “ever-white”) by the Chinese, and Paektu-
san (“white head”) by the Koreans. These names stemmed from the fact that the 
mountain looks white throughout the year because of the snow on its peaks. This 
phenomenon inspired many folk explanations, such as “The Bodhisattva wears 
Table 1 The ginseng-gathering privileges of princes and aristocrats by rank.
Rank Number of men dispatched to 
gather ginseng










huguo jiangjun 25 12
fuguo jiangjun 20 10
fengguo jiangjun 18 9
feng’en jiangjun 15 7
Sources: Shengjing shenwu dang’an shiliao, 26 (Kangxi 23/1/24; Kangxi 23/3/17); Imamura, Ninjinshi, 2:224.
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white clothes and lives in the mountain”; “The animals living on the mountain 
are all white”; and “Only white flowers grow on the mountain.” It was during the 
Liao (907–1125) and Jin (1115–1234) dynasties that the name Changbaishan first 
appeared in Chinese records. The name Paektusan appears in Korean documents 
from the early Koryŏ dynasty (918–1392).41
Soon after the Manchu rulers rose to power in Liaodong, their strong interest in 
Changbaishan became apparent. Their respect for the mountain is evident in the 
following account, which appears on the first page of the Qing Veritable Records of 
the reign of Nurhaci (Qing Taizu shilu):
Qing Taizu Aisin Gioro [Nurhaci’s] ancestors emerged from Changbaishan. It is two 
hundred li in height and one thousand li around. Trees are extremely dense there. 
On the top of the mountain is a small lake called the Tamun, which is eighty li in cir-
cumference. It is both deep and wide. Three rivers, the Yalu, the Huntong [Sungari], 
and the Aihu [Tumen],42 originate from it. The Yalu River begins on the south side 
of the mountain and flows west to the sea south of Liaodong. The Huntong River 
comes from the north side of the mountain and flows northward to the North Sea. 
The Aihu River flows eastward and enters the East Sea. The three rivers have marvel-
ous spirits, and the pearls produced in this region are highly valuable for generations 
to come. . . . The mountain named Bukūri in the east of Changbaishan had the lake 
of Bulhūri, where three daughters from Heaven had come to take a bath.  .  .  . The 
youngest daughter, Fekulen, took a red fruit delivered by a divinely magpie and then 
became pregnant. Later she gave a birth to a child, whose surname was Aisin Gioro 
and given name was Bukūri Yongšon.43
This passage states clearly that Changbaishan was associated with the origin of 
the Manchus. The legend of the sacred mountain and its role in the Manchu rise to 
power thus predated the Qing conquest of China proper.44 To Qing rulers, Chang-
baishan was undoubtedly Manchu territory.
The Kangxi emperor paid special attention to this sacred mountain. In 1677 
he sent imperial emissaries led by Umene (?–1690) to investigate Changbaishan 
and make sacrifices to the mountain.45 Such sacrifices became a regular occur-
rence during the reigns of his descendants. Kangxi even dedicated a poem to 
the sacred mountain. Along with these rituals, he also elevated the status of the 
mountain in the geographical hierarchy of sacred mountains to the extent that 
China’s premier mountain, Taishan, was imagined to come from Changbais-
han. The Kangxi emperor argued that since Changbaishan was the birthplace 
of the Manchu imperial court, it should have the highest position among all 
the mountains in China. Kangxi’s interest in this sacred place led him to seek 
to know more about its environs as well. Surveys of Changbaishan provided 
an excellent opportunity to promote the eminence of the imperial court; at the 
same time, geographic information gathered in the northeast could also be used 
for security purposes.46
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However, mapping the empire’s margins required the Qing court to recast its 
relationships with its neighbors. The problem in regard to Changbaishan was 
that the Koreans did not think that this mountain belonged to their neighbor. 
In their vision of a hierarchical order encompassing all Korean mountain chains, 
Paektusan was quite literally conceived as the summit of the system. The Koreans 
believed that this mountain accumulated its energy (K. ki) from Manchuria and 
dispensed it throughout the peninsula.47 The high status of Paektusan in Korean 
geomantic conceptions also contributed to the mystification of the mountain in 
Korean history, and it has been routinely associated with the rise of the old Korean 
kingdoms. In his book Lost History of the Three Kingdoms (K. Samguk yusa), 
Koryŏ’s famous Buddhist monk, Iryŏn (1206–1289), noted that all the founders of 
Korean kingdoms, including Ko Chosŏn, Parhae, and Koguryŏ, had been born in 
the Paektusan area.48
The northern region surrounding Paektusan had even more significance for 
the Chosŏn than it had for previous dynasties, as discussed in chapter 1, because 
the founders of the Chosŏn originated in the region of the Tumen River. Songs of 
Flying Dragons (K. Yongbi ŏch’ŏn’ga), which celebrates the founding of the Chosŏn 
dynasty, mentions this area as the birthplace of Yi Sŏnggye’s great-grandfather. 
Hamgyŏng Province, where Paektusan and the Tumen River are located, was the 
very place in which Yi Sŏnggye built his power through a series of expeditions 
against the Jurchens. Thus, it was considered “the northern gate of the country” 
(K. pungmun) and “the place where the king arose” (K. hŭngwang ŭi chi). Like the 
Qing rulers who treasured their northeastern region, the Chosŏn kings believed 
that Hamgyŏng Province was their sacred birthplace.
Interestingly, despite the mountain’s close connections with the royal family, 
sacrifices to Paektusan were not included in the Chosŏn court’s official list of na-
tional rituals until the middle of the eighteenth century. In 1414, when the Chosŏn 
Board of Rites selected major mountains and rivers in the territory, Paektusan was 
merely one of the minor mountains to which local officials, not the king, offered 
sacrifices.49 In 1437, the Board of Rites even proposed an end to the practice of 
making sacrifices to Paektusan, because “it is not within our country’s territory” 
(K. Paektusan pi pon’guk kyŏngnae).50 The exclusion of Paektusan from the Chosŏn 
territory is also described in the section on geography in the Veritable Records of 
the Chosŏn Dynasty (K. Sejong sillok chiri chi) during the Sejong reign (1419–50), 
which does not list Paektusan as a renowned mountain in Hamgil (Hamgyŏng) 
Province. Yet this section on geography also mentions that “mountains originat-
ing from Paektusan reach to the south up to Ch’ŏllyŏng,” suggesting that Paektusan 
was the summit and origin of all the mountains on the peninsula. Such ambiguity 
in the early Chosŏn understanding of Paektusan is also evident in a discussion 
between the Chosŏn king Hyŏnjong (r. 1660–74) and his court officials. When 
the king asked whether the mountain was located on Chosŏn land, his officials 
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answered, “It is in the foreign land [K. hoji],” but added that “it is also the very 
summit of our mountains and rivers.”51 These records demonstrate that during 
the early Chosŏn period, the northern provinces—Changbaishan and the Tumen 
River area, in particular—were largely considered to be a place where the Jurchens 
lived, quite beyond the reach of Chosŏn control.52 It was only in the middle of the 
eighteenth century that the assumption that all of mountains in Chosŏn territory 
originated from Paektusan was extended to claim that the mountain itself was 
actually within Chosŏn territory.
During the early Chosŏn period, in fact, neither Paektusan nor Hamgyŏng 
Province was fully under Chosŏn control. As chapter 1 explained, the early Chosŏn 
rulers all sought to bring this northern province under Chosŏn rule; nevertheless, 
this expansionist movement was largely an independent action by the Chosŏn, 
not the result of an agreement with the Ming. The two neighbors had established 
a stone marker near the Yalu River in 1605, but it served to demarcate only a small 
portion of their boundary. The exact northern limits remained rather unclear.53 In 
addition, access to the region of the six garrisons near the Tumen River, surround-
ed as it was by mountain ranges, was very limited for both the local population and 
the central administration. And the region projected northward toward Jurchen 
territory, making Chosŏn military control nearly impossible. Given the harsh en-
vironment and limited access, only a few groups of people settled in Hamgyŏng 
Province, a situation that led the Chosŏn court to virtually abandon its northern 
region.54 Another reason for the isolation of Hamgyŏng Province from the central 
politics of the Chosŏn kingdom lay in its cultural affinity with the Jurchens, who 
had intermingled and intermarried with their Korean neighbors. In the eyes of 
Seoul, Hamgyŏng Province was beyond the reach of civilization. It was not only 
geographically remote but culturally foreign as well.55
From the sixteenth century onward, the stability of the Chosŏn northern re-
gion was more closely dependent on the actions of the Jurchens and, later, the 
Manchus. During the Japanese invasions of 1592–98 and the subsequent struggles 
for restoration, the Chosŏn court could not afford to pay attention to the north. 
The northern region, especially P’yŏngan Province, was devastated by Hong Tai-
ji’s campaigns against the Chosŏn in 1627 and 1637, when Manchu forces passed 
through and pillaged the area. Hamgyŏng Province was also insecure and vulner-
able; a number of Warka, Hūrha, and other Jurchen descendants who had lived 
around the Tumen River area for generations, often called the subordinate barbar-
ians of the Chosŏn, had been relocated to Liaodong and mobilized into the eight 
banner forces. During the years of Nurhaci and Hong Taiji, Manchu troops con-
tinued to attack the local tribes near the Tumen River and moved many of these 
populations to the Manchu center, an action that made the Chosŏn northeastern 
margins even less populated.56 However, the Chosŏn court was not yet given a 
chance to begin the national project of rebuilding the northern region. What was 
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required first was removing any Qing doubts about the Chosŏn court’s loyalty 
and normalizing its relationship with the suzerain power. With the relationship 
with the Qing still tense, the Chosŏn court could not risk allowing the growth of 
permanent settlement in the Hamgyŏng Province.
In fact, by the late seventeenth century, when the Three Feudatories revolted 
in South China and the Mongol prince Buruni attacked Mukden, Qing power in 
China still seemed precarious to Chosŏn Koreans. News of civil wars in China led 
the Koreans to anticipate the fall of the Qing court. The Chosŏn court had been 
concerned about the possibility of political disorder in China and the subsequent 
threat posed by the retreating Manchus. The Koreans commonly believed that 
foreign conquerors could not control China proper for more than one hundred 
years. These expectations, based on historical observations, were confirmed by the 
breakout of the Three Feudatories’ rebellion, which convinced the Koreans that 
the Qing was in danger of imminent collapse. Koreans believed that in the event of 
a dynastic collapse, the Manchus would retreat to their homeland in the northeast 
and eventually invade Chosŏn territory again.57
News of the rebellion of the Three Feudatories strengthened the Chosŏn court’s 
hostility toward the Manchus. Some court officials were empowered to call for ag-
gressive action against the Qing, and they welcomed the revolt in South China as 
an opportunity to take revenge on the Manchus: “The uprising of Wu Sangui is so 
righteous that we should take advantage of it to clear the disgraceful experience 
of the invasion [of 1637]. Therefore, how could we dare to dispatch forces to help 
[the Qing] repress [the Three Feudatories]!”58 Tribute emissaries who had visited 
Beijing and Shengjing also delivered news of the Qing domestic crisis to Seoul. 
In 1682, Yun Ije, returning from his emissary service in Beijing, reported to King 
Sukchong:
In Shengjing, there were well-prepared city walls and a numerous population. How-
ever, the city gates in Beijing and the main hall [Taihedian] of the palace have crum-
bled and have not been repaired. It seemed to me that [the Manchus] are planning 
to retreat, so they do not care about the regions inside [Shanhaiguan] and instead 
pay attention to the areas around Shengjing and Ningguta as their base. Therefore, 
their claim to pacify the south is not trustworthy. . . . I was also told that the [Kangxi] 
emperor is going on a massive hunting expedition in Xifengkou, despite his brother’s 
dissuasion. This hunting trip is apparently aimed at displaying Qing military power 
to the Mongols.59
He further quoted the Qing interpreter Li Yishan: “A very difficult situation is 
coming soon.” Yun’s report worried Sukchong: “If the Mongols become powerful, 
the world will be in chaos. How can we be sure that the Chosŏn will be safe?”60
Amid such uncertainty about the future of Qing authority in Beijing, the 
Chosŏn court could not consider its northern region. Until Manchu rule in 
China was stabilized and the relationship with the Qing secured, discussions 
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about population resettlement or economic development in P’yŏngan and 
Hamgyŏng Provinces would be difficult.61 In fact, only the lonely voice of Nam 
Kuman (1629–1711) claimed the importance of defending the Yalu and Tumen 
Rivers. Based on his experience as governor of Hamgyŏng, Nam argued that an 
effort to protect the northern margin (K. pyŏnji) would be a better strategy for 
the state’s security than would building more defense facilities near Seoul. He 
also rejected the idea that the Manchus would retreat to the northeast via the 
Chosŏn north in the event that they had to leave China proper; he found it more 
reasonable to expect the Manchus to take familiar routes from Shengjing to 
Ningguta instead of using unknown roads in a foreign country. Thus, he argued 
that the Chosŏn should develop the northern region:
We have not planned to build garrisons even on lands that our records indicate be-
long to the Chosŏn; we have simply abandoned them to grow rich forests where no 
one lives. There are only vicious people who come and go illegally to poach ginseng, 
but nobody can control them. It is to be regretted that court officials, who worry 
only about trespassing, do not understand that deserting the land is a more serious 
problem.62
In response to Nam’s strong arguments for the development of the northern 
region, the Chosŏn court made a short-lived effort to reopen garrisons near the 
Yalu River and to encourage people to settle there in the 1670s. However, this re-
opening was soon canceled. The majority of Chosŏn officials were worried that 
any development of the northern region would cause more trouble. Specifically, 
they feared that road building in the north would help enemies invade the country, 
and population settlement along the Yalu and Tumen Rivers would loosen security 
and cause more people to trespass. In 1685, when reports that local Koreans were 
illegally crossing the Yalu River reached the Chosŏn court, the court immediately 
closed the roads and garrisons in the area. Chosŏn access to its northern margins 
had to wait until its relations with the Qing were settled.
THE INVESTIGATION OF THE MOUNTAIN
In addition to his political and historical interest in Changbaishan, Kangxi 
had another urgent motive for launching an investigation of the Qing-Chosŏn 
boundary: Koreans continued to cross the rivers and illegally enter Qing terri-
tory. Chosŏn court records include numerous cases of Korean trespassing and 
subsequent discussions with the Qing authorities about the repatriation of the 
offenders. The Qing emperor frequently sent emissaries to Korea to research the 
situation and to deliver letters ordering the Chosŏn to control its boundaries more 
effectively. Once in Seoul, the Qing officials joined the Chosŏn king and court 
officials in examining the criminals, deciding their sentences, and reporting the 
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cases to the Qing emperor, who finally authorized the punishment.63 As Qing-
Chosŏn relations gradually settled by the 1660s, Beijing sent imperial emissaries 
to Seoul less frequently than before. If the number of trespassers was small, the 
Qing allowed the Chosŏn to investigate the cases on its own and to report back 
to the Qing afterward. Punishments of local officials in charge of the regions in 
question were also lightened. Harsh sentences, such as that meted out in the 1647 
case in which a Qing emissary pressured the Chosŏn court to decapitate a local 
official for overlooking trespassing in his jurisdiction,64 were generally replaced 
with demotion or dismissal. Sentences for trespassers were often reduced through 
imperial amnesty.65
Not surprisingly, the Chosŏn court sought to avoid conflict with Beijing caused 
by Koreans crossing illegally into Qing territory. Regardless of how lenient the 
Qing became toward the Chosŏn, trespassing cases involving Korean subjects al-
ways brought trouble for Seoul. The Chosŏn court was especially keen to avoid the 
presence of Qing officials in Korean territory, since military facilities and strategic 
locations could be easily exposed during the latter’s investigatory visits. All the 
court could do was to impose heavy sentences on trespassers and hope to avoid 
incurring Qing criticism. In 1672, the Chosŏn court decided that individuals con-
victed three times of trespassing should be decapitated, but in 1686 it strengthened 
the regulation so that all first convictions would lead to beheading on the shore 
of the Yalu River. A complete prohibition of any ginseng gathering was imposed 
to stop people from trespassing; this law was included in The Supplement to the 
National Code (K. Sok taejŏn) published in 1746.66
Among the numerous trespassing cases, the Sandaogou incident of 1685, in 
particular, demonstrates how the Kangxi emperor understood Qing-Chosŏn 
relations. The emperor was already quite suspicious of Chosŏn loyalty to the 
Qing, as shown in his decision to impose a heavy fine of twenty thousand liang 
of silver on the Chosŏn king for neglecting his duty to prevent his people from 
crossing the Yalu River. In fact, the Ming court had had the same system of 
fines in place but had applied it only to domestic subjects, never to the Chosŏn 
king.67 The Kangxi emperor’s unusually rigorous attitude toward the Chosŏn 
was closely linked with his awareness of the fact that the Chosŏn court was 
informed of the rebellion of Three Feudatories and that anti-Qing sentiment 
consequently resounded in Korea. The Kangxi emperor and his Manchu of-
ficials believed that the Chosŏn was disrespectfully anticipating the decline 
of the Qing dynasty and even considering the possibility of cooperating with 
anti-Qing forces, such as the Zheng family in Taiwan. Qing suspicion and 
distrust of the Chosŏn was apparent in 1679, when Korean emissaries were 
criticized for disregarding the appropriate formalities in writing letters to the 
emperor.68 The Chosŏn king was eventually fined ten thousand liang of silver 
for the errors in his letter, a decision announced soon after the final defeat of 
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the Three Feudatories in order to send a strong warning to the Chosŏn court.69 
Later, in 1683 and 1685, Kangxi refused to accept the petition of the Chosŏn for 
temporary closure of the regular trading markets in Chunggang (C. Zhongji-
ang), Hoeryŏng, and Kyŏngwŏn, expressing his suspicions of the Chosŏn: “In 
controlling foreign countries, there should be a balance between rigorousness 
and coaxing. The Koreans are naturally cunning and often lie. If we accept their 
petition now, they will nag endlessly in the future.”70
After the Sandaogou incident, Kangxi decided to launch his investigation of 
Changbaishan and the surrounding territories. He first asked the Chosŏn court 
to participate in a joint survey in 1691, because he knew that an investigation 
of the mountain could not possibly proceed without the cooperation of local 
Koreans. In his letter to the Chosŏn king, the emperor explained that he wanted 
to compile a comprehensive gazetteer (Da Qing yitongzhi), but that the records 
held in Shengjing and Ningguta were all inaccurate. He wrote, “Since the areas 
south of Ŭiju and the Tumen River all fall within Chosŏn territory, there must 
be local people familiar with the boundaries [jierang difang].  .  .  . [The Chosŏn 
court] should find such locals and prepare postal stations to receive the Qing 
imperial emissaries.”71 When he was told that all Chosŏn roads from Ŭiju to 
Changbaishan were closed and inaccessible to both people and horses, the em-
peror reprimanded the Chosŏn king for his reluctance to participate in the in-
vestigation: “Our officials used to see your patrols in the Changbaishan region 
while they were surveying the land. How is it possible that the Chosŏn has no 
local people familiar with the boundaries?”72
The Qing opportunity to press the Chosŏn court into cooperating with the in-
vestigation finally came in 1710, when Yi Manji, a Korean from Wiwŏn, P’yŏngan 
Province, illegally crossed the Yalu River, killing and injuring Qing merchants and 
stealing their ginseng. The Kangxi emperor immediately asked the Chosŏn embas-
sy in Beijing about the area where the incident took place and about the distance 
of Wiwŏn from Qing territory. In 1711, the emperor announced the dispatch of an 
imperial emissary to the Chosŏn to investigate Changbaishan and its surrounding 
areas:
You have my order to survey the area with Chosŏn officials, following the river to 
reach [the mountain]. You can go by way of Chinese territory [Zhongguo suoshu 
difang]. If Chosŏn officials are accompanying you in Chinese territory, they, too, can 
go. If Chinese territory is too rough to traverse, you can enter Chosŏn territory. You 
must take this chance to examine the area thoroughly in order to investigate the 
boundaries and report what you find.73
However, the Kangxi emperor’s proposal for a joint survey of Changbais-
han was not welcomed at the Chosŏn court. For the Koreans, repeated visits to 
Changbaishan by Manchu officials, and their survey of the boundaries, seemed 
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to presage the possibility of an impending Qing retreat. Korean suspicions of the 
Qing interest in the boundary had been expressed already in 1680:
King Hyojong (r. 1649–59) once remarked that the Manchus would surely be at-
tacked by the Mongols along the route to Shenyang, so they will try to find their way 
via Korean territory, crossing through Ŭiju, Yangdŏk, Maengsan, and Hamgyŏng 
Province to enter their old bases. . . . [The Manchus] will seek their path of retreat 
through our territory to return to their original place. This is why they inspect the 
area under the excuse of sacrificing to the mountain, ask us to build roads, and claim 
the land south of Changbaishan as their territory. If they are defeated, they will, by 
necessity, return to their homeland via our territory.74
Given such suspicions at the Chosŏn court, it is understandable that the Kangxi 
emperor’s request for a joint survey in 1691 was not well received. While the 
Chosŏn court refused to help the Qing investigate the boundary, it was also very 
careful not to leak any domestic information to its neighbor. In 1698, when a Qing 
official from Ningguta tried to investigate the area near Kyŏngwŏn and Hoeryŏng 
and succeeded in mapping the locations of cities and towns, the Chosŏn court 
decapitated the two interpreters who had cooperated with the Qing official on the 
project. This practice later became law: anyone who informed foreigners about the 
condition of roads in Korea would be sentenced to death.75
Figure 5. P’yesagundo (map of the Four Closed Counties), early nineteenth century. Manu-
script, 115 × 194.5 cm. Kyujanggak Institute for Korean Studies of Seoul National University, no. 
ko-pok-ch’uk 4709–94. Used with permission.
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The Chosŏn officials were suspicious of the Kangxi emperor’s motives for 
proposing the joint investigation. As one of them angrily complained, “If they 
just needed geographical information for compilation of a comprehensive gazet-
teer, it would have been much easier to ask us to investigate the area and draft 
a map. Why would they bother to send so many officials and to travel inside 
another country’s territories by themselves? . . . They are cheating us with some 
excuses.”76 In fact, the Qing court clearly stated that the investigation would not 
violate Chosŏn territory. The Kangxi emperor’s letter to the Chosŏn court in 1712 
stated that the proposed survey aimed to examine the boundaries from the Qing 
side and would not bother the Chosŏn. Only in cases when the roads in Qing 
territory were too arduous to travel would the Qing officials ask for help from 
the Chosŏn court.77 However, these assurances did not relieve Korean anxiety 
about the Manchu court’s intentions. While waiting for the imperial emissary 
charged with undertaking the investigation, the Chosŏn court decided to refuse 
all requests for information about the Chosŏn northern region. Instead, it sought 
to convince the Manchu official, as well as the Qing emperor, that the Yalu and 
Tumen Rivers served as the boundary between the Qing and the Chosŏn and that 
“all the territory south of the rivers is ours.”78
MU-KE-DENG’S  MISSION
Although Jesuit missionaries had been involved in other mapping projects carried 
out by the Qing court, they could not participate in the Changbaishan survey. The 
Kangxi emperor, who had an understanding of Korean sensitivities, knew that as 
Westerners they would never have been allowed into Korea. Therefore, the map 
of the boundary with the Chosŏn had to be filled in by Butha Ula superintendent 
Mu-ke-deng, a Manchu official who was accompanied by a Chinese mathematician 
and a surveying team trained by the Jesuits.79 Mu-ke-deng’s first attempt to investi-
gate Changbaishan, which took place in 1711, faced carefully designed obstruction 
by the Chosŏn court and local officials. All the Koreans with whom Mu-ke-deng 
dealt endeavored to discourage the Manchu official from undertaking the dangerous 
journey to the mountains and refused to cooperate with the survey: they misguided 
him to more difficult paths and declined to provide proper information about their 
country. On his first visit, Mu-ke-deng thus failed to achieve his mission, succeeding 
only in having his front teeth broken.80
In 1712, Mu-ke-deng made a second visit to Ŭiju, telling the Koreans that 
his visit was authorized by an imperial edict and that he had been sent to de-
marcate the Qing-Chosŏn boundary. This mission was, he declared, designed 
to “prevent vicious people from disturbing the boundaries.”81 He also asked the 
local Korean official, Pak Kwŏn, whether the latter’s office had any documents 
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or information related to the location of the boundary and whether military 
guards were stationed to the south of Changbaishan. The official answer to all 
of these questions was no.82 When Mu-ke-deng began his survey, Pak Kwŏn, his 
Korean counterpart, could not keep pace with him and eventually abandoned 
the project. Pak suggested to Mu-ke-deng that marching up the steep side of 
the mountain through the heavy underbrush and forest was too arduous and 
that they should engage interpreters and locals instead of doing the work them-
selves. However, Mu-ke-deng insisted on taking this route.83 Assisted only by his 
Korean interpreter, Mu-ke-deng was able to map the course of the Yalu River 
quickly, because he traveled against the current of the river. The mouth of the 
Yalu was wide, and the river narrowed toward its source at the top of the moun-
tain, making it easier to follow the river from the mouth to its source. Traveling 
the other way was substantially more difficult, because the river disappeared un-
derground or divided from time to time. Because he started his investigation of 
the Tumen River from the top of Changbaishan, Mu-ke-deng found it difficult 
to identify the river’s actual source. He eventually selected a spot and ordered a 
stone marker to be erected to mark the watershed from which the Tumen flowed 
east. The stone marker reads as follows:
The Great Qing Ula superintendent, Mu-ke-deng, received imperial orders to survey 
the boundary. From this marker to the west is the Yalu River, and to the east is the 
Tumen River. Therefore, here at this watershed is a stone marker, which was erected 
and inscribed on June 18, 1712 [Kangxi 51/5/15].84
Besides erecting the stone stele, Mu-ke-deng asked Chosŏn officials to build 
fences to make the boundary visible. In fact, the Tumen River flowed under-
ground for several dozen li from its watershed, eventually becoming a wide, eas-
ily crossable stream for a distance of about one hundred li. In order to prevent 
confusion and trespassing, Mu-ke-deng emphasized that the Koreans should 
decide how to guard their side of the boundary.85 Before leaving for Jilin the 
following month, Mu-ke-deng sent a copy of his map of Changbaishan to the 
Chosŏn king Sukchong. Later, Sukchong praised the Kangxi emperor for his 
efforts to demarcate the boundary: “Last summer, the imperial emissary demar-
cated the boundary without asking for any help from foreigners [the Chosŏn]. 
Imperial virtue prevented dishonest people from disturbing the boundary. Our 
small country’s king and people altogether appreciate your great kindness. . . . 
[You] made the river the boundary, marking the north and the south of the 
mountain.”86
The following year, in 1713, Mu-ke-deng visited Seoul. He asked Sukchong for 
maps of Changbaishan as well as a general map of Chosŏn.87 The king and court 
officials obviously did not want to share detailed information on the geography of 
their country with the Manchu official, but they nonetheless had to find a way to 
Figure 6. Paektusan chǒnggyebi chido (map of the stele of Changbaishan), date 
unknown. Manuscript, 97.6 × 56.9 cm. Kyujanggak Institute for Korean Studies of 
Seoul National University, no. kyu 26676. Used with permission.
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convince the Qing emissary that the Chosŏn was willing to comply with the impe-
rial order. The Chosŏn supreme councilor (K. yŏngŭijŏng), Yi Yu, informed the 
king: “Although the nation’s defense maps are too detailed, we have just acquired a 
map that is neither too precise nor too general, with many mistakes on the Paektu 
rivers. Let us show him this.”88 Mu-ke-deng made copies of this map, saying, “We 
are taking one copy with us, and leaving one with you, so that our name and fame 
can spread to this place.”89 With this third visit to the Chosŏn, Mu-ke-deng’s of-
ficial mission was complete.
Mu-ke-deng’s long, strenuous mission did not, however, resolve all of 
the boundary issues between the Qing and the Chosŏn. To the contrary, it 
opened up a new dimension in their ongoing debate. The primary question 
concerned the location of the Tumen riverhead. After Mu-ke-deng’s departure, 
the Chosŏn officials charged with building wooden fences along the Tumen 
River found that the spot Mu-ke-deng had identified as the river’s origin was, 
in fact, to northeast of the river and thus incorrect. The Chosŏn court faced 
a dilemma: if it followed Mu-ke-deng’s guidelines, fences would be built in 
the wrong place, in Qing territory. However, if it ignored the Manchu official’s 
findings and erected the fences at its own discretion, this would create prob-
lems in its relationship with the Qing court. If the Qing emperor received word 
that Mu-ke-deng had made a mistake in identifying the Tumen riverhead, the 
Manchu official could be in trouble. If the Qing court decided to dispatch an-
other official for reexamination, the Chosŏn could face another round of inves-
tigation and eventually lose its territory.90 After much discussion, the Chosŏn 
court decided to explain the difficulty of building and maintaining the fences 
along the boundary to Mu-ke-deng, not to the Qing emperor.91 The Chosŏn 
court thus sought to protect its territory by convincing the Manchu official of 
its perspective, without agitating the Qing emperor.
The Qing court’s attitude was very different from that of the Chosŏn. There 
is no evidence that the Kangxi emperor or his successors ever verified the loca-
tion of the stone marker, a fact that was revealed during boundary surveys in 
the late nineteenth century and eventually undermined the legitimacy of it as 
a verification of demarcating the two territorial realms. Instead, Mu-ke-deng 
was seemingly untroubled about his designation of the Tumen riverhead and 
its subsequent effect on Qing territory. When Korean interpreter Kim Chinam 
asked for a copy of the map of Changbaishan, Mu-ke-deng generously answered, 
“It would be impossible [to give a copy of the map to you] if [the mountain were 
in] the great country’s territory, but because it is in yours, it is not difficult [to 
give you a copy].”92 In addition, after choosing the location for the Tumen riv-
erhead, Mu-ke-deng stated, “The spot was located ten li further north than you 
Koreans thought, so the Chosŏn actually gained more territory.” The Koreans 
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accompanying Mu-ke-deng were delighted to hear this and no longer doubted 
his decision about the site of the stone marker.93
Later on, Mu-ke-deng reassured the Chosŏn that it need not worry about the 
location of the marker and noted that he would not survey the mountain again. 
He added that local Koreans should not bother to build the fences during the busy 
harvest season.94 In fact, when Mu-ke-deng visited Korea the following year, he 
did not mention the location of the Tumen riverhead at all. The Chosŏn court 
soon realized that the Qing did not care about the location of the stone marker 
as much as the Chosŏn did. A year after Mu-ke-deng’s survey, a Chosŏn official, 
Hong Ch’ijung, found that Mu-ke-deng’s stone marker was very small and not 
firmly positioned. Even the characters inscribed on it were wrong. Hong observed 
that this “shows that even though he was an imperial emissary, Mu-ke-deng did 
not do his best.”95 Because of the apparent indifference of the Qing, the Chosŏn 
side had no reason to bring up the issue of the Tumen riverhead again. After all 
of the investigations and discussions, the origin of the Tumen River—the actual 
location of the Qing-Chosŏn boundary—still remained unclear.
We can find more than “Mu-ke-deng’s ignorance and Kangxi’s negligence”96 in 
the investigation of Changbaishan and in the ambiguity regarding the Tumen riv-
erhead. The events and circumstances surrounding this survey reveal the unique-
ness of the tributary relationship between the Qing and the Chosŏn. Contravening 
conventional assumptions about the submissive attitude of an inferior tributary 
state, the Chosŏn court did not passively welcome the Kangxi emperor’s proposed 
joint survey of the mountain. The Koreans were suspicious that the Qing court 
intended to force them to yield territory to China. Significantly, their concerns 
about Qing encroachment into Korean territory were closely related to anti-
Manchu sentiment. Since the “Manchu barbarians” had conquered China prop-
er, the Koreans believed that civilization had been lost or greatly compromised 
in China. They further believed that civilization should be protected from the 
barbarians and transferred to the Chosŏn. The Koreans did not completely ac-
cept Manchu supremacy, even though they fulfilled all of their obligations as a 
tributary state to the Qing empire.97 Therefore, instead of following the norms 
of a tributary state during the Changbaishan investigation, the Chosŏn officials 
deliberately hampered Mu-ke-deng’s mission and declined to help him. As Andre 
Schmid says, “The Chosŏn court displayed a subdued defiance of the wishes of 
the Kangxi emperor,” which gives us good evidence to challenge “the Sinocentric 
image of [the Chosŏn as] a dependent and loyal vassal state.”98
By contrast, the Qing court adopted a different approach toward its territorial 
boundary and political relationship with the Chosŏn. For the Kangxi emperor and 
his emissaries to the Chosŏn, the exact location of the Tumen’s source or, indeed, 
the exact limits of the empire’s territory were not as crucial as they were for their 
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Korean counterparts. The Qing seems to have felt that the surveys of Changbai-
shan signified Qing suzerainty over the Chosŏn. As the dominant power, the Qing 
believed that the imposition of imperial authority was sufficient to maintain the 
proper relationship and clarify the boundaries between the empire and its tribu-
tary state. The presentation of imperial virtue and power, rather than the demar-
cation of clear territorial boundaries, was the important issue. The great country 
did not need to quibble with a small neighboring state over a few dozen li of land. 
The location of the boundary on the upper Tumen River remained unclear, but 
the imperial authority was not compromised at all. The Chosŏn court joined the 
Qing-initiated survey, but the Koreans managed to protect their territory by not 
clarifying the boundary at the Tumen River. The tributary state succeeded in in-
terpreting the idea of Qing superiority for its own purposes and in misleading the 
Qing officials during the survey process. Mu-ke-deng’s investigation of Chang-
baishan was aimed at achieving a seamless and clearly demarcated line between 
the Qing and Chosŏn territories, but what it ended up creating between them was 
a borderland. The two countries were willing to tolerate this borderland as long as 
the tributary relationship was not challenged.
SHARED SYMB OL,  SEPAR ATE B OUNDARIES
The investigation of 1712 served to promote further the connection of the Qing 
imperial court to Changbaishan. The Kangxi emperor’s grandson, Qianlong, fol-
lowed in his grandfather’s footsteps by making homage to Shengjing (M. Mukden) 
a part of the imperial eastern tours. In 1743, after his first visit to the northeast, 
Qianlong wrote the “Ode to Mukden” (Shengjing fu), a panegyric on the mag-
nificence of Mukden. The emperor glorified the mountains: “Our Great Qing dy-
nasty arose from origins in Changbaishan. Marvelous humors there gathered—it 
was a most resplendent and auspicious place.”99 By drawing a direct connection 
between Mukden and Changbaishan, Qianlong sought to “rekindle Manchu eth-
nic pride and encourage the preservation of traditional customs” in the eigh-
teenth century, a time when rapid acculturation, exemplified by the loss of the 
Manchu language and a decline in martial skills among the bannermen, threat-
ened the basis of Manchu power.100 During the late years of his reign, Qianlong 
further stressed the inseparable link between his ancestors and the mountain in 
his Researches on Manchu Origins (Manzhou yuanliu kao), a 1783 imperial pub-
lication that reveals Qianlong’s understanding of the history and culture of the 
Manchu people. In the very first chapter of Manzhou yuanliu kao, the emperor 
states that “the ancestors of the Jin imperial clan lived in the Wanyan territory, 
where the White Mountain and the Black River were located.” He further ex-
plains that the Qing dynasty received the mandate of heaven and his ancestors 
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were born with the blessing of the red fruit when the heavenly maiden Fekulen 
went to the Bulhūri Lake at Changbaishan.101 As Pamela Crossley points out, it 
is not very likely that the Aisin Gioro family originated in Changbaishan, but 
Qianlong surely wanted to incorporate his ancestors into the myths of the sacred 
mountain, since it had long been respected by many northeastern peoples.102 As 
such, throughout the eighteenth century Changbaishan was seen as the source 
and symbol of Qing imperial power.
The investigation of the mountain in 1712 became the genesis of significant cul-
tural shifts in the Chosŏn that the Qing court would not necessarily have predicted 
or desired. First, it encouraged Koreans to take a greater interest in Paektusan. 
As noted earlier, prior to the eighteenth century, Koreans did not really think of 
Paektusan as part of Chosŏn territory, although they believed that it constituted 
the peak of the geomantic hierarchy of mountain chains on the peninsula. This 
ambiguous understanding of Paektusan was transformed after the investigation of 
1712 into a conviction that the mountain was actually situated on Chosŏn land. The 
joint survey of the mountain and the erection of the stone marker led the Koreans 
to believe that the Qing court recognized the land south of the Yalu and Tumen 
Rivers as Chosŏn territory and therefore that they should lay stronger claim to 
their territorial sovereignty. Not surprisingly, the Koreans’ confidence in their ter-
ritoriality was most obviously expressed in their increasing interest in Paektusan 
and the northern region.
In 1761, when the Chosŏn court sought to identify the major mountains in the 
country, the minister of the Board of Rites, Han Ingmo, proposed that Paektu-
san should be named the Northern Peak (K. Pugak), stating, “Our northern land 
was the birthplace of the dynasty.  .  .  . There are no rivers or mountains that do 
not originate from Paektusan. This mountain is surely the origin of our coun-
try.”103 Han’s claim corresponded to the intentions of King Yŏngjo (r. 1724–76), who 
sought to promote his kingly power against bureaucracy by elevating the status of 
Paektusan and the royal homeland. In the same way that the Kangxi emperor took 
advantage of the eastern tours and sacrifices to Changbaishan to demonstrate his 
imperial power, Yŏngjo wanted to strengthen his royal authority through rites for 
Paektusan and his ancestral homeland. Unlike Qing court officials, however, the 
Chosŏn officials disagreed with their king. They argued that it was very difficult to 
offer sacrifice to such rough mountaintops near foreign territory (K. hogye), and in 
addition that it was inappropriate for the Chosŏn king, who was enfeoffed by the 
emperor, to perform rituals for a place outside his territory.104 This debate lasted 
four months without yielding a conclusion, and Yŏngjo had to wait another six 
years to raise the issue of making ritual offerings again.
In 1767, the subject of offerings at Paektusan reemerged. This time, Yŏngjo in-
sisted more firmly on offering sacrifices to the mountain. He even ordered senior 
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court officials to read the Yongbi ŏch’ŏn’ga, the mythical account of the Chosŏn dy-
nasty’s origins in the Paektusan area—an order that emphasized his determination 
to uphold his power against the bureaucracy. However, his opponents were also 
persistent. The minister of the Board of Punishment, Hong Chunghyo, for one, 
disagreed with the idea of making offerings at Paektusan:
There has been a discussion that Paektusan is the summit of all the mountains in 
our country, and therefore it should be offered sacrifices. However, the Book of Rites 
[Liji] says that feudal lords should offer sacrifices to mountains and rivers within their 
territory. I do not know whether this mountain is within our territory. Mu-ke-deng 
had previously built a stone marker at the watershed and demarcated the boundary. 
The watershed is located a day trip’s distance from Paektusan. Therefore, it is hard to 
say that [the mountain] is on our land.105
Hong’s remarks show that, as late as the 1760s, Chosŏn officials still believed 
that Paektusan did not lie in Korean territory. But this time Yŏngjo did not give in 
to the pressure of the bureaucrats:
The first chapter of the Yongbi ŏch’ŏn’ga, which I had ordered you to read, says, “Our 
ancestors had their homeland in Kyŏnghŭng.” This passage is obvious evidence that 
Paektusan is in our territory. Therefore, even if the mountain were not on our land, it 
should still be offered sacrifices in order to venerate [the origin of the royal family]. 
It goes without saying, then, that if it is in fact on our land, [it should certainly be 
offered sacrifices].106
He then ordered his officials to perform sacrifices to Paektusan and to write 
a ritual address to it. The first official rite of the Chosŏn court for the mountain 
was finally offered in 1768, when the mountain was formally named the Northern 
Peak.107
The Chosŏn court’s demonstrated interest in Paektusan extended to the 
northern region—a second change that the 1712 investigation inspired among the 
Koreans. The Chosŏn court had long believed that the upper region of the Yalu 
River, where four counties had been established and later closed, should remain 
uninhabited and closed off for the purpose of preventing trespassing. By the time 
of Yŏngjo’s reign, however, discussions about developing the upstream areas of 
the Yalu River had resumed. Yŏngjo sympathized with the suggestion that people 
should be settled in the northern region, which would also help strengthen secu-
rity, but the majority of the court officials shared the traditional assumption that 
the more people gather at the boundary, the more illegal crossings will happen. 
Therefore, the dominant position at the Chosŏn court was that the land near 
the Yalu and Tumen Rivers should remain empty in order to prevent trespassing 
and subsequent trouble with the Qing.108 This belief that an uninhabited buffer 
zone at the boundary would protect Korean territory from the Qing continued 
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to prevail at the Chosŏn court until the very late nineteenth century, as seen in 
later chapters.
The idea of developing the land at the upper reaches of the Yalu River was 
brought up again during the reign of King Chŏngjo (r. 1777–1800). Nam Chaehŭng, 
a member of the local elite living in the northern region, argued in a lengthy pro-
posal that it had been a terrible mistake to abandon the four counties near the Yalu 
River and the fertile land in the north:
In the Four Closed Counties . . . the land is vast and fertile. The fields are even, the 
weather is moderate, and grain grows well, so that it is truly a paradise for a pleas-
ant life. However, the land was occupied by Jurchen barbarians [K. Yŏjin yain] from 
the late Koryŏ to the early [Chosŏn] period, and therefore the four counties were 
abandoned and undeveloped. After the Qing arose, the barbarians [K. hoin] who 
had lived near the [Yalu] River all left. Afterward, for 140 to 150 years, the land north 
of the Yalu, as wide as one thousand li, has been empty, with no trace of barbarians 
living there. It is such a pity that all our fertile land south of the river has been simply 
discarded.109
Interests in the northern region at this time were not, of course, the exclusive 
sphere of the monarch and the court, but became prevalent more broadly among 
the Korean literati. It was the Korean literati in the late eighteenth century, rather 
than the Chosŏn kings, who were most interested in the northern region, as well as 
the territorial limits of their country. Some of the scholars of the “practical studies” 
movement (K. Sirhak), including Yi Ik (1681–1763), Sin Kyŏngjun (1712–1781), and 
Hong Yangho (1724–1802), believed that the 1712 investigation and the established 
stone marker had set the boundary between the Qing and the Chosŏn, resulting 
in a substantial loss of territory for the Chosŏn. Their sense of territorial loss de-
veloped into a kind of irredentism based on the assumption that the Qing-Chosŏn 
boundary was in reality located not on the Tumen River but in a place farther to 
the north. Some argued that the boundary was the Heilongjiang; others insisted 
it lay seven hundred li north of the Tumen River. Even those who accepted the 
Tumen as the boundary still believed that the Chosŏn had lost several hundred 
li of land in the upper region of the Tumen through the investigation. In order to 
recover this lost territory, these scholars argued, the Chosŏn should strengthen its 
military defenses in the north, especially by reopening the Four Closed Counties 
near the upper Yalu and the Six Garrisons near the Tumen.110
Chŏng Yagyong (1762–1836) was one of the most notable figures among the 
Chosŏn scholars who argued for Korean territorial sovereignty in the north. 
In his An Investigation of Our Nation’s Territory (K. Abang kangyŏkko), Chŏng 
claimed that the Chosŏn dynasty had ruled over its territory, which was distinct 
from that of China, since the late fourteenth century. For Chŏng, who believed 
that territoriality was the essence of a state, there was no more urgent matter than 
74    Making the Borderland
reclaiming the northern land. Neglecting the Yalu River and abandoning the 
Four Closed Counties, he argued, were terrible mistakes from a security stand-
point. Chŏng hoped that the eighteenth-century Chosŏn kings would endeavor 
to protect their territory in the north just as their great fifteenth-century ances-
tors, who launched military expeditions to conquer the Jurchens and secure the 
Tumen River, had done.111
The Chosŏn court finally made the decision to develop the land near the Yalu 
River in 1793, when part of the Four Closed Counties was opened for settlement. 
Local officials in P’yŏngan Province recognized that population settlement and 
land reclamation were more efficient ways to achieve security than the stationing 
of military guards would have been. As new settlers were granted a three-year 
tax exemption and permission to collect ginseng, a growing number of people 
moved to the north.112 This population growth led the Chosŏn court to assign 
officials to govern local affairs, but not until 1823.113 Only in the early nineteenth 
century, then, did Paektusan and the Yalu and Tumen Rivers, having long been 
considered part of foreign territory outside of the Chosŏn realm, come to be fully 
incorporated into Korean administrative control. It thus took a century after the 
investigation of 1712 for the Chosŏn to begin to demand full sovereignty over its 
northern region.
• • •
Triggered by Korean trespassing and ginseng poaching, the 1712 investigation of 
Changbaishan demonstrates that the Qing court continuously sought to achieve 
two goals—the imposition of Qing superiority and the demarcation of the territo-
rial boundary—in its relationship with the Chosŏn court. The nature of their con-
ceptions and practice of territoriality and sovereignty, together with the tributary 
relationship, played a crucial role during the investigation. It was the Qing court, 
not the Chosŏn, who initiated the investigation of the mountain sitting between 
them. The Manchus gathered geographic information about their sacred birth-
place, but the wish of the Qing emperor to establish a clear boundary with the 
Chosŏn was not fulfilled. Instead, he bequeathed to his successor a borderland, 
characterized by uncertainty regarding the location of the Tumen riverhead and 
the exact limits of Qing territory, both authorized and sanctioned by the tributary 
relationship. Unexpectedly, it was the Chosŏn court and the Korean people whose 
understanding of their territorial realm was profoundly inspired and transformed 
by the information generated by the survey. Whether this outcome was planned 
or unexpected, the joint mapping project helped to confirm to the Koreans that 
the areas south of the Yalu and Tumen Rivers lay within the Korean realm and 
to increase Korean interest in its previously neglected, or abandoned, northern 
region. The lengthy debates regarding the offering of sacrifices to Paektusan and 
the reopening of the Four Closed Counties demonstrate the transformation of the 
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Chosŏn court’s perception of the northern region from a foreign land to Korean 
territory. Ironically, the investigation of Changbaishan, which was begun as part 
of a Qing empire-building strategy and completed under the terms of the tributary 
relationship, eventually helped foster a sense of Korean territory distinct from the 
Qing empire. These two seemingly contradictory ideas—Chosŏn territorial sover-
eignty and Qing rulership over a tributary state—coexisted without much trouble 




















On June 10, 1727, the Chosŏn Ŭiju magistrate (K. puyun), Yi Sŏngyong, sent an ex-
press letter to Seoul, reporting that Qing subjects had trespassed in Chosŏn terri-
tory.1 The letter said that several hundred people from Qing territory had appeared 
aboard boats on the Yalu River and tried to trade goods on the shore. Yi Sŏngyong 
sent his soldiers to investigate the situation and also dispatched people across the 
river to inform the senior commandant (chengshouwei) of Fenghuangcheng about 
this intrusion:
That night, I witnessed that the passengers of numerous ships came on shore and 
made a fire; I realized that these intruders would not be defeated by words. The Fen-
ghuangcheng office sent sixty Qing soldiers to arrest the criminals. When we ap-
proached the intruders, who were well aware of the seriousness of their crime, they 
fiercely resisted and tried to find a way to escape. They attacked our soldiers, five of 
whom were hurt and drowned to death. We arrested only twenty-nine people; the 
rest of them ran away. . . . The discarded ships and other things turned out to belong 
to illegal traders and ginseng poachers from Shandong and Shanxi Provinces.2
The Chosŏn court immediately reported the incident to Beijing, highlighting 
the serious implications of the case: “Our small country [K. sobang] has been wor-
ried about the possibility of trespassing, since it is adjacent to the great country. 
The previously imposed regulation was certainly rigorous, but illegal crossings 
have recently increased, finally reaching the present extent.” The Chosŏn court de-
manded a clear response from the Qing government: “Illegal crossings have hap-
pened before, but there has never been a case such as this, with several hundred 
people arriving on several dozen ships, injuring soldiers of the superior country 
[K. sangguk], and killing those of our small country. Had the situation not been 
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corrected immediately, it is not even necessary to mention what might have hap-
pened in the future.”3
This trespassing case concluded with the strangulation and decapitation of nine 
criminals, one of whom was Guo Lianjin, a Qing bannerman. But Guo Lianjin 
and his men were hardly the last Qing subjects to enter Chosŏn territory illegally. 
Trespassing incidents, involving both bannermen and civilians, continued after 
the Guo Lianjin group was punished. In an effort to stop trespassing, the Yong-
zheng emperor dispatched a special envoy to the Shengjing area and maintained 
regular communication with him. Numerous palace memorials and imperial re-
sponses were exchanged between the emperor in Beijing and the special inspector 
in Shengjing, demonstrating that the emperor and local officials alike recognized 
that Qing policy toward the Chosŏn was closely linked to security at the empire’s 
northeastern margin—Manchuria.
This chapter discusses the Qing court’s management of Manchuria and the 
boundary with Chosŏn in three aspects. First, it examines the Qing restriction 
on entry into Manchuria, later known as the “quarantine policy” (fengjin). After 
moving to China proper, the Qing court divided Manchuria into several regions, 
assigning different groups to each, and restricted people’s movements in order 
to confine the Han Chinese to Shengjing, the Manchus to the northeast, and the 
Mongols to the northwest. This restriction policy was intended to protect local 
tribes from the majority Han Chinese population and to preserve untainted Man-
chu ethnic traits and practices in Manchuria. The Qing strategy for restricting 
access to Manchuria was to build physical barriers to separate this region from the 
outside world. Right after moving the capital to Beijing, the Qing emperor began 
to rebuild the Willow Palisade (liutiaobian), along which gates (bianmen) were 
built at given intervals to prevent people from coming in and going out freely. 
Second, it was expected that this restriction of Manchuria would help the Qing 
court monopolize the natural resources—especially ginseng—in Manchuria. In 
1745, the court established the Ginseng Office (Guanshenju) in Manchuria as a new 
institution for more effective and comprehensive management of the state ginseng 
monopoly. Through this exclusive office for ginseng monopoly, the court sought to 
ensure the ginseng quota and curb illegal ginseng poachers in Manchuria.
Finally, this chapter further explores the ways in which the Qing restrictions 
on entry into Manchuria contributed to the peculiar nature of the boundary with 
the Chosŏn, and how the rhetoric of the asymmetrical relationship worked to 
the small country’s benefit with regard to its boundary management. When Qing 
emperors and officials sought to tighten security along the boundary with the 
Chosŏn, Koreans felt their territory threatened and resisted the Qing approach. 
In seeking to deter Qing movements, the Chosŏn court relied on the norms of the 
tributary relationship. By highlighting the inferior status of the Chosŏn vis-à-vis 
the great Qing, the Koreans succeeded in preventing the construction of a Qing 
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military facility on the Yalu River; as the benevolent ruler of the suzerain court, the 
Qing emperor accepted the Chosŏn request to maintain the vacuum at the bound-
ary by force. Qing and Chosŏn conceptions and practices of territory, which were 
based on asymmetrical tributary relations, differed from those governing borders 
between modern states. The Qing-Chosŏn boundary was rather “a thick line with 
a broad horizontal context.”4 However, as long as the Chosŏn remained submissive 
to Qing imperial authority, the key features of the Qing-Chosŏn borderland—the 
empty zone on the Yalu River side and the unclear territorial limits on the Tumen 
River side—caused few troubles between the two neighbors.
THE WILLOW PALISADE
The conquest of China in 1644 provided the Manchus with a new capital in China 
proper. Soon after the move to Beijing, the situation in the northeast became very 
unstable. The long war against the Ming army had destroyed both the land and 
the population.5 In 1653, in response to the severe depopulation of Liaodong, the 
Shunzhi emperor made a proposal on recruitment and cultivation in Liaodong 
(Liaodong zhaomin kaiken ling): an imperial edict that encouraged Han Chinese 
immigration and offered compensation in order to repopulate the northeast. Im-
migrants were granted titles and ranks, provided with land and farming tools, and 
exempted from paying taxes. The Liaodong resettlement policy continued into 
the Kangxi reign, and even political and criminal exiles were sent to Liaodong to 
supplement the meager population.6 By the end of the seventeenth century this 
immigration effort had proved successful, and the Han population in Liaodong 
continued to increase. One result of the booming immigration was that many peo-
ple, most notably illegal ginseng gatherers, were able to pass unnoticed through 
Shanhaiguan. The recovery and stabilization of the northeast eventually alarmed 
the Kangxi emperor, who worried that Han immigration would undermine Man-
chu privileges in this region. He finally ended the promotion policy in the north-
east in 1668.7
The Qing policy of stabilization in the northeast was accompanied by admin-
istrative reorganization. The region was divided into three jurisdictions headed 
by military governors. The Shengjing military governor ruled the populous area 
of Shengjing, while the headquarters of the military governors of Ningguta and 
Heilongjiang were established in Jilin Wula and Qiqihar, respectively. Throughout 
the Qing period, the area under these three military governors was known as the 
“three eastern provinces” (Dong sansheng).8 Within the three eastern provinces, 
the Shengjing military governor had a particularly wide range of responsibili-
ties, including the prevention of illegal immigration and control of the boundary 
with the Chosŏn. A map in The Unified Gazetteer of Shengjing (Shengjing tong-
zhi) shows that his domain covered an area demarcated by Hetu Ala in the east, 
80    Managing the Borderland
Shanhaiguan in the west, Ninghai in the south, Kaiyuan in the north, Zhenjiang 
in the southeast, the Bohai (K. Parhae) Sea in the southwest, Weiyuanbao in the 
northeast, and Jiuguantai in the northwest near the Mongol areas. Pastures and 
hunting fields near the Yalu River were also under his command.9 Two adminis-
trative divisions within the Shengjing office were closely related to Chosŏn affairs: 
the post of the Xiongyue garrison lieutenant general (fudutong), who directed 
the Yalu River region, and that of the Fenghuangcheng senior commandant, who 
supervised the boundary with the Chosŏn.10
In addition to the military governorship, another distinctive feature of Qing 
rule in the northeast was the Willow Palisade, a physical defense facility that was 
designed to control access to this vital region. The Qing Willow Palisade was in 
fact based on the Liaodong Frontier Wall that the Ming had built. After its con-
quest of China, the Qing court began to rebuild the palisade, which was composed 
of the eastern line, the western line, and the northern line. In 1661, the Shunzhi 
emperor relocated the residents along the western line and separated the pastoral 
Mongols in the west from the sedentary Manchus and Han Chinese in the east.11 
Later, the Kangxi emperor continued to expand the fences until 1697, when the 
Willow Palisade reached its final form. The expansion of the eastern line allowed 
Figure 7. Willow Palisade. From Shengjing tongzhi (Gazetteers of Shengjing), 1784 (Shenyang: 
Liaohai chubanshe, 1997), Shengjing quantu: 1.
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old cities such as Fushun, Qingyuan, Fe Ala, and Hetu Ala as well as the tombs of 
the early rulers to be safely enclosed within the palisade. The western line reached 
from Weiyuanbao to Shanhaiguan, and the eastern line from Weiyuanbao to Fen-
ghuangcheng. The two lines together stretched across 1,950 li. The northern line, 
also called the New Palisade, was built north of Weiyuanbao during the period 
from 1670 to 1681. The lines connecting the four points of the palisade, namely 
Shanhaiguan, Weiyuanbao, Fenghuangcheng, and Fatha, formed the shape of the 
Chinese character ren.12
According to Richard Edmonds’s research, the Willow Palisade had a total of 
thirty-four gates, whose locations underwent considerable change over the Qing 
period.13 The Complete Gazetteer of Shengjing, compiled in 1748, lists six gates 
on the eastern line and ten on the western line.14 Each gate had a tower staffed 
with a certain number of officers and soldiers. The management of the palisade 
was the responsibility of the banner soldiers stationed at the gates and outposts 
(M. karun). While the gates were located along the palisade, the outposts were 
built inside and outside of it. They were added after the Willow Palisade was 
completed, providing a strong indication that the palisade itself was not adequate 
to prevent illegal intruders from entering the prohibited land. Outpost person-
nel were primarily charged with arresting illegal hunters, ginseng poachers, and 
unlawful settlers outside the palisade.15
All of the major functions of the palisade, the gates, and the outposts were 
about restriction of people’s movements. The Qing court sought to contain its Han 
Chinese subjects within China proper and Shengjing, and by doing so to protect 
other ethnic groups. The first function of the Willow Palisade was to distinguish 
the administrative districts of the three military governors, enabling the separa-
tion of the Han Chinese from the Manchus, the Mongols, and other tribal people 
in Jilin and Heilongjiang. The central Shengjing area was settled by the Han Chi-
nese, the land outside of the western line was reserved for the Mongols, and the 
territory north of it was designated for hunting peoples such as the Solon, Dagur, 
and Orochon tribes.16 The second function of these installations was to protect 
the rich natural resources in the region. The Qing rulers established numerous 
graveyards, pastures, hunting fields, and ginseng mountains outside of the Willow 
Palisade, all of which were reserved for the exclusive use of the imperial house-
hold: “Along the road from Fenghuangcheng to Shanhaiguan and from Kaiyuan to 
Sa-lin-wo-li, the Willow Palisade is to be built and commoners are to be prohibited 
from entering.”17
In the area north of the Yalu and Tumen Rivers and near Changbaishan, 
especially rigorous restrictions were enforced soon after the Qing conquest of 
1644. The Kangxi emperor announced that “Changbaishan is the sacred birth-
place [faxiang zhongdi]” and prohibited any settlement or cultivation.18 The re-
striction on entry into the area beyond the eastern line of the Willow Palisade 
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was also designed as a deterrent to exploiters of ginseng, furs, and pearls, who 
came from Shengjing and China proper as well as from Korea. The gates on the 
eastern line were opened for such special occasions as imperial eastern tours, 
hunts, and ginseng gathering outings, as well as a Chosŏn tributary embassy’s 
journey.19 When he followed the Kangxi emperor’s eastern tour in 1682, Gao 
Shiqi described the eastern line thus: “The Willow Palisade divides [the inner 
land] from the Mongols. It reaches the Chosŏn in the south and Shanhaiguan 
in the west. Illegal intruders beyond [the palisade] are severely punished.  .  .  . 
Within the preserve, barren mountains bar the passages, so that the roads are 
decayed and closed.”20
GINSENG IN THE SACRED BIRTHPL ACE
Soon after acceding to the imperial throne in Beijing in 1723, the Yongzheng em-
peror realized that good management of the gates and outposts was key to the 
security of the northeastern region as well as to the imperial monopoly of ginseng. 
In the early eighteenth century, Qing ginseng policy oscillated between the two 
directions of banner allocation and merchant licensing. The court entrusted mer-
chants with ginseng collection in 1714, then transferred the task to the banners 
in 1724, and again hired merchants to run the business in 1730. These changes 
indicate that as the ginseng harvest declined and the bannermen had difficulty re-
cruiting and provisioning ginseng gatherers, the state had to devise various alter-
native plans to secure the ginseng quota. Whether through bannermen or through 
merchants, the purpose of the Qing ginseng monopoly was to collect the amount 
of ginseng specified by the court. It is also likely that the changes in ginseng policy 
were part of the overall administrative and financial reforms that the Yongzheng 
emperor implemented throughout his reign.21
It was very clear that the ginseng quota reflected the needs of the state, not 
the natural conditions of ginseng production. As the Shengjing military governor 
Tang-boo-ju said, “Ginseng production is of huge importance for state revenue, 
and therefore the quota [of ginseng] should be predetermined [before collec-
tion].”22 In 1730 the state printed ten thousand ginseng licenses and commissioned 
wealthy merchants to recruit gatherers and to collect sixteen liang of ginseng per 
license; in exchange for recruiting and provisioning their gatherers, the merchants 
received six out of every sixteen liang of ginseng in their quota.23 This new ar-
rangement was designed to guarantee the set ginseng quota for the court, while 
merchants and gathers were able to sell their surplus ginseng and make a profit. 
According to Wang Peihuan’s analysis, in 1740 the Qing court issued 4,562 licenses 
and collected 45,620 liang of ginseng; the licensed merchants received 20,138 liang 
of ginseng, which was equivalent to 402,760 liang of silver at the market price in 
Beijing.24
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Soon, however, the licensed merchants became unable to secure the high gin-
seng quota predetermined by the government, and in 1736, the Shengjing Board 
of Revenue proposed that the state, not merchants, should manage the ginseng 
monopoly: “Illegal ginseng poachers continue to increase, not because they do 
not know of the strict state regulations, but because they are not afraid of pun-
ishment in exchange for huge ginseng profits. Instead of relying on merchants, 
the government should issue ginseng licenses, recruit gatherers, and control their 
collection.”25 In 1745, after years of discussion, the Qianlong emperor implement-
ed a major reform of the ginseng monopoly, which established Ginseng Offices 
in three places: Shengjing, Jilin, and Ningguta. The Ginseng Offices held exclu-
sive responsibility for the state ginseng monopoly, taking charge of collecting 
and inspecting ginseng and sending it to the Imperial Household Department 
in Beijing.26 Despite its physical location in Manchuria, it was under the direct 
control of the Board of Revenue, not under the supervision of the military gover-
nors. However, the military governors of Shengjing and Jilin were involved in the 
ginseng monopoly, because the authorized routes for ginseng gatherers passed 
through all three districts.27 All ginseng gatherers and the soldiers escorting them 
were required to possess standard permits for entering the ginseng mountains 
(M. temgetu bithe; C. jinshan zhaopiao).28 When merchants passed through Shan-
haiguan into Manchuria to trade surplus ginseng, they had to possess permits 
stating the quality, grade, and quantity of their ginseng. They were allowed to 
trade ginseng in China proper only after returning these permits to the Board of 
Revenue in Beijing.29
Despite such efforts to regulate the ginseng monopoly, a variety of illegal ac-
tivities persisted. Some gatherers entered areas not authorized by their specific 
permits or places where any access was entirely prohibited, such as Changbais-
han or Chosŏn territory. Others ran away with the ginseng they had harvested 
or bypassed the designated location for submission in order to avoid inspection. 
Some gatherers stayed in the mountains to cultivate land or to grow ginseng. All 
of these illegal actions were punished, while officials and soldiers who addressed 
smuggling successfully were rewarded.30 As part of his efforts to secure the ginseng 
monopoly in the northeast, in 1723 the Yongzheng emperor sent a Manchu official, 
Yong-fu, to Shengjing as a special inspector of six gates on the eastern line of the 
Willow Palisade (bianmen zhangjing). Yong-fu reported to his emperor about the 
conditions in Shengjing:
The gate of Weiyuanbao leads to Jilin, Ningguta, and Heilongjiang. The gate of Feng-
huangcheng is adjacent to the Chosŏn. Outside the gates of Ying’e, Wangqing, Jian-
chang, and Aiyang are imperial hunting fields and ginseng-producing areas. These 
gates are thus extremely important; [however,] there are a great number of workers, 
bannermen, civilians, and huntsmen living near the gates, so that it is nearly impos-
sible to prevent people from passing through and poaching ginseng.31
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The Shengjing military governor Tang-boo-ju likewise reported that ginseng 
poaching continued to take place in his jurisdiction:
Illegal ginseng poachers travel in groups to go deep into the mountains but often 
end up getting lost and dying of hunger, being attacked and wounded by wild beasts, 
or hurting each other fighting over ginseng profits. As these situations affect human 
lives, [the court] has already prohibited entering the mountains. But in spite of the 
soldiers’ patrolling, illegal ginseng poaching never disappears.  .  .  . No matter how 
thoroughly patrolling and prohibitions are imposed, people still seek the huge profits 
of ginseng. Those from Tianjin and Shandong come by boat; others pass through 
Shanhaiguan and enter Shengjing and Jilin Wula. It is extremely difficult to track 
down every smuggler.32
The emperor had a bigger concern than illegal entrance and poaching by Han 
Chinese: bannermen, who supposedly embodied the “Manchu Way” and repre-
sented the dignity of the ruling elite, were increasingly involved in ginseng poach-
ing outside the palisade. In the very first year of his reign, Yongzheng was informed 
about several dozen bannermen suspected of ginseng poaching. The vice minister 
of the Shengjing Board of War, Majintai, reported that among those arrested for 
ginseng poaching were thirty-two bannermen (M. gūsai niyalma) and sixty-two 
civilians from China proper (M. dorgi ba i irgen). Punishments for infractions in 
the prohibited area were harsh: whether civilians or bannermen, criminal leaders 
had both of their Achilles tendons cut and their accomplices had one; bannermen 
were sent back to their banners and civilians to their original registers.33 Later, the 
punishment became even more severe. In 1771, Han Chinese poachers were beaten 
one hundred times with a heavy flogging stick (zhang) and sentenced to penal 
servitude (tu) for three years. The punishment for bannermen was reduced by a 
degree to wearing a cangue for two months and receiving one hundred lashes by a 
flogging leather (bian).34
Reports about banner soldiers engaged in ginseng poaching continued to reach 
Beijing. Yong-fu sent reports to his emperor about various cases, including that 
of a company captain (zuoling) and a corporal (lingcui) who confiscated ginseng 
from illegal intruders and traded it privately; a corporal who engaged in ginseng 
poaching himself; and huntsmen who stealthily delivered illegal ginseng and sable 
skins through the gates in collusion with merchants.35 Yongzheng’s response to the 
disturbances in the Willow Palisade was, not surprisingly, firm and resolute: “We 
Manchus should do our best in everything, work twice as hard as Chinese-martial 
bannermen [hanjun baqi] and Han Chinese do, and not expect silver in reward. 
[Such a crime as trespassing] is a truly corrupt practice.”36 Yongzheng’s concern 
was not limited to the fact that these bannermen had abandoned their duties in 
favor of illegal activities. Many of the cases of unauthorized crossing for ginseng 
collection also related to the neighboring Chosŏn—an issue that made the Qing 
government’s management of the northeast even more complicated.
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MULTIPLE B OUNDARIES WITHIN THE EMPIRE
Of the numerous trespassing cases involving bannermen in the northeast, it was 
the incident of Guo Lianjin in 1727 that received the greatest attention at Yong-
zheng’s court. The news that several hundred ginseng poachers had intruded 
into Chosŏn territory and killed Korean soldiers reached the current Shengjing 
military governor, Yen-tai, through a report from the Fenghuangcheng mili-
tary commander, Bo-xi-tun. Yen-tai’s report to the emperor explained that Sun 
Guangzong, one of Guo Lianjin’s accomplices and also a local civilian living in 
Fenghuangcheng, had attracted several hundred people with his plan, bribed the 
patrolling soldiers to allow him and his followers to cross the Yalu River, entered 
Chosŏn territory to poach ginseng, and ended up killing people. The patrolling 
soldiers were supposed to check illegal traffic but instead accepted bribes for 
several years and helped criminals pass through the gate and make trouble in 
Chosŏn territory.
Upon receiving the report, Qing court officials agreed that “this case involves 
foreign people being held and killed” and that such violations could be not toler-
ated: “The Chosŏn is close to China [Zhongguo] and it has long been loyal, because 
our [Qing] court has taught them with benevolence, treating them equally with 
the domestic [Qing] subjects [neidi chenmin].” Then Qing officials suggested that 
officers should be dispatched to the scene to arrest the criminals and that soldiers 
who took bribes should be investigated. It was also deemed necessary for the em-
peror to empower the Chosŏn king to arrest Qing intruders in Chosŏn territory 
whenever they injured people or poached ginseng; Chosŏn soldiers should also 
be authorized to kill Qing intruders if they resisted arrest. These were considered 
inevitable decisions, required to “prevent Qing subjects from trespassing and em-
brace the Chosŏn with imperial benevolence.”37
The Yongzheng emperor ordered all trespassing suspects to be brought to 
Shengjing for investigation. During the investigations at Shengjing, it was re-
vealed that the first reporter of the case, the Fenghuangcheng military commander 
Bo-xi-tun, was also involved in corruption and bribery. Despite his position as an 
“important official to protect the boundary” (fengjiang yaoyuan), Bo-xi-tun had 
accepted about a thousand liang of silver in bribes to help ginseng poachers pass 
the inspection at the gates. The military commander did not admit his wrongdo-
ings, but others—including those who were involved in giving and delivering the 
bribe to Bo-xi-tun—all confessed their crimes.38 Sun Guangzong also admitted 
that he had bribed the military commander.39 The Qing court was full of criticism 
for these corrupt officers and soldiers: “The trespassers formed a group to carry 
out evil activities and break the law. All this happened because soldiers were negli-
gent in watching the gates and instead accepted bribes, while their officers did not 
recognize their misconduct. These soldiers and officers should be dismissed and 
investigated thoroughly by the Shengjing military governor.”40
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The new Shengjing military governor, Gioro I-li-bu, discovered that Guo Lianjin 
had originally lived in Shanhaiwei and moved in 1726 to Fenghuangcheng. When 
Guo was planning the ginseng poaching with his neighbors, Sun Guangzong had 
provided money to support the plot. Subsequently, Guo and his accomplices gath-
ered ginseng illegally in Yanghe outside of the gate, and Guo used part of the haul 
to repay Sun. The following year, Guo and as many as two hundred men returned 
to Yanghe to poach ginseng again. At the gate, they were approached by two of the 
patrolling soldiers, who demanded one hundred liang of silver as a “fee” for illegal 
entry. Guo’s group paid the silver and passed through the gate to Mangniushao, 
where they were caught by Chosŏn soldiers.41 Besides the sheer number of people 
participating in the conspiracy, what was stunning about this case was the extent 
of rampant corruption among the banner soldiers stationed at the gates. Wang 
Tingzuo, a corporal, received four hundred liang of silver as a bribe from Sun 
Guangzong and promised to procure a ginseng-gathering permit for him. When 
he failed to obtain such a permit, Wang agreed instead to let Sun’s people pass 
through the gate in order to poach ginseng. Upon hearing of Wang’s actions, his 
senior officer, a company captain, demanded that Wang share the bribe with him.42 
Outside the gate, Sun and his people were discovered by another corporal, who 
did not arrest them but instead demanded a bribe to let them go. Sun gave him 
five hundred liang of silver, which the corporal shared with nine other soldiers at 
the gate.43 This veritable chain of corruption was common at many gates along the 
Willow Palisade.
In 1728, Yongzheng issued the final sentences in the Guo Lianjin case: Guo 
Lianjin was decapitated and eight other people were strangled, while additional 
accomplices were exiled or beaten according to their crimes. Although he was a 
bannerman, Wang Tingzuo was not spared given the seriousness of his crime and 
the amount of the bribe he had accepted. However, other bannermen involved 
in the Guo Lianjin case benefited from their privileged bannerman status: the 
sentences of most of the soldiers who received bribes from Guo were reduced 
because “they were bannermen [qiren].”44 Despite his firm treatment of those in-
volved in this and similar case, Yongzheng did not believe that Qing subjects were 
the only ones to be blamed for trespassing and the resulting Korean casualties. 
The emperor criticized the Chosŏn king for his failure to fulfill the duties of a 
tributary state:
Previously, Shengzu Ren Huangdi [Kangxi] had written an edict to the Chosŏn 
king saying, “If bandits enter your country to plunder it, the king should arrest and 
kill them and return the rest [to the Qing].” After succeeding to the throne, I also 
explained to the king several times that if any wanderer without a legitimate pass 
should cause trouble [in Chosŏn territory], the king should punish him according 
to his law. As prohibitions and regulations are now strongly imposed, outlaws in 
China proper [neidi] can find nowhere to hide and therefore flee to a foreign country 
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[waiguo] to save their lives. The Chosŏn king has already been included among the 
tributaries [fanfeng], so he is obliged to serve the [Qing] court by arresting bandits 
and pacifying the population. Despite the issuance of several edicts by Shengzu Ren 
Huangdi and myself, the king has a weak character and has failed to follow these 
decrees. Therefore, the outlaws of China proper have come to consider Chosŏn ter-
ritory a hiding place to avoid punishment. Such an evil practice is not to be endured. 
Hereafter, if the Chosŏn soldiers and officials fail to arrest trespassers and trouble-
makers, the king should punish them, and the [Qing] Board of Rites should disci-
pline the Chosŏn king for failing in his duty as a tributary king to follow the imperial 
edicts to arrest bandits and pacify the people.45
Interestingly, this edict refers to the Chosŏn simultaneously as “a foreign coun-
try” and as “a tributary state.” The use of these two different labels for the Chosŏn 
indicates that people within the Qing empire held different conceptions of the 
boundary with the Chosŏn, depending on their location and status. On the one 
hand, “bandits” in Shengjing, like Guo Lianjin and his fellow troublemakers, re-
garded the Chosŏn state as a foreign country where they could avoid Qing regula-
tions; on the other hand, the Qing emperor in Beijing considered the Chosŏn a 
tributary state that had an obligation to serve the Qing court. Seen from the north-
eastern periphery, the Chosŏn was a foreign country, but from the perspective of 
the center the same neighbor was regarded as a tributary state.
Yongzheng’s edict also reveals the ways in which the emperor understood the 
territoriality of the empire. He recognized that the Willow Palisade served to di-
vide the inside from the outside, but he simultaneously thought that areas both 
inside and outside the palisade fell within the empire’s territory. This view cor-
responds with his conception of the Chosŏn state. The Chosŏn king governed his 
people by his own law; nevertheless, he was, above all, a tributary ruler whom the 
emperor had enfeoffed. The Willow Palisade was deemed a boundary, and so was 
the Yalu River. In other words, the Qing empire had multiple boundaries within 
it. Further, each boundary carried a different meaning according to its location in 
the empire and represented the imperial power in a different way and to a varying 
extent. The imperial authority gradually extended over these boundaries from the 
center to the periphery and then farther beyond to the tributary state.
Yong-fu seemed to share Yongzheng’s conception of the Qing empire’s territo-
riality and the status of the Chosŏn state. After the Guo Lianjin case closed, Yong-
fu reported to the emperor that Qing subjects continued to trespass in Chosŏn 
territory. He asserted that those who intruded into Chosŏn lands violated the law 
more seriously than did those who simply poached ginseng outside the Willow 
Palisade:
Guo Lianjin and his fellow criminals received serious punishments for violating 
Chosŏn territory. This time, [the trespassers] were also involved in intruding into 
[Chosŏn] land and poaching ginseng. Their crime is so serious that it should not 
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be treated as a simple case of ginseng poaching. These people should be sent to 
Shengjing for investigation and heavy punishment. They should serve as an example 
to warn people who try to trespass and break the law.46
The Yongzheng emperor and his official Yong-fu thus believed that the divi-
sion between the inner and outer territories was not fixed but rather changeable 
according to context.47 From one perspective, what lay west of the pass at Shanhai-
guan corresponded to the inner land—China proper—while the territory to the 
east of the pass was the outer land. However, this outer land was divided again by 
the Willow Palisade, which created a different set of “inner” and “outer” lands. In 
turn, the remote territory outside the palisade was divided by the Yalu and Tumen 
Rivers. If the area north of these rivers was the inner land of the empire, the south-
ern areas were outside of the empire—they comprised the lands of the Chosŏn, a 
tributary of the Qing empire.
Qing imperial authority reached everywhere under heaven, beyond Shan-
haiguan, the Willow Palisade, and the Yalu and Tumen Rivers. However, each of 
these multiple boundaries had different functions and meanings for the empire. 
Shanhaiguan and the Willow Palisade served to create boundaries between ethnic 
groups, including the Manchus, the Han Chinese, and the Mongols, while the Yalu 
and Tumen Rivers separated the empire from the tributary state. Unauthorized 
entrance into Shanhaiguan and beyond the Willow Palisade meant violating state 
laws meant to segregate ethnic groups and protect imperial property. In compari-
son, crossing the Yalu and Tumen Rivers was deemed to disturb the tributary state 
under the protection of the imperial court. What, then, did the territorial bound-
ary between the empire and the tributary state mean to the Qing emperor and the 
Chosŏn king? Did the two share similar ideas about the Yalu and Tumen Rivers? 
The ways in which these rulers viewed the territory and sovereignty of the Qing 
empire and the Chosŏn kingdom are revealed in their debates over the issue of 
the potential outpost at the Yalu River, a discussion that continued through the 
Yongzheng and Qianlong periods.
TRESPASSING C ONTINUED
Until the late seventeenth century, one of the most vexing issues between the Qing 
and the Chosŏn had been Korean trespassing on Qing land. At the turn of the 
eighteenth century, however, cases of Qing subjects encroaching on Chosŏn ter-
ritory and, for the most part, poaching ginseng there also began to be reported. 
In 1707, a group of Qing ginseng hunters were reported to have entered P’yŏngan 
Province and to have taken away a Korean soldier and food supplies.48 The fol-
lowing year, the Hamgyŏng governor (K. kwanch’alsa), Yi Sŏnbu, disclosed that 
at least ten Qing ginseng poachers had built tents near the Kapsan area and had 
made several attempts to rob Korean residents. When arrested and interrogated 
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by Chosŏn soldiers, these Qing intruders stated that they had legitimate ginseng 
permits issued by the Shengjing authority and claimed, “We simply got lost while 
searching for ginseng and ended up coming here after wandering around the 
Changbaishan area for some time.”49 Although it was evident that a growing num-
ber of Qing people were approaching Chosŏn territory at this time, it was difficult 
for Chosŏn officials to confirm their status as legitimate ginseng gatherers. In 1711, 
Seoul received another report of trespassing in the Kapsan area; again, ten people 
from Qing territory had been arrested for ginseng poaching and for making con-
tact with local Koreans. After some discussion, the Chosŏn court decided to report 
this particular event to the Qing as a mere accident rather than as an intentional 
intrusion.50
In 1714, when Qing hunters entered the Yisan area in P’yŏngan Province, the 
Chosŏn court finally took the step of complaining to Beijing about the ever-in-
creasing intrusions by Qing subjects and officially requested the Qing to take ac-
tion to prevent such violations:
People of the superior country come and go [across the boundary], forming groups 
of several dozen or hundreds to hunt animals and gather ginseng. While hunting in 
the winter and digging for ginseng in the summer, they set up tents and stay for ex-
tended periods of time. Their secret contacts with local people in our small country 
caused the previous trespassing incidents. . . . Now they have violated the rule again 
by crossing the boundary to abduct a patrolling soldier. If this kind of crime is not 
stopped now, we cannot anticipate what will happen in the future. . . . Trespassing by 
the people of the superior country is not something in which this small country can 
intervene, but I dare to bother Your Highness by reporting this incident. . . . I beg 
Your Highness to curb illegal trespassers and to stop them from plundering the food 
supplies and frightening the people of our small country.51
Upon receiving the Chosŏn court’s report, the Kangxi emperor ordered the 
imposition of strict regulations for trespassers and local officials. He went fur-
ther and gave the Chosŏn government his permission to arrest Qing intruders: “If 
Chosŏn soldiers arrest trespassers and send them back [to the Qing], these crimi-
nals should be thoroughly questioned and punished. The Chosŏn should also be 
informed in writing to strengthen patrolling at the boundary and, in the event of 
discovering such trespassers, arrest them and send them back to the Qing.”52
In fact, the Kangxi emperor had already given permission for the Chosŏn to 
arrest Qing intruders two years before this incident, in 1712, explaining, “If [such 
criminals] enter [Chosŏn territory] and plunder there, the Chosŏn people will 
think helplessly, ‘We cannot do anything to the people of the Heavenly Court.’ This 
is something I cannot endure.” The emperor then ordered the Shengjing military 
governor to stop illegal seafaring near Chosŏn territory and also instructed the 
Chosŏn court to arrest and punish Qing trespassers, not to pardon them on the 
basis of their being “imperial subjects.”53 Thus, if Chosŏn soldiers arrested a Qing 
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subject for seafaring without an authorized pass or for causing a disturbance in 
Chosŏn territory, they were allowed to punish the Qing criminal under Chosŏn 
law. However, the emperor also made it clear that this permission did not mean 
that the Chosŏn court had been given free rein to punish Qing subjects: “[This 
power] is given to the Chosŏn only as a means of serving the emperor.”54
The fact that the Kangxi emperor allowed the Chosŏn to arrest and punish 
Qing trespassers reflects a profound change in Qing-Chosŏn relations at the turn 
of the eighteenth century. In the early years of the Kangxi reign, the Chosŏn king 
had had to pay an excessive fine as a punishment for Korean trespassing, but now, 
in the last decade of his rule, the emperor granted the Chosŏn court imperial per-
mission to punish Qing subjects for boundary violations. There is no doubt that 
this change reflected the growing strength of Qing rule in China in the early eigh-
teenth century. The Qing emperor harbored no serious concerns regarding the 
relationship with the Chosŏn, and this confidence allowed for greater leniency in 
his Chosŏn policy. In short, the consolidation of the Qing empire opened up op-
portunities for the Chosŏn court to assert its power at the boundary.
In 1714, the Chosŏn court expressed grave concern over the discovery of Qing 
seafarers who had built houses and begun to cultivate land around the Kyŏngwŏn 
area in Hamgyŏng Province. A statement made by these Qing intruders is in-
dicative of the situation: “We were told that people from Ningguta were going to 
move here, so we wanted to take this fertile land before they came.”55 The subse-
quent investigation by the Chosŏn court revealed a plan proposed by the Ning-
guta military governor according to which Qing soldiers would be stationed in 
Hunchun, across from Kyŏngwŏn, and the surrounding area would be declared a 
military post.56 The Chosŏn court’s response to the Qing plan to develop the land 
on the Tumen River reveals Korean conceptions about the Qing and their mutual 
boundary:
In Ming times, Jiuliancheng and several other garrisons near the boundary were so 
close to us that even crowing cockerels and barking dogs could be heard. If people 
from Liaodong came to our land to till it, we reported [the intrusion] to the [Ming] 
Liaodong commander so he would stop it and erected a stone marker to demarcate 
the boundary. The world was then like one family, and our people and the Chinese 
people [hua] were close neighbors; but we were still worried about not having a de-
fense line. It is not even necessary to mention [the importance of the boundary] now. 
We cannot understand the real intention of the Qing, but it is truly worrisome, since 
frequent contacts across a narrow river will cause trouble.57
This comment implies that drawing clear boundaries had been an important 
issue during the Ming period and that it became even more critical when the 
Chosŏn faced the Qing. It assumes that the Qing Manchus could be more threat-
ening to Chosŏn security than the Ming Han Chinese had been.
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The Chosŏn court sent a letter to Beijing requesting that the Qing court halt 
the Ningguta military governor’s plan. Contrary to its tacit belief that the Qing 
represented a greater threat to the Chosŏn than the Ming had been, the Koreans 
politely explained to the Kangxi emperor that they did not agree with the devel-
opment of the land near the Tumen River because such development conflicted 
with previous policy: “[The emperor] built a gate at Fenghuangcheng and checked 
the entrance, leaving the land outside the gate uninhabited and preventing people 
from living there. This made a clear distinction between [the great country] and 
our small country, avoiding their mixing. It was due to imperial thoughtfulness 
that the boundary has been safe thus far.”58 Apparently convinced by the argu-
ment that trespassing could be prevented only by keeping the area near the river 
empty of people, the Kangxi emperor accepted the Chosŏn appeal and ordered 
all Qing subjects residing near the Tumen River to evacuate. In 1715, the Qing 
Board of Rites sent a letter of confirmation to the Chosŏn, stating that houses and 
shelters near Kyŏngwŏn had been cleared and that the Ningguta soldiers had also 
been repositioned. The letter further promised a strict prohibition on Qing people 
crossing the Tumen River or building houses on or tilling the land near the river; 
in essence, if illegal residents were discovered near the river, Qing soldiers and of-
ficials would be punished for negligence.59
Despite Chosŏn oppositions and protests, the Qing had, in fact, established a 
military garrison in Hunchun, across the Tumen River from Kyŏngwŏn, in 1714. 
Under the jurisdiction of the Ningguta military governor, the Hunchun regiment 
colonel (xieling) was newly appointed to supervise 150 Kūyara soldiers, who were 
organized into three companies (M. niru), and forty Manchu banner soldiers.60 
That same year the Chosŏn court dispatched interpreters to deliver a letter ex-
pressing its concerns to the Qing,61 but there is no further record of how the Qing 
court explained to the Koreans its decision to build the banner garrison in Hun-
chun, from where Kyŏngwŏn could be visited in a single day’s round trip. In the 
end, the Chosŏn court did not succeed altogether in stopping the Kangxi emperor 
from stationing Qing soldiers near the Tumen River. But it was at least able to pre-
vent the Qing from developing the land at the Tumen River, because the Ningguta 
military governor decided to open land in a different location, far away from the 
river, for his soldiers being stationed in Hunchun.
Li Huazi points out that Kangxi’s decision to cease Tumen River development 
can be deemed a diplomatic victory for the Chosŏn court. She argues that it had 
a negative effect on Qing boundary management, because the Qing military pres-
ence at the Tumen River became insecure and was thus unable to prevent Koreans 
from crossing the river in the late nineteenth century.62 It is true that the Chosŏn 
court applied the rhetoric of the benevolent emperor who had great trust in his 
loyal tributary state and that it succeeded in persuading Kangxi to retract his plans 
for development of the Tumen River area. However, there is more to the decision 
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than the Chosŏn manipulation of the tributary relationship and its taking advan-
tage of the diplomatic language of loyalty to attain certain objectives. Kangxi’s de-
cision not to develop the area was also related to the conception of the boundary 
as a buffer zone that should be empty of people to prevent troubles with one’s 
neighbor. The empty space at the boundary near the Tumen River did not cause 
serious problems during the eighteenth century, when the Qing authorities were 
still strong enough to control traffic across the rivers. It was only in the late nine-
teenth century that the two states were no longer able to stop people’s movements 
and the uninhabited buffer zone invited a growing number of immigrants and 
settlers hungry for land.
THE MANGNIUSHAO POST
The Kangxi emperor’s authorization of the active involvement of the Chosŏn in 
patrolling the boundary was confirmed by his son, who in 1728 issued the Yong-
zheng Imperial Decree (Yongzheng huangzhi) to give Chosŏn soldiers permis-
sion to arrest Qing intruders in Korean territory and even to kill them in the 
case of resistance.63 Beyond the imperial efforts in Beijing to curtail trespassing, 
the Shengjing military governor at the time, Nasutu, identified additional effec-
tive methods for achieving security at the boundary, one of which was to build a 
military post at the mouth of the Yalu River. He paid special attention to a small 
sandbank called Mangniushao, located where two streams—the Caohe and the 
Aihe—converged and flowed into the Yalu. This sandbank was used as a foothold 
by criminals and as a port for delivering provisions to ginseng poachers and tres-
passers. Nasutu’s problem was that although the west side of the sandbank was un-
der the jurisdiction of Fenghuangcheng, the east side fell within Chosŏn territory. 
Nasutu explained to his emperor that the sandbank enabled criminals to easily 
evade Qing soldiers because it was located along the boundary with the Chosŏn.64 
In order to prevent further transgressions, the military governor suggested, ships 
and soldiers should be stationed at a new military post on Mangniushao. The 
Yongzheng emperor’s first response to Nasutu’s proposal was to discuss the matter 
with the Chosŏn. Despite being the ruler of the superior country, matters pertain-
ing to a boundary with a foreign country could not be decided unilaterally by the 
Qing emperor.
Upon receiving the Qing court’s letter concerning the possible establishment 
of a military post on Mangniushao, the Chosŏn court assumed that the Qing in-
tention was to “open the land along the Yalu River for settlement.” Second State 
Councilor (K. chwaŭijŏng) Cho Munmyŏng said:
Since the Shunzhi reign, the land outside the [Fenghuangcheng] gate has remained 
empty and no one has been allowed to approach it from either side, a decision that 
was made after careful consideration. It is very worrisome that recent criminal 
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activities by our subjects have repeatedly violated the boundary and caused trouble 
for the superior country. We should stop any attempt at building a military post 
near the boundary.65
Cho’s argument against a military post near the Yalu River was the same as 
the one that had been used in 1714, when the Chosŏn court had opposed devel-
opment of the land near the Tumen River during the Kangxi reign: if the area is 
opened for settlement, people will immigrate, and illegal crossings will increase. 
In 1731, the Chosŏn king Yŏngjo sent a letter to the Qing court, drawing on famil-
iar rhetoric to remind the emperor of the precedents of the Shunzhi and Kangxi 
emperors, who had displayed consistent benevolence and care on matters relating 
to the Chosŏn:
In the past, Taizong Wen Huangdi [Hong Taiji] . . . built the Willow Palisade, enforced 
regular patrols in the region, and kept the land empty; people were not allowed to 
settle there. It was a truly considerate and extraordinary decision. During the rule of 
Shengzu Ren Huangdi [Kangxi], the Ningguta military governor stationed soldiers 
opposite Kyŏngwŏn to the north of this small country. When he further tried to 
build camps and develop the land, however, the emperor disapproved of the proposal 
after reading the letter from this small country and showed that imperial benevo-
lence is always deep and eternal. Thanks to his decision, this small country was able 
to reduce temporarily the burden of patrolling at the boundary.66
In the face of Chosŏn complaints, the Yongzheng emperor finally bestowed his 
favor on the Chosŏn king rather than on his Shengjing military governor. In the 
same year, 1731, the Qing Board of Rites informed the Chosŏn court of the em-
peror’s objection to the proposed military post on Mangniushao:
[The emperor] understands that the two streams of Caohe and Aihe run along the 
boundary with the Chosŏn and therefore asks the Chosŏn whether there is any prob-
lem [with the proposal]. Since the Chosŏn king begs to follow past precedent, the 
plan to build a military post will be stopped. It is not necessary for the Board of War 
to discuss it again.67
As an effective way of preventing trespassing, the emperor favored the Chosŏn 
idea of maintaining an empty buffer zone at the boundary over his own local of-
ficial’s proposal to station soldiers on Mangniushao. Yongzheng’s decision was not 
simply the result of successful Chosŏn diplomacy; rather, the emperor recognized 
that the Qing empire and the Chosŏn state shared a zone between their territo-
ries and he decided to maintain the area uninhabited by force instead of pursuing 
maximum strategic efficacy in controlling the boundary.
The decision not to build an outpost on the waterway limited Qing efforts to 
open up new mountains for ginseng collection. In 1738, Yong-fu, now vice minister 
of the Shengjing Board of War, proposed that more ginseng-producing mountains 
be opened up and gatherers be allowed to enter via the waterway into Bendou 
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and Huanggou outside the eastern line of the palisade. This region was located to 
the southeast of Elmin and Halmin, the old ginseng preserve in Shengjing. When 
Yong-fu’s proposal was delivered to Beijing, however, the primary concern of the 
Qing court was not the probable ginseng yield of Bendou and Huanggou but rath-
er the likely reaction of the Chosŏn court, which had been very displeased with the 
idea of Qing soldiers or ginseng gatherers approaching its territory. In the end, the 
Qing court rejected the proposal, reasoning,
If we open a waterway to Bendou and Huanggou, which is separated only by 
a river from Chosŏn territory, some unlawful people may trouble the Chosŏn 
people and mar the imperial benevolence to embrace the small country. There-
fore, ginseng gatherers going to Bendou and Huanggou are not allowed to take 
the waterways; instead, they should enter through the nearest gates of Jianchang 
and Aiyang.68
The fervent appeal of the Chosŏn for Qing magnanimity evidently pressured 
the Qing court to take extra precautions at the boundary and to limit voluntarily 
its efforts to improve ginseng collection in its own territory.
Figure 8. The Fenghuangcheng gate, the Yalu River, and Ŭiju. Details from Sǒbuk kyedo (map 
of the northwestern boundary), 1777–91. Manuscript, 140 × 135 cm. Kyujanggak Institute for 
Korean Studies of Seoul National University, no. ko 4709–89, vol. 5. Used with permission.
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After the proposal for a military post was rejected, Mangniushao continued 
to serve as a foothold for illegal ginseng poachers. By the time the Qianlong 
emperor took the throne in 1736, it was clear that the Willow Palisade had failed 
to check the constant flow of Han Chinese immigrants and ginseng poachers 
into Manchuria. It was also at this time that the acculturation of the bannermen 
became a serious concern at the Qing court: signs were omnipresent that the 
bannermen were losing their traditional means of securing their livelihood, the 
military skills of horsemanship and archery, and their command of the Manchu 
language.69 As a part of efforts to halt the deterioration of the “Manchu Way,” in 
1740 the Qianlong emperor decided to prohibit further immigration to Shengjing 
and to send illegal residents back to China proper. The same regulations were en-
forced in Jilin and Heilongjiang in the following years.70 Later history tells us that 
this restriction could not stop tens of thousands of hungry peasants looking for a 
living in the northeastern region, and the Qing court failed to protect its home-
land from Han Chinese immigrants. However, the court did not officially aban-
don the restriction on entry into the northeast until the end of the nineteenth 
century, because it was directly linked to the Manchu identity and the basis of 
the Qing empire. Even in the face of the reality of an increasing Han popula-
tion in Manchuria, the Qing court doubled down on its efforts to promote the 
symbolic status of the northeast as the Manchu homeland. From the Qianlong 
period onward, the Shengjing region in particular began to be called “the place 
of our Manchu origin” (Shengjing xi wo Manzhou genben zhi di), indicating that 
the Qing court connected the physical locality of Manchuria directly with the 
ethnicity of the Manchus.71
Ginseng in Manchuria was still a matter of importance when Qianlong and his 
officials were discussing places appropriate for the relocation of Beijing banner-
men to Manchuria as a way of resolving the “Eight Banners livelihood problem” 
(baqi shengji wenti). Poverty had been increasing among banner soldiers since 
the eighteenth century for various reasons, including loss of banner lands and the 
growth of the banner population, and thus the Qing court was confronted with 
the challenge of finding solutions to the growing economic problems of the ban-
nermen.72 In 1741 the court considered the possibility of relocating the banner-
men stationed in Beijing and their families to the northeast, where arable land was 
available. In the course of the discussion regarding appropriate destinations for the 
bannermen, Grand Secretary Liang Shizheng pointed out that the areas around 
Hunchun and the Burhatung and Hailan Rivers—two tributaries of the Tumen 
River—were not to be included among possible resettlement locations, because 
“these are ginseng-producing areas.” He warned that since the bannermen were 
not familiar with cultivation, they would have to hire Han Chinese peasants to till 
the land, and these Han people would certainly try to poach ginseng. Therefore, 
Liang explained, ginseng-producing areas should not be made available for the 
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bannermen’s relocation.73 Every aspect of Qing policy in Manchuria, even con-
cerning the benefits of the bannermen, thus had to give way to the imperatives of 
the state’s ginseng monopoly.
It was for the same purpose of strengthening security in Shengjing and Jilin 
in general and of checking ginseng poachers at the boundary with the Chosŏn 
in particular that the idea of a post at Mangniushao was raised again. As briefly 
discussed in the introduction, in 1745, fifteen years after Nasutu’s initial proposal, 
the newly appointed Shengjing military governor Daldangga wrote a memorial to 
the Qianlong emperor about the significance of security in Shengjing. Before men-
tioning the Mangniushao post, Daldangga argued that the Willow Palisade should 
be repaired and the area between Fenghuangcheng and Weiyuanbao opened for 
cultivation.74 For him, a guard post at Mangniushao was not only a matter of se-
curing the boundary with the Chosŏn; it was part of an overall plan to reinforce 
security in Shengjing. Well aware that his predecessor, Nasutu, had failed to per-
suade the Yongzheng emperor of the merits of the plan, Daldangga first provided 
the new emperor with a detailed explanation of the geographic features around 
Mangniushao. In particular he emphasized that the two streams that converged at 
Mangniushao, the Caohe and the Aihe, both originated from Changbaishan—the 
sacred homeland of the Manchu court—and that the region was rich in ginseng, 
the imperial family’s precious asset. Even though a number of outposts had been 
built and soldiers patrolled regularly to protect the ginseng mountains in the im-
perial preserves, Daldangga cautioned that “vicious people are still illegally build-
ing ships to transport food; they pass through Mangniushao and enter the ginseng 
preserves in secret.”75 In order to stop them, he argued, one hundred well-trained 
banner soldiers with nautical experience should be dispatched to Mangniushao. 
These soldiers should also be allowed to cultivate the land and build houses near 
the guard post.76
Daldangga knew very well that the previous proposal had been rejected mostly 
because of the Chosŏn court’s appeal against it. He thus made a point of refuting 
Chosŏn arguments, which he believed were absurd and irrational, arguing that 
security at the boundary would be beneficial for the Chosŏn as well:
If we miss this opportunity to station soldiers and defend key posts, there will be 
more people looking to make a profit [at the boundary] as time goes on. There will 
also be incessant cases of [Qing subjects] coming into contact with Chosŏn people, 
violating the boundary, and causing trouble.  .  .  . [This military post] will not only 
prevent unruly people from stealing ginseng but also pacify the boundary with the 
Chosŏn.77
Based on a report from the Xiongyue commander, Daldangga made it clear 
that the proposed location was outside of Chosŏn territory. All Qing soldiers and 
ships would be stationed on Qing land, thus precluding any violations of Chosŏn 
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territory. If an illegal Qing ginseng poacher were to be discovered within Chosŏn 
territory, the military governor’s men would be dispatched and would cooperate 
with Chosŏn soldiers to arrest the perpetrator.78
In addition to local officials in Shengjing, court officials on the Board of Rites 
in Beijing also supported Daldangga’s proposal. Even though the previous em-
peror had accepted the Chosŏn appeal, they emphasized, “strategic locations 
at the boundary must be thoroughly secured,” and the proposed location lay 
clearly within Qing territory. Court officials further argued that the “decision 
to construct a military post within Qing territory [neidi] should be made by the 
presiding local official, not necessarily in consultation with the Chosŏn king.”79 
In essence, they believed it wrong to compromise the country’s security out of 
fear of disturbing a relationship with a neighboring country. Unlike the Yong-
zheng emperor, who gave priority to diplomatic relations with the Chosŏn, the 
emperor’s officials in Beijing and Shengjing all emphasized the urgency of the 
local situation.
IMPERIAL AUTHORIT Y AT THE MARGINS
News of resumed discussions in Beijing regarding the Mangniushao post soon 
reached the Chosŏn court. Through several channels, including the tributary en-
voy in Beijing and local interpreters in Fenghuangcheng, the Chosŏn court man-
aged to gather fragments of information and came to the conclusion that the Qing 
court was making an attempt to relocate the gate of the Willow Palisade closer 
to the Chosŏn side.80 This led to further speculation that by moving the gate, the 
Shengjing military governor and Qing people would first try to occupy the land 
at the Yalu River and eventually demand control of Ŭiju and other cities in the 
Chosŏn northern region. Hence, King Yŏngjo claimed that the Chosŏn would 
“lose five to ten li of its territory every day.” Describing the Qing action as analo-
gous to “someone else building a fence outside my gate,” Yŏngjo insisted that any 
relocation of the Qing gate should be prevented.81
Anxious to uncover the Qing court’s true intentions, especially after receiv-
ing news that the Xiongyue commander had already visited the Yalu River, the 
Chosŏn court decided to ask the Qianlong emperor directly.82 Given that the 
Chosŏn letters were usually delivered to the Qing Board of Rites either in Beijing 
or in Shengjing, any direct form of contact with the emperor was deemed to be “a 
violation of the heavenly dignity.” This unusually direct channel of communication 
demonstrates how seriously the Chosŏn court took the Qing state’s movements at 
the Yalu River:
Ever since the imperial court has ruled the world, Your Highness has firmly set the 
boundary between inside and outside. Concerned with the possibility of vicious 
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people crossing the boundary in secret, Your Highness built gates and instituted 
checks at the entrances. The land from the [Qing] gate to the Yalu River, as wide as a 
hundred li, has remained empty, with no one allowed to live on it or till it, and thus 
people [on either side of the boundary] have not seen or heard each other. It was a 
considerate plan that permanently secured people’s welfare.83
Yŏngjo then reminded the Qianlong emperor that the Kangxi and Yongzheng 
emperors had not approved of land development or the stationing of soldiers at 
the boundary with the Chosŏn. He also talked about the special relationship be-
tween the Qing and Chosŏn courts: “This small country, despite being an outer 
dependency [K. oebŏn] of the imperial court, has considered itself to be within 
the empire [K. naebok]. We have voiced all our concerns, and [the imperial court] 
has listened to our requests. From these sincere reactions, we have felt [that the 
imperial court] has expressed unparalleled devotion to us.”84 Yŏngjo described the 
relationship between the two countries as amicable; it was a relationship in which 
the Chosŏn had served the Qing with sincerity for generations and, in return, the 
Qing had treated the Chosŏn generously. Yŏngjo implied that he now expected 
the Qianlong emperor to listen to the Chosŏn court’s request to stop plans to 
build the Mangniushao post.
The language in the Chosŏn king’s letter, which reflected the hierarchical role 
of a submissive inferior court to “serve the great [court]” (K. sadae) and that of 
a benevolent imperial court to “care for its tributaries” (K. chaso), was typical of 
the tributary relationship. But the same rhetoric could carry very different mean-
ings depending on the context. Hong Taiji had applied this rhetoric in the early 
seventeenth century when he demanded that the Chosŏn king Injo punish Korean 
trespassers and emphasized the obligation of the Chosŏn to “serve the great.” 
The mid-eighteenth-century letter from the Chosŏn king Yŏngjo used the same 
expression but purposely put more weight on the imperial duty to “care for its 
tributaries.” Hong Taiji had used this language to coerce the Chosŏn to accept his 
authority, whereas Qianlong heard the same words when being asked to accept 
the Chosŏn court’s demands. Another interesting point is that the Chosŏn letter 
tried to portray the Qing rulers as typical Chinese emperors upholding Confucian 
virtues, a depiction that supported the Chosŏn demand that Qianlong follow past 
precedent. In spite of their contempt for the Manchus as non–Han Chinese, the 
Koreans were willing to bestow the epithet of the Confucian sage king on the Qing 
emperor in order to bolster their claim against the military post. In this sense, the 
Koreans were exceptionally adept at manipulating the traditional rhetoric of the 
tributary relationship for their own purposes.
It is not surprising that Qianlong was displeased with the persistent com-
plaints of the Chosŏn about the plans for the empire’s northeastern margins. Dal-
dangga explained repeatedly that a military post at the boundary would benefit 
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the Chosŏn as well, and all the officials in the Boards of Rites, Work, and War 
concurred with him. Beyond that, the emperor had already approved the plan. 
Qianlong said to his officials: “The Chosŏn king’s memorial admits that some 
people in his country have taken advantage of the opportunities for trespass-
ing and illegal ginseng gathering. If we station soldiers and patrol [the bound-
ary], these [Koreans] will not be able to cross in secret. The memorial is surely 
contemptible. People in the small country do not understand what is important; 
they merely pursue profits and neglect security at the boundary.”85 However, it 
was equally inappropriate for Qianlong to simply ignore the repeated Chosŏn 
protests in order to follow Daldangga’s proposal. The Chosŏn was one of the old-
est tributaries of the Qing empire, a neighbor long favored by the imperial court. 
If Qianlong desired to live up to the model of a benevolent Confucian king, as 
Yŏngjo portrayed him, the emperor needed to acknowledge and duly consider 
the Chosŏn court’s petition.
In addition to the Chosŏn court’s strong resistance, there were internal voices 
against the plan. The Grand Councilor, Bandi, after inspecting conditions at the 
proposed location, secretly reported to the Qianlong emperor that building a mili-
tary post at Mangniushao would not have a great effect on security, since it was 
not the only place where illegal trespassers could come and go. He further pointed 
out that the plan would impose on the court the huge expense of provisioning the 
soldiers and create a diplomatic problem in its relations with the Chosŏn court.86 
In 1746, Qianlong decided to discontinue the Yalu River development, thereby re-
jecting one part of Daldangga’s plan and at the same time assuaging the biggest 
concern of the Chosŏn:
With regard to Daldangga’s memorial about the [Yalu River] development, the 
Chosŏn king mentioned that the land outside the gate has remained off-limits 
and empty and the inside and the outside have been separated, so that people 
have been prevented from coming and causing trouble. This rule must be en-
forced. As for the relocation of the gate, let this plan be stopped, since the Chosŏn 
king has appealed against it. Let the Board [of Rites] forward this decision to the 
Chosŏn king.87
As this imperial decree called for the cessation of development at the Yalu 
River, Daldangga’s master plan for managing the Shengjing region, which includ-
ed the renovation of the Willow Palisade from Fenghuangcheng to Weiyuanbao 
and the relocation of soldiers to military posts at the Yalu River, could not move 
forward. To maintain military forces at the boundary, Daldangga needed hous-
ing and land, which he sought to secure in the empty areas near the Yalu River. 
When the emperor announced his decision to cease further development near the 
river, officials on the Board of War attempted to change his mind by reiterating 
the importance of building a post at Mangniushao. The officials, who described 
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themselves as being “concerned about boundary control,” emphasized the good 
intentions of Daldangga, who “tried to track down vicious thieves and to secure 
the boundary for eternity.” They argued that the Mangniushao post would “ter-
minate any trouble at the boundary forever and be beneficial to the outer depen-
dency [the Chosŏn] as well.” They stressed that the Chosŏn complaints were not 
necessarily serious concerns and that Daldangga’s proposed plan should be put 
into action.88
Between his own court officials, who insisted on erecting a guard post at the 
Yalu River, and the Chosŏn king, who petitioned to stop it, Qianlong favored the 
Chosŏn, following his father’s precedent:
The proposed location for the new post is within Qing territory, and it is thus ir-
relevant to the Chosŏn. However, the Chosŏn king, who has been loyal and sub-
missive to our court for generations, is now worried about being held responsible 
if his people violate the proposed regulation, and he is therefore pleading with us 
not to build such a post. . . . I could not bear to see the Chosŏn king being blamed 
for his people’s wrongdoings. In accordance with his petition, let the building of the 
Mangniushao post be stopped; [the Board of Rites should] teach the Chosŏn king to 
control his people better.89
Regardless of the urgency of the need for a military post at the boundary, the 
Qing emperor could not pursue the proposed plan in the face of the Chosŏn 
court’s persistent appeals against it. The Yongzheng and Qianlong emperors, who 
sought to uphold the virtues of a Confucian ruler and to embrace the Chosŏn 
tributary state, decided to sacrifice the potential benefits of a military post at the 
Yalu River in order to pursue these higher goals. The failed proposal for the Mang-
niushao post shows that the Qing-Chosŏn relationship had changed significantly 
over the previous century. The relationship between the two countries was still 
premised on the asymmetrical hierarchy of a superior and an inferior partner, but 
it now also allowed space for negotiation and discussion. In addition to this flex-
ible, if not wide open, relationship they also shared an empty zone between their 
territories, in which the superior court could display its imperial honor while al-
lowing the inferior tributary to keep its benefits. Daldangga’s proposal was unsuc-
cessful not simply because the small Chosŏn kingdom succeeded in protecting 
its territory against the military might of the Qing empire. The emperor’s desire 
to embody the role of the universal ruler, the increasingly negotiable relationship 
between the imperial center and its tributary state, and a shared conception of 
territory and sovereignty all combined to obviate the necessity of a clearly drawn 
line between the two neighbors. Instead, they agreed to perpetuate the borderland 
by maintaining the existing buffer zone and using force, if necessary, to keep it 
empty and uninhabited.
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The gate and the outposts between the eastern line of the Willow Palisade 
and the Yalu River remained under the jurisdiction of the Shengjing mili-
tary governor throughout the Qing period. By the 1770s, there were a total 
of thirty-seven outposts both inside and outside the eastern line, with each 
of the outposts being staffed with one officer and ten soldiers. Soldiers were 
stationed at the outposts located inside the eastern line from winter to next 
spring and then moved to those outside the line from summer to autumn of 
each year. This schedule for the patrolling soldiers was surely related to the 
routine of ginseng gathering, which usually took place during the summer 
outside the eastern line of the palisade. By the end of the Qianlong reign, the 
number of outposts around the eastern line had changed, to twelve outside the 
eastern line and twenty-two inside the line.90 However, the Qing military pres-
ence was not fully visible at this margin of the empire; as Richard Edmonds 
explains, the Willow Palisade functioned as “an internal boundary rather than 
the demarcation of the Chinese-Korean border.” Even though Qing soldiers 
supposedly continued their regular patrols and inspections to prevent ginseng 
poaching and illegal logging, the empty buffer zone demonstrated “the lack of 
strategic or political concern at the Qing court for a clearly defined boundary 
with Korea.”91
Qianlong might have had little interest in a clearly drawn boundary line with 
Chosŏn territory because he was full of confidence in the superiority of his status 
vis-à-vis his Chosŏn tributary. His ideas about the territorial limits of the Qing 
empire can perhaps be glimpsed in his famous poem about the Willow Palisade, 
which he wrote in 1754, less than a decade after the debates over the Mangniushao 
post, when he went on a hunting trip from Jehol through Inner Mongolia to Jilin. 
The physical barrier in the northeast, the emperor announced, had now become 
insignificant:
Building it is the same as not having built it
In so far as the idea exists and the framework is there, there is no 
need to elaborate
The methods of predecessors are preserved by descendants
When there are secure fortifications it is peaceful for ten thousand 
years
How can this be dependent upon these insignificant willows?92
When he wrote this poem, Qianlong seemed “to believe that the deteriora-
tion of the Willow Palisade was a sign of the virtue of his rule, for no barrier was 
necessary to regulate the movement of people when the ruler was a true sage.”93 
It is surely questionable whether Qianlong’s confidence was based on the real-
ity of Qing supremacy or merely expressed an ungrounded wish. However, it is 
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clear that his confidence in his rulership was not limited to Qing territory but 
also reached the boundary with the Chosŏn. In his view, the imperial power of 
the Qing extended beyond such trivial barriers as the Willow Palisade; the em-
peror’s prominence was not circumscribed by the narrow rivers dividing the great 
country and the tributary state. Just as his grandfather Kangxi had done in the 
case of the 1712 Changbaishan investigation, the Qianlong emperor believed the 
presentation of imperial power was more important than securing a clear bound-
ary with the Chosŏn.
• • •
The debates around the Mangniushao post at the Yalu River demonstrate that the 
Qing-Chosŏn borderland was managed and practiced in accordance with the dual 
principles of the Qing policy on Manchuria and its relationship with the Chosŏn. 
The Qing economic interest in ginseng production in Manchuria was one of the 
main reasons why the Qing authorities paid special attention to preventing access 
by Han civilians to the region. This restrictive policy was also aimed at keeping 
Koreans away from the Yalu and Tumen Rivers and Changbaishan. The desire of 
the Qing to protect Manchuria, together with the Chosŏn court’s wish to avoid 
trouble with the great country, led the two states to ban settlement at the bound-
ary and eventually to create the borderland through the imposition of an empty 
buffer zone between the two countries. This incident also helps us understand 
the changeability of Qing-Chosŏn relations. Korean trespassing in Qing territory 
was a constant occurrence from the Nurhaci era to the Qianlong reign, but the 
Qing court’s responses changed over time. The early Manchu rulers imposed harsh 
punishments on Korean criminals—a policy aimed at forcing the Chosŏn court to 
accept their power. Unlike their seventeenth-century predecessors, however, the 
Qing emperors in the eighteenth century ruled over a vast territory populated by 
diverse groups of people, and they sought to represent themselves as the universal 
rulers of all subjects of the empire, including the Manchus, the Han, the Mongols, 
the Uighurs, and the Tibetans.94
Such universalism was necessarily reflected also on those living outside the 
imperial domain. In relation to a tributary state as old as the Chosŏn, in particu-
lar, the Qing emperors cast themselves as the benevolent rulers of the Confucian 
world, an image that required them to accept Korean demands, at least to some 
degree. The aborted proposal for the Mangniushao post offers an example of how 
the Qing ruling ideology was projected in its foreign relations. The Chosŏn court’s 
loyalty was very useful and important for justifying Qing rule, while its potential 
as a military threat to the Qing empire was minimal. Because of this carefully 
weighed positioning, one can argue that Qing universalism in the eighteenth cen-
tury actually helped the Chosŏn king protect his territory and sovereignty. This 
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peculiarity of the tributary relationship between the Qing and the Chosŏn led to 
the creation and maintenance of the borderland, whose logic did not permit the 
establishment of a military post. Instead, the same tributary relationship invit-



























On January 8, 1748, the Shengjing military governor Daldangga received a report 
that property belonging to a member of the Chosŏn embassy had been stolen as 
the group had passed Liaoyang, a city within Daldangga’s jurisdiction.1 According 
to the initial report delivered through Korean interpreters, the victim was Sahwan, 
a Korean packhorse driver serving the embassy on its journey to Beijing. He was 
also a servant of Yun Ch’angli, the Korean official in charge of the embassy’s lug-
gage. Sahwan reported what he had seen:
When we arrived near Wanbaoqiao, a man riding a horse turned up all of a sudden 
shouting out loud. My horse was so frightened that it ran away. I hurried to catch up 
with the horse and found it standing in front of a house. There I saw one of the two 
packages of silver [that the horse had been carrying] on the ground, but the other 
package was gone. . . . We asked [the people in the house] about the silver, but they 
said they didn’t know about it. Later, my colleagues searched through the house and 
found the silver package hidden in a pile of sorghum.2
Sahwan pointed to Song Erdazi, a Qing subject living in Wanbaoqiao, as the 
prime suspect. Song’s testimony was, however, very different from the Korean ser-
vant’s presentation of the case:
When I had made a fire [inside my house] . . . the Koreans appeared at the gate, ask-
ing for a light for tobacco. Near the gate was a pile of firewood; it was very windy on 
that morning, so I did not give it to them. Then they asked me the way, so I opened 
the gate. Upon coming in, however, they started talking all of a sudden about their 
lost luggage, rummaging through my house with one hand while tying me up with 
the other. . . . As the day dawned, the Koreans returned, insisting that their silver had 
been found in the pile of sorghum in my house and tying me up again.3
4
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This incident, which later became known as “Korean Sahwan’s false accusation 
of theft,” was reported by Daldangga to the Board of Rites in Beijing and eventu-
ally to the Chosŏn court in Seoul, and it troubled the Qing and Chosŏn courts for 
several years to come.
This chapter discusses the Chosŏn tributary embassy and their trade as the 
background of the Sahwan case and then examines the subsequent series of dis-
putes involving the Shengjing military governor and the Chosŏn court. Two prob-
lems are of special concern here. First, the Qing and Chosŏn courts had estab-
lished a tributary relationship that not only defined the nature of their political 
ties but also shaped their economic connections. Qing foreign policy guaranteed 
regular visits and the payment of tribute by the subordinate neighbor, and this 
regular ritual had an unexpected side effect: the creation of a variety of trading op-
portunities for Qing and Chosŏn merchants. Second, the empty buffer zone north 
of the Yalu River—maintained through the consensus of the Qing emperors and 
the Chosŏn kings—created a space and an opportunity for Koreans to make con-
tact with local people in Qing territory. The frequent and regular contacts between 
the Chosŏn embassy and local Qing people led to the development of flourishing 
markets on the route from Fenghuangcheng to Shengjing.
In his analysis of the trade between Chosŏn Korea and Tokugawa Japan, James 
Lewis explains that “frontiers [such as Tsushima and Pusan] . . . [as] the sites of 
actual contacts” were as important as national centers in the formation of cultural 
perceptions and historical memory.4 If Tsushima and Pusan were the contacting 
locations between Chosŏn Korea and Tokugawa Japan, it was Fenghuangcheng 
and Shengjing where Qing China and Chosŏn Korea met. Details of actual con-
tacts at the boundary near the Yalu River and the Qing northeastern margin, in 
fact, revealed unknown dimensions of Qing-Chosŏn relations. A centralized per-
spective on Qing-Chosŏn tributary relations assumes that the courts in Beijing 
and Seoul had a single, direct connection and portrays other contacts, which took 
place in the periphery, as trivial, marginal, and even abnormal. For Beijing and 
Seoul, whose shared primary interest was to maintain proper tributary rituals, the 
incident involving Sahwan and Song Erdazi was merely an annoyance for both 
sides. From the perspective of the periphery, however, the practice of paying trib-
ute not only served to maintain the political hierarchy between the Qing emperor 
and the Chosŏn king, but also affected the development of physical contacts and 
commercial exchange between people from the two countries. The tributary em-
bassy provided a legitimate opportunity for many Korean profit seekers to cross 
the Yalu River and enter Qing territory, as well as for local Qing merchants and 
ordinary people to benefit from trade with the Chosŏn embassy.
This chapter also demonstrates the ways in which the empty, restricted area 
near the boundary and the peripheral margins of the empire were commercialized 
by the tributary relations. Fenghuangcheng and Shengjing witnessed the growth 
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and thriving of trade and transportation related to the Chosŏn embassy in the 
eighteenth century. Local Qing people and Chosŏn merchants alike took advan-
tage of the vacancy created at the boundary and developed various ways to exploit 
trade opportunities in the area. On the other hand, the frequent contacts between 
Chosŏn visitors and Qing locals sometimes turned into conflicts, mostly over 
money, and minor arguments sometimes developed into serious tensions between 
Beijing and Seoul. The tributary relationship attracted people and money to the 
Yalu River, but in the end the resulting contacts and conflicts caused Qing author-
ity to be enforced to the Chosŏn court in Seoul. Tribute and trade combined to 
commercialize the Qing-Chosŏn boundary and some parts of the Qing northeast 
margin, yet this process was limited and controlled by the asymmetrical relations 
between the Qing and the Chosŏn.
THE CHOSŎN TRIBUTARY EMBASSY
The 1637 peace treaty between the Qing and Chosŏn courts required the Koreans 
to send royal embassies to the Qing to celebrate the winter solstice, New Year’s 
Day, and the emperor’s birthday, in addition to paying an annual tribute to Beijing. 
In 1645, when the Qing capital moved from Shengjing to Beijing, the Manchus 
allowed the Chosŏn court to combine other embassies with the winter solstice 
embassy because of the lengthened tribute route. This became known as the an-
nual tribute or the regular embassy.5 There were also various types of irregular 
embassies.6 The composition of any given embassy varied according to the specific 
obligations and duties of the party. The leading members of the embassy were 
court officials, including the chief ambassador (K. chŏngsa), the vice ambassador 
(K. pusa), and the attendant secretary (K. sŏjanggwan). The chief ambassador was 
nominated from among members of the royal family or high officials, and he rep-
resented the Chosŏn king to the Qing emperor. The vice ambassador was in charge 
of the general office work of the embassy, while the attendant secretary supervised 
all affairs relevant to the embassy, notably regulations on smuggling.7 In practice, 
however, these high officials did not directly manage the tributary mission because 
they were not permitted to communicate with Qing officials at will; every discus-
sion had to be conveyed through written memorials. Go-betweens from the Office 
of Interpreters (K. Sayŏgwŏn) dealt with all practical matters. The chief interpreter 
essentially managed the mission, from trivial transactions with local merchants 
during the journey to important discussions with Qing officials pertaining to ritu-
als at the imperial court. High court officials were thus in actuality simply nominal 
representatives, whereas the interpreters were the actual managers of the embassy.8
Tribute embassies also included military guards (K. kun’gwan) and other minor 
officials. These individuals were in charge of keeping records of the tribute and 
other goods, hiring porters and carts for transportation to Beijing, and protecting 
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the luggage from the predations of the local porters. Besides such minor officials, 
numerous retainers also served the embassy. The Chosŏn court sought to prevent 
an excessive number of people from joining the embassy, but since the number of 
retainers was not officially fixed, uncounted individuals were able to slip into the 
embassy entourage.9 In addition to retainers, there were painters, astronomers, 
physicians, and others who usually had some connection with embassy officials. 
Moreover, numerous people joined the delegation to carry the tribute and the lug-
gage and to lead the horses during the journey. With all of these participants, the 
total number of people in an embassy often exceeded three hundred.10 By the early 
eighteenth century, the number had continued to grow; for example, 687 people 
crossed the Yalu River in the embassy of 1712.11
The Chosŏn embassy faced a long journey to the Qing imperial court. Travel-
ing to Beijing from the Yalu River via Shengjing took a month.12 Adding in the 
1,070 li from Seoul to the Yalu River, the journey time totaled more than six weeks. 
Including the customary monthlong stay in Beijing, the whole round trip took at 
Figure 9. Sanhaegwan tongnasŏng (eastern rampart of Shanhaiguan), circa 1784. Hand scroll, 
ink and color on paper, 35.4 × 45.3 cm. From Yǒnhaengdo: Paintings of the Korean Envoys to 
Beijing during the Joseon Dynasty (Seoul: Sungsil taehakkyo Hanguk Kidokkyo Pangmulgwan, 
2009), 12. Used with permission.
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least four months and could easily last up to five or six months.13 Although Beijing 
could be reached either by land or by sea, the land route was preferred because 
the sea-based journey was more dangerous. During the period when the Manchus 
were fighting Ming forces in Liaodong, the Chosŏn embassy traveled across the 
sea to the Ming court in Beijing. Once the Qing conquered China proper, the land 
route became the official travel route.
The final inspection of tribute embassies in Korea occurred in Ŭiju, a city on 
the Yalu River. A rigorous search for illegal group members was carried out, be-
cause the number of positions in the embassy was always significantly smaller than 
the number of people seeking entry into Qing territory. All of the tribute, people, 
and horses were checked. If anyone who was not officially listed was found in the 
embassy, the inspector in Ŭiju and the responsible embassy official were both pun-
ished.14 However, this inspection was often meaningless, since no matter how me-
ticulous the controls, it was impossible to prevent all illegal crossings. Pak Chiwŏn 
(1737–1805), who participated in the tribute embassy to Beijing for the commemo-
ration of the Qianlong emperor’s seventieth birthday in 1780, provides us with a 
description of the stunning sight of the embassy at the shore of the Yalu River.15 
Pak was particularly astonished by the great hassle created by the inspection, as 
embassy officials searched every item of luggage in order to prevent smuggling:
People are asked for their name, residence, age, facial features, height, et cetera. The 
inspectors of the embassy and the Ŭiju office examine every single piece of luggage 
to check for any illegal items, such as gold, silver, pearls, ginseng, furs, or weapons. 
Attendants and servants take off their shirts and pants and open their luggage to 
show to the officials. Bundles of linens and clothes and various boxes are scattered all 
around the shore. Without these inspections, there is no way to prevent smuggling. 
However, the inspections inevitably create great inconvenience. Nonetheless, even 
this inspection is nothing but a ritual. Since the Ŭiju merchants sneak across the river 
prior to the inspection, what effect does it really have?16
Pak was surprised again after crossing the river. On his first night in Qing terri-
tory, he witnessed people setting up their tents to spend the night in an open field; 
others were busy cooking meals and tending to horses. Instead of viewing an un-
spoiled territory, as the Yongzheng and Qianlong emperors might have expected, 
Pak found a scene reminiscent of any common village.17 Pak’s vivid descriptions 
of the scenes at the Yalu River seem to contradict conventional assumptions about 
the Qing northeast, a region that held special meaning and value for the Qing im-
perial court and to which access was therefore supposedly rigorously prohibited. 
This sacred birthplace of the Manchus was supposed to be protected from all in-
truders, whether coming from China proper beyond Shanhaiguan or from Korea 
across the Yalu River. However, Pak’s group of Chosŏn emissaries were left to their 
own devices for the first night after crossing the Yalu River and were not met by 
Qing officials until the next day.
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After crossing the Yalu River, the Chosŏn embassy was led to pass through 
the designated gate at the foot of the Fenghuang mountain. This first Qing gate, 
which Koreans called Ch’aengmun, was located along the Willow Palisade, thirty 
li away from Fenghuangcheng, the Qing administrative office that was closest to 
the Chosŏn. The gate was 90 li away from the Yalu River and 120 li from Ŭiju.18 
Since there were no postal stations between the Yalu River and the gate of Feng-
huangcheng, the embassy had to camp out for two days before arriving in Fen-
ghuangcheng. Korean authors of travel diaries about journeys to Beijing often 
remarked that they entered Qing territory by crossing the Yalu River, but there 
was, in fact, an uninhabited area between the Yalu and the Qing gate. Pak Chiwŏn 
noted that when he crossed the river, the land seemed abandoned:
The land near Jiuliancheng has .  .  . not only high mountains and deep waters, but 
also wide fields and rich woods. I expected to see a big village where houses are so 
crowded that the residents can hear each other’s dogs and chickens. The land is seem-
ingly very fertile and suitable for reclamation. . . . It could support the establishment 
of a huge military garrison. However, both we [the Chosŏn] and they [the Qing] have 
abandoned it to make an empty land [K. han’gu].19
Pak’s description corresponds with Marion Eggert’s explanation that “the Ŭiju 
border was considered a tripartite form, consisting of first the Yalu River, then a 
stretch of wilderness, and finally the palisade with its gate.”20 What Pak found, 
then, was not a clear-cut line dividing two neighbors; rather, it was a zone or a 
thick line. The land near the Yalu River remained empty, as the Qing and Chosŏn 
courts had agreed, but it also created unintended confusion about the exact limits 
of the two countries’ territories, at least in the eyes of Korean travelers. While 
crossing the Yalu River, Pak Chiwŏn encountered a group of local people sail-
ing across the river on their way back to Fenghuangcheng after logging timber 
in Changbaishan.21 According to the Qing restriction policy, such a violation of 
the sacred mountain was a serious crime, but it nonetheless took place in front of 
the Korean visitors’ eyes. Near Fenghuangcheng, Pak also met a group of people 
who were on their way to serve their military duty: “They were on donkeys, look-
ing ragged and tired,” he wrote. “I realized that [the Chosŏn boundary control] is 
more reliable whereas China’s is very lax.”22 The strict regulations that the emperor 
issued in Beijing were seemingly failing to reach the empire’s margins.
After passing through the vacant land, the Chosŏn embassy reached the Fen-
ghuangcheng office. A Korean interpreter was sent ahead to the gate to report 
the arrival of the embassy, so the Fenghuangcheng senior commandant received 
the Korean visitors at the gate. Qing officials also checked the number of people 
in the embassy and the amount of luggage they had with them against the deliv-
ered documents. Any Koreans whose names were not listed were prohibited from 
passing through the gate.23 However, there were numerous opportunities to evade 
this inspection. In 1806, for example, the Fenghuangcheng office allowed a given 
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number of Koreans to come to the gate from Ŭiju in order to provide food and 
other necessities for the Chosŏn embassy. Despite the Qing court’s warning to the 
Koreans not to abuse this opportunity to cross the river, Korean merchants con-
sidered it official permission to visit the Qing gate for trading.24
Dealing with the corruption of local Qing officials was an expected part of pass-
ing through the Fenghuangcheng gate. When the Korean embassy brought their 
tribute and luggage to the gate, its members usually presented a certain quantity 
of gifts to the Fenghuangcheng office. But these offerings eventually became a re-
quired “entrance fee” that grew every year as the Qing officials increased their de-
mands. The exchange of “gifts” at the gate often developed into a fistfight between 
Korean interpreters and Qing soldiers and porters.25 The abuses by the Feng-
huangcheng officials grew more and more egregious, to the point that in 1811 court 
officials in Beijing formally accused them of having received Korean bribes for 
entry through the gate.26 Two years later, Fenghuangcheng officials were criticized 
again for exacting bribes and entrance fees from the Koreans.27 Korean aspirations 
to enter China caused the rampant corruption of Qing officials at the crossing 
point; but on the other hand, this corruption also made it possible for numerous 
unauthorized Koreans to continue to cross into Qing territory.
TR ADING OPPORTUNITIES
Koreans participating in tribute missions were given an official right to do business 
during their journey to Beijing. During the Qing period, Korean embassies were 
officially permitted to carry up to eighty kŭn (C. jin) of ginseng, or the equivalent 
value in silver or other goods. A bundle (K. p’o) contained ten kŭn of ginseng, so 
the total trading allowance equaled eight bundles (K. p’alp’o). Later, the term p’alp’o 
came to stand specifically for the Chosŏn embassies’ right to trade in China.28 The 
p’alp’o trading right was granted to embassy officials, including the chief ambas-
sador, the vice ambassador, the attendant secretary, military guards, and interpret-
ers. It held more importance for interpreters than it did for high officials, because 
the former regarded the p’alp’o trading right as a substitute for their salaries, while 
the latter thought of it more as a bonus for serving the court.
Chinese silk was the main item that Korean merchants wanted to purchase 
when they visited the Qing empire. The Korean love for Chinese silk is described 
well in the stories of Zheng Shitai, a Beijing merchant who supplied Koreans with 
silk fabrics from Jiangsu and Zhejiang Provinces. Every year he ordered Chinese 
silk products worth as much as one hundred thousand liang of silver, all intended 
for his Korean customers. If the silk Zheng had ordered did not arrive in time, 
the Chosŏn embassy would actually postpone its departure from Beijing.29 Winter 
hats made in Zhonghousuo, a town near Shanhaiguan, were among the other Chi-
nese commodities that were popular with the Koreans. Hong Taeyong (1731–1783) 
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visited hat shops in Zhonghousuo and declared, “All of our Korean hats come from 
here.”30 Fifteen years later, Pak Chiwŏn confirmed that Koreans still purchased 
huge numbers of Chinese winter hats made in Zhonghousuo, adding, “If you cal-
culate the amount of silver we bring to China on these winter solstice embassies 
[and other official missions] . . . it is no less than one hundred thousand liang of 
silver. In ten years the total comes to one million liang.”31 Silver was the currency 
most commonly used to buy Chinese products, but the Koreans also traded other 
items, such as paper, fans, hides, cotton fabrics, and furs. Besides silk, Korean visi-
tors also purchased cotton, dyes, pepper, fruit, and pottery; most of these purchas-
es they made at the Fenghuangcheng gate.32
Various opportunities for trading were available to the Chosŏn embassy be-
tween the Yalu River and the Fenghuangcheng gate.33 From Ŭiju to the Feng-
huangcheng gate, the embassy had to manage the transportation of the tribute 
and other luggage by itself. This seemingly inconvenient situation in fact provided 
the Korean merchants with a huge business opportunity. The Ŭiju office often sent 
extra horses to accompany the envoy in case of unexpected incidents during the 
Table 2 The size of the p’alp’o trade.
Rank 
(number of individuals)
Silver allowed per 
person (liang)
Total amount of 
silver (liang)
High officials
Chief ambassador (1) 3,000 3,000
Vice ambassador (1) 3,000 3,000
Attendant secretary (1) 2,000 2,000





Chief interpreters (2) 3,000 6,000
High interpreters (2) 2,000 4,000
Official for questions (1) 2,000 2,000
Officials for local products (8) 2,000 16,000
Officials for annual tributes (3) 2,000 6,000
Officials for food (2) 2,000 4,000
Manchu interpreter (1) 2,000 2,000
Assistant interpreter (1) 2,000 2,000





Physician (1) 2,000 2,000
Writer (1) 2,000 2,000
Painter (1) 2,000 2,000
Subtotals (3) 6,000
Total (35) 74,000
Source: Yu and Yi, Chosŏn hugi Chungguk kwa ŭi muyŏksa, 57.
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journey, and these spare horses did not go to the Fenghuangcheng gate with empty 
carts. Korean merchants used them to carry their own commodities to trade with 
the local Chinese at the gate. The number of spare horses increased steadily, along 
with the frequency of this type of private trade. Officially, merchants were allowed 
to bring only a dozen horses, but a Chosŏn court official noted in 1686, “In these 
days private merchants and officials in the embassy take as many as one thousand 
horses.”34
The area beyond the Fenghuangcheng gate on the way to Shengjing also pro-
vided the Koreans with plentiful opportunities for trade. Once the Chosŏn tribute 
was delivered to Shengjing, it was managed by Qing officials and soldiers. After 
the goods were handed over, a Chosŏn official with the title of military escort 
(K. tallyŏnsa) returned to Ŭiju with the part of the embassy that was not traveling 
on to Beijing. On his way back, he often used the horses, now relieved of their 
burdens, to carry the commodities he had acquired in Shengjing. Before 1705, the 
tallyŏnsa was selected from among the military officers in Ŭiju, but subsequently 
a merchant was appointed to the position. By the time the tallyŏnsa left Shengjing 
and returned to Ŭiju, he had often made too many purchases to carry in his own 
carts. He then hired local Qing people to deliver his goods to the Fenghuangcheng 
gate, where Koreans from Ŭiju were waiting to receive him. Those who came to 
meet the tallyŏnsa at the gate themselves never arrived empty-handed; they also 
did not want to miss the chance to trade Korean commodities with local people 
in Fenghuangcheng.35
These systemic appropriations by Korean merchants of the horses and services 
provided for the tribute embassy transformed the Qing gate into an active mar-
ketplace. Korean interpreters described the situation at the gate around 1715 as 
follows:
In the past ten years, the city [of Fenghuangcheng] has grown, as the market de-
veloped and more people moved in. When the market opened, the city was full of 
carts and horses, carrying cotton from Jinzhou, Fuzhou, Haizhou, and Gaizhou; cot-
ton fabrics from Shenyang and Shandong; and hats from Zhonghousuo and Liaoy-
ang. Ships from the south [China] also came to the harbor of Niuzhuang. Beijing 
merchants came to the Fenghuangcheng gate with silk and other commodities. The 
shops on the streets looked like those in any city inside Shanhaiguan. The clothes and 
accessories worn by the merchants [at the Fenghuangcheng gate] were as splendid 
and lavish as those of high officials.36
In order to prolong the time available for conducting business in Feng-
huangcheng, embassy interpreters often cooperated with private merchants and 
delayed the embassy’s departure from the gate to the Yalu River. Korean offi-
cials complained about the widespread smuggling and hectic trade at the Feng-
huangcheng gate:
On their way back to the Chosŏn, officials in the embassy often hurry to leave and 
cross the Yalu River. These officials do not want to wait for [their servants who have 
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to move slowly to transport] the imperial gifts for the king, so they are the first ones 
to cross the Yalu River. They eventually leave behind [at the Fenghuangcheng gate] 
interpreters and retainers from the embassy, who are free to go back and forth be-
tween the gate and Ŭiju. They are given a lot of time to trade with Qing people.37
The departure of the high officials gave the rest of the embassy free rein to con-
duct trade. In this way, the Qing-Chosŏn tributary relations made their boundary 
wide open to Korean merchants.
THE TR ANSPORTATION BUSINESS
If the Korean traders were mostly interpreters and Ŭiju merchants, their Qing 
counterparts were local merchants in Fenghuangcheng and Shengjing. The best 
opportunity for local people to work with the Koreans was in helping to transport 
the Chosŏn embassy’s huge amount of baggage—the tribute for the Qing emperor 
and food and necessities for the embassy itself—across the Yalu River, through 
Figure 10. Choyangmun (Gate of Rising Sun), circa 1784. Hand scroll, ink and color on paper, 
35.4 × 45.3 cm. From Yǒnhaengdo: Paintings of the Korean Envoys to Beijing during the Joseon 
Dynasty (Seoul: Sungsil taehakkyo Hanguk Kidokkyo Pangmulgwan, 2009), 14. Used with 
permission.
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Fenghuangcheng, and on to Shengjing. The local porters were mainly villagers 
who lived along the road between Fenghuangcheng and Shengjing, a route that 
included eight postal stations in the Shengjing region, which were known as the 
“eight eastern stations” (Dong bazhan).38 Upon arrival in Shengjing, the Chosŏn 
tribute was handed over to the Shengjing Board of Revenue; a portion of it was 
left in Shengjing, and the rest was taken on to the imperial court in Beijing. The 
transport and care of the tribute now became the responsibility of Qing officials.39 
The Chosŏn tribute was not the only item to be delivered. The Korean visitors 
often wished to travel more comfortably, so they employed local people to drive 
them in horse-drawn carriages to Shengjing or even all the way to Beijing. By the 
nineteenth century, it was so common for members of the Korean embassy, even 
interpreters and traders, to rent carriages in Fenghuangcheng that “riding on a 
horse became a matter of shame.”40
For the local people living in this remote margin of the Qing realm, the busi-
ness of providing transportation for the Korean embassy presented an infrequent 
but very profitable opportunity. The transport business soon became an important 
part of the local economy. As a Korean visitor pointed out, “Local people [at the 
eight stations] were entirely dependent for their living on transportation of Ko-
rean luggage.”41 In 1660, a Korean traveler noticed that it was easier and cheaper 
to hire local porters in the winter, when they were not working in the fields.42 By 
the late seventeenth century, wages for transportation were standardized: “It costs 
five liang of silver to have a piece of luggage carried from Fenghuangcheng [to 
Shengjing]. The same trip in the other direction was twice as expensive. . . . People 
from the eight stations make huge profits, so the streets are full of lavish houses.” 
If a cart could carry several pieces of luggage at once, the wages that local porters 
earned were indeed substantial.43 Pak Chiwŏn also recognized the economic ben-
efits that Qing locals accrued from the Korean embassies. When he asked people 
living near the Fenghuangcheng gate about their livelihoods, he was told, “Our 
lives would be threatened without the visits from your country.”44
The lucrative business of luggage transportation for the Chosŏn embassy soon 
attracted the attention of the Shengjing merchants, who in the late seventeenth 
century organized a group called the lantou to monopolize the Korean trade: 
“From 1689 onward, a local man in Liaodong named Hu Jiapei organized a trans-
portation cartel called the lantou. Hu and other merchants took exclusive charge 
of carrying the luggage [of the Chosŏn embassies].”45 These merchants were so rich 
that they were believed to “have a thousand slaves and keep numerous mistresses.” 
Most importantly, they had a close relationship with Qing officials in the Shengjing 
Boards of Rites and Revenue. Seven of the twelve lantou merchants were, in fact, 
Shengjing officials. Therefore, even before the granting of official approval for the 
lantou business, the Shengjing office informed the Korean embassy that their lug-
gage should be handled by the lantou merchants.46
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The lantou cartel, operating under the protection of the Shengjing office, ex-
ploited the Chosŏn embassies. First, the lantou merchants intervened in the sched-
uling of the Chosŏn embassy’s departure and dates of stay, so that the embassy 
often had to stay in Qing territory for several additional months, wasting funds 
and causing perishable goods to spoil. Second, the Qing merchants often pro-
vided poor service; for example, in 1690, when the Fenghuangcheng senior com-
mandant came to the gate to receive the Chosŏn embassy, the lantou merchants, 
blaming the rain, did not show up to take the embassy’s luggage. Without lantou 
transportation, the members of the Chosŏn embassy had to sleep in their carts 
in the rain.47 Korean discontent with the lantou monopoly is well documented in 
Chosŏn records:
Once the Chinese lantou merchants began to monopolize transportation, the de-
livery fee doubled. These greedy Chinese merchants volunteer to pay taxes to the 
Shengjing office and cooperate with the officials there, and in return they monopo-
lize the benefits from the Korean trade. At the Qing gate, they intentionally delay the 
departure of the embassy [to Ŭiju] or tell the [Chosŏn] officials to return to Korea 
first, and then they trade freely [with the merchants].48
The lantou merchants developed a special connection with the Korean inter-
preters, who helped increase the former’s influence over the Chosŏn embassies. 
When the Koreans arrived in Fenghuangcheng, the lantou held a lavish reception 
banquet to entertain the foreign visitors.49 On the way back to Ŭiju, the attendant 
secretary and minor officials in charge of the luggage were invited to stay at an 
extravagant house owned by the lantou merchants.50 It was arguably the Korean 
interpreters who monitored an embassy and provided information about it to the 
lantou merchants. One Korean official cynically noted, “There are fourteen lantou 
merchants,” referring to the twelve Qing merchants plus the two embassy inter-
preters covertly collaborating with them.51
The monopoly of the lantou cartel was not favorable for Korean traders. When 
some of the Korean merchants purchased illegal commodities in Shengjing and 
were caught in the inspection in Fenghuangcheng, the lantou used this opportu-
nity to curb Korean merchants from making transactions without its approval. 
The lantou merchants manipulated the Fenghuangcheng officials into complain-
ing to the Chosŏn court about illegal Korean trade, an accusation that led to the 
dismissal of the Ŭiju magistrate on charges of neglecting the inspections at the 
Yalu River.52 This incident demonstrates the influence of the lantou merchants: 
their power reached the Chosŏn court and affected Chosŏn inspections at the 
Yalu River.
The lantou cartel also exploited local Qing people at the eight eastern stations. 
While the lantou merchants charged the Korean embassy ten liang of silver for 
delivering a cart to Liaoyang, they paid local porters only two and a half liang and 
kept the remaining seven and a half liang for themselves. In 1712 the local people 
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sought to reclaim the profits from business with the Koreans by taking legal ac-
tion against the lantou impositions.53 In response to this litigation, and with the 
intent to protect their cartel, the lantou merchants bribed the Manchu officials in 
Shengjing, who eventually wrote a memorial to the Kangxi emperor requesting 
that the lantou organization be protected rather than abolished. The money for 
the bribe, surprisingly, came from the Chosŏn embassy.54 In the end, the lantou 
won the lawsuit and maintained its monopoly over the provision of transportation 
services to the Korean embassy.
Continuing abuses by the lantou merchants finally led the Chosŏn king, 
Kyŏngjong (r. 1720–24), to ask the Yongzheng emperor to abolish the cartel. 
Soon the Qing and Chosŏn courts launched a joint investigation of Hu Jiapei and 
other lantou merchants in Fenghuangcheng. In 1723, Hu was finally deprived of 
his monopolistic right to the Korean trade and made to wear a cangue for three 
months after receiving one hundred lashes from a flogging leather (bian). Not only 
were the lantou merchants punished, but the Fenghuangcheng senior comman-
dant was also disciplined for corruption and abuse of power. After the lantou cartel 
Figure 11. Chogong (tributary ritual), circa 1784. Hand scroll, ink and color on paper, 35.4 × 
45.3 cm. From Yǒnhaengdo: Paintings of the Korean Envoys to Beijing during the Joseon Dynasty 
(Seoul: Sungsil taehakkyo Hanguk Kidokkyo Pangmulgwan, 2009), 16. Used with permission.
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was dismantled, the Korean embassy was once again free to hire carts and horse-
men directly from the local Qing population.55 However, the breakup of the lantou 
did not come without a cost. Since the Shengjing and Fenghuangcheng offices lost 
two thousand liang of tax income and other benefits that they had received from 
the lantou merchants, the Qing officials turned to the Koreans with their griev-
ances. To appease them, the Korean embassy agreed to hire only local porters rec-
ommended by the Fenghuangcheng officials.56
“DISHONORING THE STATE”
As early as 1700, it was known that some Koreans associated with the Chosŏn 
embassy were indebted to Qing merchants. Well aware that such a situation might 
cause further problems, the Chosŏn court ordered the decapitation of any Ko-
rean trader owing money to Qing subjects, regardless of the value of the debt.57 
However, even this harsh ruling failed to end credit transactions between Qing 
and Chosŏn merchants. Trading on credit became an issue again in 1706, when 
Qing merchants in Fenghuangcheng made an official complaint about Korean 
liabilities.58 The following year, the Chosŏn court sent the accused debtors to 
Fenghuangcheng for interrogation, which revealed that only one out of the nine 
accused Koreans had actually borrowed any money. The rest were being falsely ac-
cused: the contracts with the accused Koreans had been forged and signed by the 
Qing accusers themselves. The Fenghuangcheng senior commandant, evidently 
backing his countrymen, told the Chosŏn officials that he was interested only in 
receiving the money owed and was not concerned with the fate of the debtors.59
It was in 1724, soon after the dissolution of the lantou cartel, that the endur-
ing credit practices finally caused serious diplomatic tensions between the Qing 
and Chosŏn courts. In that year, the Shengjing officials found that Hu Jiapei and 
his eleven cosigners, the former lantou merchants, owed a substantial amount 
of money to the Shengjing office.60 The money, which the lantou merchants had 
borrowed from the office over more than seventeen years, was now tied up in 
huge outstanding loans to numerous people, including thirty-eight officials in the 
Shengjing office and eighteen in the Imperial Household Department in Beijing. 
The greatest debtors, however, were Korean traders. There were 247 Korean debt-
ors who together owed more than sixty thousand liang of silver.61
The Shengjing office reported the staggering Korean debts to the Yongzheng 
emperor, who eventually ordered the Chosŏn court to investigate the issue and 
to repay the money. However, the emperor’s order to cross-examine the Qing 
accusers and the Chosŏn accused at Zhongjiang on the Yalu River was nearly 
impossible to follow. One of the problems was that there was no way to locate 
the hundreds of Korean traders who frequently changed their names and con-
stantly moved back and forth across the Yalu River. Beyond the issue of locating 
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the debtors, the Chosŏn court also had no intention of spending more than sixty 
thousand liang to pay off private debts. Clearing these debts on behalf of private 
traders would have set a precedent that would have opened the door for similar 
claims by the Qing in the future. After long discussions, the Chosŏn court de-
cided to explain to the Shengjing office that the Korean debtors should, indeed, 
be decapitated on the shore of the Yalu River but that their private debts would 
not be taken care of by the state.62 As a result of the Chosŏn court’s repeated peti-
tions, the Yongzheng emperor finally decided to dismiss the case of Korean debts 
to Qing merchants in 1728:
The late Chosŏn king [Sukchong] was praised by the Kangxi emperor for his capabil-
ity and modesty. He enforced the law properly to punish Korean debtors and acted 
fairly. I have heard that the present king [Yŏngjo] is weak and incompetent. . . . An in-
vestigation of debtors would be beyond his capacity. Ordering [the Chosŏn king] to 
undertake an impossible task is not appropriate to my intent to embrace foreigners. 
Therefore, it is not necessary to interrogate the criminals. I am generously waiving 
the silver that the Chosŏn subjects are supposed to pay. This decision is meant to be-
stow a favor on a foreign subordinate [waifan], not to ease regulations on foreigners 
to a greater extent than is the case for people in the inner land [neidi].63
In referring to the Chosŏn king as weak and incompetent, this imperial letter 
was surely insulting to the Koreans. After the embarrassing incident of “falling into 
debt to the Qing and dishonoring the state” (K. Ch’ŏngch’ae yokkuk),64 the Chosŏn 
court tried to implement rules limiting Korean trade with Qing merchants. Upset 
with the accusations made by the Yongzheng emperor, the Chosŏn king Yŏngjo 
blamed the credit problem on rampant trade activities. His court officials agreed 
that it was the private merchants sneaking along with the embassy to Shengjing 
who were causing all the trouble. The Chosŏn court was convinced that as long as 
merchants continued to join the tributary embassy traveling to Shengjing, humili-
ating problems such as financial obligations to Qing merchants would persist.65 
Finally, the court decided to authorize trade in Shengjing only for the embassy’s 
interpreters. Soon thereafter, other types of trade, such as using extra horses at the 
Fenghuangcheng gate and joining the Korean tallyŏnsa group in Shengjing, were 
also prohibited. Yŏngjo ordered that the local Qing porters should deliver the trib-
ute and the luggage from Fenghuangcheng all the way to Shengjing, an edict in-
tended to eliminate any opportunity for Korean merchants to enter the gate and to 
reach Shengjing.66 In short, the Chosŏn court sought to end debt problems by clos-
ing off all possibilities of trade for the tribute embassy between Fenghuangcheng 
and Shengjing.
However, these attempts were ineffectual, because the Korean trade with the 
Qing was already inextricably linked to the maintenance of the Chosŏn tribute 
embassy visits. In fact, the embassy needed a vast amount of silver in addition 
to the money required to prepare the tribute and gifts for the Qing emperor. 
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Whenever the Chosŏn embassy handed over the tribute, delivered documents, 
collected information, or discussed complicated issues with Qing officials in 
Beijing, the delegates had to present gifts or silver. It was the profits from the 
trade along the embassy’s journey that made the tribute mission possible; the 
practice of the embassy visits would have been impossible without the substan-
tial amount of silver gained from trade with Qing merchants. In other words, the 
trade and the tribute embassy existed in a symbiotic relationship, neither being 
possible without the other. Therefore, the growth of the trade with the Qing was 
a top priority for the Chosŏn tribute embassy, and abuses by merchants, such 
as shady credit practices, needed to be tolerated. As a result, Yŏngjo’s efforts to 
regulate the Chosŏn embassy’s trade were doomed to fail. Before long, smug-
gling was rampant from Ŭiju to the Fenghuangcheng gate and on to Shengjing, 
and silver continued to cross the Yalu River. Finally, in 1754, the Chosŏn court 
had to reauthorize trade with the Qing for Ŭiju merchants who served the 
tribute embassy.67
The markets in Fenghuangcheng and Shengjing continued to thrive during the 
eighteenth century. In 1780, Pak Chiwŏn reported that numerous Qing subjects 
waiting for the arrival of the Korean embassy at the Fenghuangcheng gate were 
pleased to meet the Korean interpreters and other retainers, who were in fact all 
merchants from Ŭiju. The two groups were familiar with each other thanks to the 
regular visits of the Chosŏn embassy. When Pak and his friend stopped by a civil-
ian’s house in Fenghuangcheng, they found it full of Korean packhorse drivers and 
servants having drinks.68 From this point onward, all of the Korean luggage was 
to be carried on carts belonging to the local people, as King Yŏngjo had earlier 
ordered; this did not, however, stop Korean trade with the Qing, as the king had 
hoped. Instead, Korean visitors continued to bring their goods for trade to Feng-
huangcheng.
The local Qing population actively contributed to the creation of a meeting 
place with the Koreans. Throughout the eighteenth century, Korean embassies con-
tinued to rely on local cart drivers for the transportation of their luggage. The end 
of the lantou monopoly did not ease the problems of carrying luggage to Beijing 
via Shengjing. In 1790, when the Chosŏn embassy had to rush to leave Shengjing 
in order to celebrate the Qianlong emperor’s eightieth birthday in Beijing, Qing 
cart owners attempted to take advantage of the situation by raising cart fees to ten 
times their normal level. The accompanying Qing officials recognized the attempt-
ed exploitation and punished the cart owners, forcing them to lower their fees. 
Indignant at this decision, the owners responded by causing further trouble for the 
Korean embassy by hiring local gangsters to drive their carts. The leader of the cart 
drivers, who called himself a bannerman of the Plain Yellow Banner, frequently 
delayed the departure of the embassy by demanding “a break after every five li and 
a drink after every ten li.” The Koreans were annoyed but could do nothing since 
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they were dependent on the local people for their journey.69 Chosŏn tribute paying 
and Qing profit seeking were inextricably intertwined to create a flourishing trade 
in goods and services in the Shengjing region.
THE ISSUE OF SILVER THEFT
Although it was the emperor sitting in Beijing who received the Chosŏn embassies 
and their tributes, it was the Shengjing military governor who had to deal with all 
practical matters related to the Korean visitors. A variety of Chosŏn affairs, rang-
ing from control of illegal trade to the resolution of liabilities among merchants 
and the prevention of trespassing, fell under the auspices of the Shengjing office. 
Accordingly, when the Chosŏn embassy reported that some of its belongings had 
been stolen, the Shengjing military governor managed to connect the incident to 
the earlier arrest of ginseng poachers in an entirely different location in order to 
shape the implementation of the Qing Chosŏn policy. The military governor in 
question was Daldangga, who had failed to gain the emperor’s permission to build 
a military guard post at the Yalu River in 1746. As discussed in chapter 3, Daldangga 
had sought to combat the problem of ginseng poaching by strengthening the Qing 
military presence in the area near the boundary, but his plan was thwarted by 
strong opposition from the Chosŏn court, which persuaded the emperor to veto 
the idea. It was less than a year after the frustration of the denied guard post pro-
posal that Daldangga was informed of a Korean packhorse driver who had lost his 
silver near Liaoyang. The military governor, surely annoyed by the Chosŏn court, 
saw a good chance to exact revenge for the failure of his security plan.
The case of Sahwan and Song Erdazi, described at the beginning of this chapter, 
reached Daldangga after passing through several hands: first the village head of 
Wanbaoqiao, then the Liaoyang senior commandant, and finally the Fengtian pre-
fect. The village head said that Song Erdazi, the man accused of stealing the silver 
of the Korean Sahwan, had been tricked into opening his door to the Koreans, and 
that his good intentions to help the foreign travelers had unexpectedly been met 
with assault. Song Erdazi recounted the ensuing situation in detail:
Wu Er and Zhang Lian, who were staying in my house at the time, were also tied up 
and sent to the [local] office.  .  .  . [The Koreans insisted] that their silver had been 
found in the pile of sorghum in my house and tied me up again. They did not even 
give us time to put hats on our heads or socks on our feet. . . . My house is located 
very close to the main street. Since they had hurried to catch up with me and soon 
reached me in front of my place, how could I have managed to remove a package of 
silver from the horse and hide it in the sorghum pile?70
According to the village head’s report, the two individuals, Wu Er and Zhang 
Lian, who were working for Song at the time and staying at his place, had not put on 
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proper clothes, hats, or socks before they were taken to the local office—evidence 
implying that they had been mistreated during the arrest.71 One of Song’s neigh-
bors also reported that the Koreans had attacked him after he heard a scream and 
ran to Song’s place: “The Koreans asked who I was. I said I was [Song’s] neighbor. 
Then a Korean came with a bamboo stick and hit me on the head twice. My head 
was torn up. I was so scared that I ran back home.” Later he showed his scar to a 
local official as evidence of the assault.72
Song Erdazi, Wu Er, and Zhang Lian were all residents of the area near the 
tribute route who had presumably been hired to transport the Koreans’ luggage. 
What is striking in the accounts of this case is the apparent attitude of the Korean 
travelers toward the local porters who provided transportation services for them. 
Under the excuse of searching for the lost silver, the Koreans moved around in an 
intimidating crowd, forced their way into houses, searched through them, and at-
tacked locals at will. It was these Korean foreigners, not Qing soldiers, who found 
the suspects, tied them up, and sent them to the office. It is true that there were 
only a dozen Qing soldiers accompanying the tribute embassy—too few to prop-
erly escort hundreds of Koreans—so the Koreans had to protect themselves. How-
ever, the primary reason why the Koreans felt able to act in such an arrogant way 
in the territory of the “superior country” was that they were at a remote margin 
of the empire, where Koreans appeared with regularity. In addition, the economic 
relationship between the Korean embassy and the local Qing population was that 
of employer and employee, another factor that emboldened the Koreans to behave 
imperiously, or even abusively, in this context. Furthermore, Korean interpreters 
forwarded Sahwan’s allegation directly to the Shengjing Board of Rites, and Qing 
soldiers imprisoned Song Erdazi solely on the basis of the Korean servant’s accusa-
tion without further investigation. All of these facts indicate that the Koreans were 
uniquely privileged in this remote region.
However, Daldangga had no intention of protecting the privileges Koreans en-
joyed within his jurisdiction. The fact that Sahwan’s testimony contradicted that of 
Song Erdazi raised his suspicions, so he decided to summon the suspects and to 
conduct his own questioning. Song Erdazi, Wu Er, and Zhang Lian were pressured 
to tell the truth with the threat of severe treatment if they failed to do so, but they 
continued to insist that they had not stolen any silver from the Koreans.73 On the 
other hand, all of the Korean interpreters and Qing soldiers questioned by Dal-
dangga answered that they had not themselves seen when and how Sahwan lost 
the silver, and that they had relied on his word only in reporting the theft. It also 
turned out that not one of the other Korean packhorse drivers had seen exactly 
how Sahwan lost his silver.74
Convinced that Sahwan held the key to resolving the affair, Daldangga called 
him back for further questioning. Daldangga asked Sahwan why he had changed 
his testimony concerning what he saw in front of Song Erdazi’s house, why the 
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other packhorse drivers had not seen the “man on horseback” he had mentioned, 
and whether he acted with violence while tying up the suspects. Surprisingly, Sah-
wan confessed that his testimony had been a lie:
As it was getting dark, it became very windy. We arrived near Wanbaoqiao around 
the time of the rooster’s crow. Desiring to smoke, I slackened the reins of my horse 
and struck a light. Not expecting it, my horse was so startled by the light that it ran 
away. I followed the sound of the hooves to the west, arriving in front of Song Erdazi’s 
house. When I grabbed my horse, I found that one of the two bundles of silver had 
fallen to the ground, but the other one was gone. I was so scared that I began to cry. 
Then many of my colleagues joined me. I tried to light up the area to search for the 
silver bundle, but Song Erdazi would not give me a light. When I said I was lost, he 
opened the door. When I said I had lost some silver, he said he did not know any-
thing about it. Then I said, “My horse was standing in front of your house and the 
silver was gone. If you did not take it, then who could have taken it?” My colleagues 
came to tie him up.  .  .  . Later, I found the other silver bundle on the ground. By 
then people had already tied [Song and the others] up. If I had confessed that it was 
actually me who had scared the horse, causing it to run away and drop the silver on 
the ground, my lord would have blamed me not only for being reckless but also for 
falsely accusing innocent people. I was so scared that I lied about finding the silver 
in the pile of sorghum.75
After revealing that Sahwan had lost the silver himself and then falsely accused 
innocent locals of a crime, Daldangga sent all of the Koreans involved back to 
Korea, asking the Chosŏn king to resolve the case. He also proposed punishments 
for each of them. Sahwan had committed two crimes, namely, the fabrication of 
the theft of silver and the false accusation of an innocent party, so Daldangga sug-
gested that he be beaten sixty times by a heavy flogging stick (zhang) and sen-
tenced to penal servitude (tu) for a year. He recommended that Sahwan’s lord, Yun 
Ch’angli, also be punished for blindly trusting his servant’s word and falsely ac-
cusing innocent Qing subjects. According to Daldangga, the Korean interpreters 
were all guilty, too, because they had not conducted an appropriate investigation 
of the incident, but merely reported that a Korean servant’s silver had been stolen. 
Finally, he declared that the Qing soldiers were not innocent either: they should 
be punished for having neglected to investigate the theft carefully and to report it 
immediately to their superior, in addition to having failed to provide the foreign 
embassy with proper escort service.
Daldangga suggested that the Chosŏn king deal with the Koreans involved in 
the case: “This incident happened because people from the small country are ig-
norant of what is right and wrong. I beg the emperor to show generous forgiveness 
and great kindness in allowing the Chosŏn king to punish the people concerned.”76 
However, this seemingly generous offer to let Koreans discipline Koreans offered 
no comfort to the Chosŏn court. The Chosŏn officials took offense at the edict 
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from the Qing Board of Rites, which blamed Yŏngjo for neglecting his duties.77 
Some court officials argued that in addition to the individuals involved in the false 
accusation of theft, the delegate who brought such an odious letter to the Chosŏn 
court should be punished.78 In addition, the Chosŏn court distrusted Daldangga’s 
intentions in the case. The Koreans believed that there were more pressing issues 
than the Sahwan case affecting the Qing-Chosŏn relationship, most notably the 
increasing number of illegal Qing settlers in the area near the Yalu River.79 They 
suspected that Daldangga had attempted to take advantage of the Sahwan case to 
deflect attention from the problem of illegal settlers at the boundary—a phenom-
enon that, in the view of the Chosŏn, had far greater potential to damage the Qing-
Chosŏn relationship in the long run. “The Qing authorities, especially Daldangga, 
are not trustworthy,” was a common view among Chosŏn court officials discussing 
the sentences of Sahwan and the others concerned in the case.
BROADENING THE INVESTIGATION
The Koreans may have expected the incident of Sahwan’s false accusation to end 
with the ruling that Sahwan and Yun Ch’angli be sent into exile. However, Dal-
dangga had different plans. Prompted by the shocking realization that Koreans 
had dared to level false accusations against Qing subjects in Qing territory, the 
Shengjing military governor decided to reinvestigate similar cases that had hap-
pened earlier. Daldangga wrote a letter to the Qianlong emperor, describing two 
other cases akin to Sahwan’s. According to his investigations, Sahwan was not 
the only Korean to have reported a loss of silver in Qing territory. One case had 
occurred in 1744, when a group of Koreans had passed near Langzishan and 
one of them, Yi Goroja, had reportedly discovered his silver missing and ac-
cused a local innkeeper of the theft. The case had not been resolved, Daldangga 
explained, because the suspected innkeeper had since died of an illness and Yi 
Goroja had returned to Korea without waiting for the results of the investiga-
tion.80 The second case, involving a Korean interpreter, Yi Yunbang, similarly re-
mained unsolved. This case had happened in 1745, when Yi Yunbang and eleven 
other members of the Chosŏn embassy had reported their silver missing near 
Shilihe. Once again, the Koreans had accused an innkeeper, but the thief had 
not yet been identified.81
Having observed the case of Sahwan, Daldangga did not believe that Yi Goroja 
and Yi Yunbang had really lost silver in Qing territory:
The suspects have already been questioned several times, but they have never 
changed their original testimonies, bitterly insisting that they are innocent. It is not 
right at all that we rely only on the word of Koreans and suspect [our subjects] of 
being criminals. If we ask the Chosŏn king to collect testimony from the accusers, 
it is very likely that they will simply repeat what they said earlier. This case will not 
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be resolved in that way. An attempt to solve this case [based on the statements of 
Koreans] will end up having the same result as we saw in the case of Sahwan, who 
falsely accused Song Erdazi. Without cross-examination of Sahwan and Song Erdazi, 
the Korean servant would never have confessed the truth, and Yun Ch’angli would 
never have accepted responsibility for his crime.82
In order to figure out who was telling the truth, Daldangga insisted, cross-ex-
amination of the accusers and the accused was necessary: “The original testimo-
nies of Yi Goroja and Yi Yunbang are confused and unreliable, so we need to wait 
for the truth. The suspects consistently claim their innocence, but their statements 
are also one-sided and should be double-checked against those of the accusers.”83 
The Qianlong emperor endorsed Daldangga’s suggestion, and the Shengjing Board 
of Rites asked the Chosŏn court to immediately send all concerned parties to Dal-
dangga for interrogation.84
In the first instance, the Chosŏn court blamed Yi Yunbang and the Korean 
interpreters for these disputes, which it saw as arising from their careless accusa-
tions against Qing subjects without proper evidence. Nonetheless, the Chosŏn 
court also suspected Qing officials of greed and of seeking bribes from the Korean 
embassy; the court feared that the upcoming investigation of the previous cases 
of the Chosŏn embassy’s lost silver would trigger even more demands from Qing 
officials.85 In contrast to the Shengjing military governor, who thought that the 
Koreans, having carelessly lost their silver, had pinned the blame on innocent 
Qing subjects and managed to avoid the ensuing crises, the Chosŏn court con-
sidered all these troubles to have been caused by the corruption of Qing officials. 
In the end, the Chosŏn court consented to the Qing request on the condition that 
a Chosŏn official would be allowed to accompany the summoned Koreans and 
to conduct the investigation together with Qing officials. Accordingly, the vice 
minister of the Chosŏn Board of Punishment (K. hyŏngjo ch’amŭi), Kim Sangjŏk, 
was sent to Fenghuangcheng with the accusers.86 King Yŏngjo gave a special mes-
sage to Kim Sangjŏk: “It is not proper to punish innocent subjects of the superior 
country.” The king advised Kim to do his best to conduct a thorough investigation 
of the case.87
In 1749, Daldangga’s successor as Shengjing military governor, Alantai, report-
ed the result of the investigation to the Qianlong emperor. Quoting the two Feng-
huangcheng officials who carried out the joint examination with Kim Sangjŏk, 
Alantai reported that “the Qing subjects singled out as thieves provided evidence 
to prove their innocence, whereas the accusations of the Koreans were not veri-
fied.” It turned out that Yi Goroja and his colleagues had quarreled with the inn-
keeper over the charge for their stay. Later, finding the group’s baggage and a hun-
dred liang of silver missing, a Chosŏn interpreter and a Qing soldier immediately 
arrested five Qing people staying in the inn and handed them over to the office. 
However, the baggage of the Koreans was later found inside the house along with 
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other items, and only some of the silver was not recovered. Yi Yunbang’s case was 
similar. After the early departure of four of the Korean travelers, the remaining 
eight discovered that their silver was gone. The Qing soldiers beat up and tortured 
the innkeeper before sending him to the office. The village head later reported 
that, in spite of several years of effort, he had found no evidence of the innkeeper’s 
involvement in the theft.88
Alantai concluded that Yi Goroja and Yi Yunbang had plotted to level false 
charges of theft against innocent Qing subjects. To make matters worse, in the 
course of the reinvestigation it was revealed that Yi Yunbang had also attempted 
in vain to bribe a servant who was a witness of the case. Yi had given twenty-
five liang of silver to the servant to give a false witness statement, but the servant 
subsequently disclosed the bribe to Qing officials. Yi Yunbang’s attempted brib-
ery undermined the efforts of Kim Sangjŏk, who had tried to settle the dispute 
as a representative of the Chosŏn court. The revelation convinced Alantai of the 
Korean’s guilt, and he insisted that “the Chosŏn king should examine the process 
by which his Korean subjects made schemes [to falsely accuse Qing subjects] and 
discuss the sentences of these criminals.” He also asked the Qianlong emperor to 
discipline the Qing soldiers who had failed to investigate the cases properly.89
In 1749, the Qing Board of Rites sent the Chosŏn court an imperial edict con-
cerning punishments for the Korean criminals:
Those people, including Yi Yunbang and Yi Goroja, arrested and falsely accused in-
nocent people of the inner land [neidi] and also attempted to buy off a servant. Their 
crimes deserve a sentence of military servitude. However, imperial favor is blessing 
them, reducing their sentences to one hundred strokes with a heavy flogging stick 
[zhang] and penal servitude [tu] for three years. The silver used for the bribe should 
be sealed and sent back to the Chosŏn court.90
Three months later, the Chosŏn court reported to the Qing Board of Rites that 
all of the criminals had been punished, including the Chosŏn representative, Kim 
Sangjŏk, who had been sent to Fenghuangcheng for the cross-examination.91 Se-
vere punishments were meted out to all concerned, including the servants who 
had failed to take care of the silver and instead tried to avoid responsibility by 
accusing someone else, the interpreters who had too readily trusted the word of 
their servants and made little effort to discover the truth, and the representative 
of the Chosŏn court who had participated in the joint interrogation. Daldangga 
thus succeeded in setting a precedent that he hoped would deter future offenses by 
Koreans as well as enhance the authority of the superior country.
Despite Daldangga’s revelation of the Koreans’ false accusations in these cases, 
the Chosŏn embassy’s reports of silver thefts in Qing territory were not always 
fabricated. Another case shows that some Koreans really did have property stolen 
from them during their journey and that someone had to take responsibility for 
their compensation. In 1746, the Liaoyang military commander reported that a 
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Korean servant, Yi Ch’ansuk, had lost a thousand liang of silver. As in the previous 
cases, Yi Ch’ansuk seemed to have lost the silver during his journey with the em-
bassy to Beijing and suspected some of the innkeepers and cart drivers with whom 
he had been in contact. Unlike in the previous cases, however, Qing officials de-
termined that Yi Ch’ansuk’s silver truly had been stolen in Qing territory, but they 
failed to find the real thief. Who, then, should pay back the silver to the Koreans? 
After two and a half years of discussion, the Shengjing Board of Rites reached the 
conclusion that the Qing merchants who had contracted to transport the Korean 
embassy’s luggage should take responsibility for the compensation:
These merchants were affluent, so they were able to become the merchants [autho-
rized to work with the Chosŏn embassy]. They were entrusted with the valuables of 
the Korean embassy and received a huge transportation fee. Nonetheless, they failed 
to care for the commissioned property and thus caused its loss. It is therefore appro-
priate that these merchants take responsibility for compensating the owners. They 
should be put in custody until they pay back the entire amount. Their release can be 
granted only after everything is paid. The money can be reimbursed later when the 
real criminal is arrested.92
In 1750, the Shengjing Board of Rites sent the specified amount of silver to 
Korea.93 The Chosŏn court wrote a letter thanking the Qianlong emperor for his 
imperial kindness: “The great country has always taken care of the small country. 
Your Highness is now showing mercy even to a servant and allowing him to recoup 
his loss even though such a long time has passed. This is all thanks to the great 
kindness of the great country. This small country cannot hide its joy and grati-
tude.”94 To the Korean envoys, the local Qing residents on their travel route were 
merely innkeepers providing lodging for a night, porters transporting their valu-
ables, merchants acting as trading partners, or even thieves eyeing their belong-
ings. To the Chosŏn king, however, the Qing emperor and the Shengjing military 
governor represented the highest power in the world, authorities to whom he had 
to regularly pay homage and tribute, who commanded his obedience when they 
ordered him to arrest his own subjects and send them to the Qing, and whom he 
even had to thank for punishing his own people. The relations between the Qing 
and the Chosŏn thus varied greatly depending on whether their encounter took 
place in Beijing, Shengjing, or a local town on the far reaches of the empire.
• • •
Qing foreign policy guaranteed regular visits from the subordinate neighbor for 
the purpose of paying tribute, and the Chosŏn practice of sending tributary em-
bassies created an opportunity for Koreans to make regular contact with Qing 
people. The various cases involving members of the Chosŏn embassy on the 
Fenghuangcheng–Shengjing route demonstrate that the practice of tribute pay-
ment, originally intended to preserve the political hierarchy between the Qing and 
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Chosŏn courts, also had an unexpected outcome, as a great number of Koreans, 
along with their money and goods, were attracted first to their boundary and then 
to the Qing northeastern margin. Korean travelers had to depend on the local 
Qing population for various services in order to make the journey to Beijing for 
an audience with the emperor. The tributary relationship and the practice of em-
bassy visits were, therefore, the reason for all of the ensuing disputes over thefts 
and losses.
In this way, trade and tribute, two key elements of Qing foreign policy, comple-
mented each other to form a commercial web spanning the boundary between 
the two neighbors. Equally, it is important to note that these commercial rela-
tions between the subjects of the Qing and those of the Chosŏn were framed by 
the asymmetrical power relationship between the suzerain court and the tributary 
state. The procedure for settling disputes, which was initiated, carried out, and 
concluded by the Qing court, demonstrates the political hierarchy inherent in the 
tributary relationship. Problems experienced by the Koreans, such as the rampant 
corruption among the Qing officials encountered by the Chosŏn embassies and 
the Chosŏn king’s frustration with the punishment of his own officials, were never 
raised in discussions with the Shengjing military governor or the Qianlong emper-
or. The tributary relationship required commercial exchange, but this economic 
connection was built and maintained on the premise of a firm political hierarchy.
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On April 4, 1867, the vice minister of the Shengjing Board of Revenue, E-le-he-bu, 
reported to the Tongzhi emperor (r. 1862–74) that a steadily increasing number 
of civilian farmers were illegally cultivating prohibited land outside the eastern 
line of the Willow Palisade. According to his letter, the illegal settlers had even 
approached the Shengjing office and volunteered to pay taxes, following the prec-
edent of Jilin, where illegal famers were already allowed to do so. E-le-he-bu had 
responded cautiously to the farmers’ willingness to pay taxes, since their settle-
ment in the prohibited area outside the palisade was a serious violation of Qing re-
striction policy in the northeast. He was also well aware that the area was located 
near the boundary with the Chosŏn and therefore required special consideration; 
he needed to check whether the settlement could cause problems with the Chosŏn 
court.1 E-le-he-bu’s report was forwarded to the six boards and the Grand Council 
for further discussion. The high officials in Beijing emphasized that Shengjing 
was the sacred birthplace of the Qing empire and that several thousand li of land 
and mountains there had always been protected by the palisade. Simultaneously, 
however, they recognized that there were numerous people living outside the pali-
sade and that these people made their living by cultivating the land and logging 
timber. The officials were rightly concerned that if the illegal settlers were forced 
to evacuate the prohibited territory, they would lose their livelihoods and likely 
end up rebelling. The Qing court thus had to find a solution that would place these 
settlers under the state’s authority but also protect the prohibited land near the 
boundary with the Chosŏn.2
5
From Borderland to Border
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As early as 1863, the Jinzhou garrison lieutenant general (fudutong), En-he, had 
informed the emperor of the situation in the area between the Willow Palisade and 
the Yalu River in the following way:
Because of the wide land and the deep mountains in this region, thorough investiga-
tion and patrolling are nearly impossible. Trespassers have long been sneaking into 
the area, first to hunt and to log, and later to mine for gold and to cultivate land. 
These days, vagabonds from Zhili and Shandong are coming here and forming gangs 
to cause trouble. Previously they built houses and tilled the land only in the deep 
mountains, but now there is no limit to the illegal settlement, and it is spreading 
widely over hundreds li of land. Patrolling soldiers are few in number and weak in 
power, so they are unable to stop these criminals. The prevention of access to the area 
near the boundary is gradually becoming ineffectual; the land outside the palisade is 
being reclaimed without any official effort [by the state].3
En-he’s last sentence provides a succinct description of the illegal settlement 
that was taking place at the Qing-Chosŏn boundary already in the late nineteenth 
century. No matter how much the Qing and Chosŏn authorities tried to restrict 
access to the area, the vast territory near the Yalu River had gradually filled with 
illegal farmers hungry for land.
This chapter examines the ways in which the Qing and Chosŏn courts discussed 
the increasing illegal settlement at the boundary where ginseng disappeared and 
how Korean immigrants north of the Tumen River led the two neighbors to a 
series of negotiations to establish the exact limits of their territories in the late 
nineteenth century. The chapter begins by tracing the changes in the Qing gin-
seng monopoly in the nineteenth century. As ginseng became scarce and people 
involved in its business expected little profit, the Qing court failed to maintain 
its monopolistic control over it. The depletion of ginseng in Manchuria came 
along with an influx of Chinese farmers in the restricted margins of the empire. 
From the nineteenth century on, the Qing prohibition of civilian settlement in the 
northeast gradually broke down; the growing number of Chinese immigrants ef-
fectively invalidated the state’s restrictions. In addition, Russia undermined Qing 
rule over land and tribal people in Manchuria through a series of new treaties. 
Under the circumstances, the only way for the Qing court to uphold its territorial 
sovereignty in Manchuria was to encourage Chinese farmers to move to the region 
and thereby fill it with Qing subjects. The previously restrictive Qing Manchuria 
policy, consisting mainly of the stationing of banner soldiers and unwavering in-
sistence on the evacuation of the region, was gradually replaced by a new plan of 
“recruiting civilians to populate, cultivate, and settle,” a policy that was known as 
yimin shibian.
The second focus in this chapter is on the transformation of the nature of Qing-
Chosŏn political relations and territorial boundaries. As early as the nineteenth 
century, the area near the Yalu and Tumen Rivers and Changbaishan had lost its 
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fame for rich ginseng production. Instead of ginseng hunters, it was civilian farm-
ers who were increasingly seen in the region. This supposedly empty land invited 
not only Chinese immigration but also Korean settlers, and consequently the Qing 
government began to claim jurisdictional authority over the Korean immigrants. 
Debates over the Korean settlers living north of the Tumen River became more 
complicated because they took place at the very time when Qing-Chosŏn relations 
were being reinterpreted and renegotiated. The Qing court of the late nineteenth 
century wanted to retain the absolute power over the Chosŏn court that it had held 
for centuries; newly emerging international relations in East Asia, however, caused 
the Chosŏn to reevaluate its traditional respect for the suzerain Qing power in 
order to protect Korean subjects living north of the Tumen River. This chapter 
demonstrates that this change in Qing-Chosŏn relations led to a revision of their 
previous conceptions and practices of boundary and sovereignty. The new envi-
ronment surrounding the two countries no longer tolerated the borderland that 
the Qing and the Chosŏn shared, and instead led to the emergence of a clearly 
defined border.
DISAPPEARING GINSENG,  INCREASING PEOPLE
Until the late eighteenth century, Manchurian ginseng continued to claim an im-
portant position in Qing state revenue. In 1753, the Qing state’s total revenue from 
customs duties had been 4,330,000 liang of silver. In 1760 the Qing court issued six 
thousand ginseng permits and allocated a quota of six liang of ginseng per permit, 
36,000 liang in total. This amount was equivalent to 1,440,000 liang of silver, since 
the market price of a liang of ginseng at the time was forty liang of silver.4
As table 3 shows, however, the number of issued ginseng permits plummeted 
and the ginseng business declined from the late eighteenth century onward. The 
primary reason for this trend was the overharvesting and subsequent depletion of 
ginseng stocks. The depletion was a predictable result of the continuous exploita-
tion of this natural resource over the centuries. Shortages of natural resources in 
Manchuria throughout the period 1750 to 1850 applied not only to ginseng but also 
to pheasants, storks, pine nuts, and sable skins. This phenomenon indicates that it 
was imperial foraging, rather than Han Chinese poaching, that had played a prima-
ry role in resource depletion in Manchuria.5 The government imposed various reg-
ulations in an effort to protect the resource base, such as enforcing “resting” periods 
for mountains, rivers, and forests; strengthening control over gathering operations; 
erecting walls and fences; dispatching patrols to strategic points to deter poaching; 
and arresting poachers, illegal cultivators, and black market operators.6 However, 
the policy of resting ginseng-producing mountains, for example, amounted merely 
to a temporary halt in the issuance of ginseng-gathering permits and was thus inef-
fective in combating illegal poaching.7 The depletion of ginseng stocks also wreaked 
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havoc on the state’s control over gatherers, licensed merchants, and officials. It was 
a common practice that the Ginseng Office extended advance loans to gatherers to 
enable the latter to pay for their expenses; the gatherers were then expected to pay 
back the loans by selling their surplus ginseng. In actuality, however, every year, 30 
to 40 percent of gatherers failed to meet their quota. Facing a shortage of collected 
ginseng, the Ginseng Office often had to borrow public funds and purchase surplus 
ginseng from licensed merchants. As the issuance of ginseng permits declined be-
cause of the depletion of the stocks, the Ginseng Office’s debts increased.8
However, even the persistent shortfalls in ginseng resources and the decline 
in state income did not make the Qing government relax its strict prohibition 
against ginseng cultivation, which might have provided an alternative source. Ful-
ly grown, four- to five-year-old ginseng was hard to find, but younger ginseng was 
poor in quality and less valued on the market. Therefore, ginseng gatherers sought 
to transplant young wild ginseng plants into gardens, wait for them to reach matu-
rity, and then harvest the mature ginseng for the state. However, the government 
was concerned that the widespread cultivation of ginseng would affect its state-
controlled price, and it thus continued to outlaw the practice of ginseng cultiva-
tion and to punish ginseng farmers as severely as it did poachers.9 In 1802, when 
the Jilin military governor proposed legalizing ginseng cultivation, the Jiaqing 
emperor retorted: “Ginseng grows from the energy of the soil [diling]. If anyone 
collects a big piece of the root, he should pay it [to the state]; if he cannot find a 
big one, it is fine for him to report the truth. Why should he use human efforts to 
cultivate it and cheat [the state]? Only wild ginseng growing in the mountains has 
medical effects; taking cultivated ginseng is useless.”10 Despite the emperor’s dis-
trust, cultivated ginseng became widespread: in 1810, for example, it represented 
60 percent of the ginseng received by the state from Shengjing and 10 percent of 
the receipts from Jilin.11
As poor ginseng harvests caused financial ruin for the gatherers and devastat-
ing deficits for the Ginseng Office, the Qing government sought to support the 
Table 3 Change in the number of ginseng permits from the 1760s to 1850s.





1846 1,752 Unknown 
1852 753 632
Source: Wang, “Qingdai dongbei caishenye,” 191.
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ginseng monopoly through the booming business in sorghum liquor (gaoliang 
jiu). Distilled liquors were already produced as early as the Yuan dynasty; it was 
the Qing era, however, when the real growth in liquor consumption took place. 
Chinese liquor was made of sorghum, a grain growing widely in northern China 
and Manchuria. The sorghum liquor, which was cheap and easy to get drunk on, 
was particularly popular during the cold winter in Manchuria.12 Concerned that 
its production consumed a large amount of food grains, however, the Qing court 
imposed a strict prohibition on distilling liquor. In 1726, the Yongzheng emperor 
lectured his subjects: “The price of rice rose because of the flood in Zhili Prov-
ince, and I therefore already decreed a prohibition on distilling liquor in the re-
gions outside the passes. However, liquor dealers reportedly run their business in 
Shengjing as well as at the boundary with Mongolia. Spending food grains on such 
a wasteful business should be thoroughly proscribed.”13 By the late eighteenth cen-
tury, however, when the Qing government was no longer able to obtain the pre-
determined quota of ginseng from the gatherers, liquor dealers gradually joined 
the ginseng business as sponsors (baoren) of gatherers, taking responsibility for 
recruiting and provisioning them and guaranteeing the amount and quality of the 
ginseng they gathered. In 1800, the Shengjing Ginseng Office formally authorized 
the liquor business and began to collect taxes from the distillers. In 1807, liquor 
dealers’ sponsorship of ginseng gatherers was officially legalized.14
Despite all these efforts, wild ginseng in Manchuria was exhausted to the extent 
that the government could no longer maintain its monopoly on ginseng collec-
tion and trade. The chronic shortage of ginseng caused a serious burden on liquor 
dealers, who had difficulty in securing the ginseng quotas and eventually refused 
to sponsor ginseng gatherers. Without the distillers, the government was unable 
to find takers for a sufficient number of ginseng permits to procure the prede-
termined quota of ginseng. The rate of depletion of wild ginseng in Manchuria 
accelerated; the number of ginseng permits issued continued to decline; and the 
merchants and gatherers could not meet the high ginseng quotas set by the state. 
All of these factors combined to spell the end for the Qing ginseng monopoly. In 
1853, the Qing court finally announced the official end of the state monopoly on 
ginseng collection and trade.15
By the time ginseng disappeared in Manchuria to the extent that the Qing court 
had to give up the monopoly, circumstances in the northeast had changed radically 
in terms of both domestic politics and foreign relations. Prior to the middle of the 
nineteenth century, the wealthy provinces in the Yangzi Delta contributed their 
surplus to poorer provinces, such as Jilin and Heilongjiang. But these subsidies 
were greatly depleted due to years of warfare in the south, especially during the 
Taiping Rebellion (1851–64), which devastated the affluent Jiangnan region. The 
emptied provincial treasuries caused serious problems in Qing rule in Manchuria, 
as the poorly paid banner soldiers were unable to impose effective restrictions on 
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the increasing illegal immigrants and to establish necessary public order within 
local societies.16 Furthermore, as banner garrison troops in the northeast were 
mobilized to suppress rebellions in China proper, security in Manchuria was also 
jeopardized by foreign aggressors, notably Russia. By the mid-nineteenth century, 
Russia pushed forward a series of expeditions of the Heilongjiang River, where the 
Qing did not have military power to prevent Russian approaches. In 1858, when 
Qing forces were in the midst of fighting the Taiping rebels and were also strug-
gling against British and French forces, Russia succeeded in forcing the Qing court 
to sign the Treaty of Aigun. Two years later, in 1860, the Convention of Beijing 
confirmed the “[opening of] the entire northern frontier of the Qing empire, from 
Manchuria to Xinjiang, to Russia’s political and commercial influence.” By requir-
ing the Qing to cede all lands north of the Heilongjiang and east of the Ussuri to 
Russia, these two treaties enabled Russia to encroach on Qing Manchuria.17
By the 1850s, the Qing court continued its effort, in vain, to maintain the re-
striction policy on civilian settlement in Jilin by repeating the old rhetoric of the 
“place of Manchu origins.” However, local military commanders in the northeast 
had to find ways to meet the new financial shortfalls, and land was the most abun-
dant and readily available resource. Eventually, the Jilin and Heilong jiang authori-
ties began to make a series of proposals to Beijing that the restricted areas should 
be opened to civilian settlement, and by doing so, money and taxes be collected 
from the settlers. In 1859, Jilin military governor Jing-chun proposed the opening 
of the previously prohibited regions of the Suifen and Ussuri Rivers, because of the 
possible threat that the Russian ships might approach there. He suggested that “if 
[our] people can gather and settle in the region and take profits from timber log-
ging, hunting, ginseng gathering, and fishing in the deep mountains, the Russians 
will retreat on their own.” The Xianfeng emperor (r. 1850–61) agreed with Jing-
chun, saying that “it is beneficial that China’s subjects should live in China’s vast 
land” (yi Zhongguo zhi kuangtu, ju Zhongguo zhi minren, li zhi suozai), by which 
people were to protect themselves and foreign aggressions be prevented.18 The fol-
lowing year, in 1860, the Qing court opened parts of southern Jilin for civilian 
settlement, a decision largely considered the first official lifting of the restriction 
policy in Qing Manchuria. From the 1860s to the 1880s, many prohibited areas in 
Jilin and Heilongjiang were gradually opened for settlement and the restrictions 
on civilian settlers became effectively nominal.19
The opening of the northeast and the increase in civilian immigrants required 
a transformation of the administrative system in Manchuria: the Qing govern-
ment needed a new institutional structure to deal with the increasing civil af-
fairs. In 1875, the acting Shengjing military governor, Chong-shi, suggested that 
the Shengjing government be restructured to match the administrative system 
of China proper and to make a necessary response to the increasing numbers of 
Chinese immigrants. The Guangxu emperor (r. 1875–1908) eventually approved 
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his proposal, and the Shengjing military governor was granted authority over all 
affairs involving garrison troops as well as civilian settlers. While increasing the 
power of the military governor, this reform also sought to limit the privileges of 
banner garrisons and shift more administrative authority into the hands of civil 
officials. Between 1877 and 1883, Jilin also carried out an overall reorganization 
of its government through the efforts of the Jilin military governor, Ming-an. 
Throughout the 1870s and the 1880s, new county administrative offices for civilian 
affairs were established in various places in Shengjing and Jilin. As administrative 
power was transferred from banner garrisons to civil offices, the primary purpose 
of the government changed from protecting and nurturing the banner forces to 
supervising and governing Chinese immigrants.20 It was these newly arrived Chi-
nese settlers who began to occupy Manchuria when ginseng grew scarce and the 
Manchus lost their privilege.
FILLING THE EMPT Y L AND
Just like other regions of Manchuria, the long-prohibited areas near the Chosŏn 
boundary faced a profound transformation in the nineteenth century, in terms of 
both environmental conditions and political relations. The region around the Yalu 
and Tumen Rivers and Changbaishan had claimed a reputation for rich produc-
tion of high-quality ginseng, which caused the constant trespassing incidents be-
tween the Qing and the Chosŏn. After the exploitation for centuries, however, the 
old ginseng mountains in Shengjing and Jilin, especially those near the Chosŏn 
boundary, which had long been harvested, no longer produced much ginseng. 
And as the ginseng harvest shrank, the number of illegal ginseng hunters also 
dwindled. By the mid-nineteenth century, there were very few cases reported to 
Beijing or Seoul for trespassing related to ginseng poaching. Now, it was illegal 
timber loggers and farmers who were replacing the ginseng poachers and animal 
hunters in the land north of the Yalu and Tumen Rivers.21 The emergence of civil-
ian farmers in the restricted areas at the boundary brought substantial changes in 
the ideas and practices of this territory that the Qing and the Chosŏn had shared. 
As previous chapters show, it was ginseng that led the two neighbors to an agree-
ment to keep the land at the boundary off-limits to civilian settlers. The Qing 
wanted to protect the Manchu privilege, which was signified as ginseng, while the 
Chosŏn hoped to avoid conflicts with the suzerain power by giving up this pre-
cious root despite its physical accessibility. When there was ginseng, the land at the 
boundary was to be restricted for the purpose of preserving both Qing hegemony 
and Chosŏn sovereignty. As ginseng disappeared and people began to settle there, 
however, the two neighbors had to reconsider their old agreement to maintain the 
empty land at the Yalu and Tumen Rivers—as well as their ideas about territory 
and boundary.
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Two good examples from the 1840s illustrate the growth of illegal settlements 
of Chinese farmers near the Yalu River. In 1842, the Chosŏn provincial governor of 
Hamgyŏng reported to Seoul that Qing subjects were building houses and cultivat-
ing land across the Yalu River from the Chosŏn Kanggye and Manp’o. In response 
to the Chosŏn court’s request to put a stop to illegal settlement at the boundary, 
the Shengjing military governor investigated three relevant locations, where 3,300 
mu of cultivated land was found along with nearly a hundred thatched huts. Qing 
soldiers failed to arrest any of the illegal settlers, all of whom ran away, so the sol-
diers merely destroyed the unauthorized fields and lodgings. The incident reveals 
that Chinese immigrants were not intruding into the area near the Yalu River only 
for such temporary activities as ginseng poaching or timber logging; rather, they 
were establishing permanent settlements and engaging in cultivation. Strikingly, 
neither the Qing nor the Chosŏn had managed to check these violations until as 
much as 3,300 mu of land had been put under the plow. A similar situation was 
reported in 1846, only four years later, with the discovery that vast tracts of land in 
forty different locations across the Yalu River from Chosŏn Kanggye were being 
cultivated. This time Qing and Chosŏn officials undertook a joint investigation 
along the middle and lower parts of the Yalu River and arrested three hundred 
illegal settlers.22
Reports about rampant illegal settlement led to an increase in Qing patrols 
at the boundary with the Chosŏn. Most importantly, the Qing and the Chosŏn 
agreed to make joint patrols of the boundary a regular, biannual practice. The 
two governments carried out thirty-eight joint patrols during the years 1849 to 
1867. However, all of these efforts to stop illegal settlement and to keep the area 
off-limits and empty were ineffectual. The Qing and Chosŏn soldiers reported no 
cases of illegal settlement between 1857 and 1867, but this apparent calm did not 
reflect the reality in the region.23 In 1867, the Shengjing military governor Du-xing-
a visited the area outside the palisade and met with Chosŏn officials at Zhongjiang 
to deal with illegal settlements near the Yalu River. Two years later, Du-xing-a 
sent a report to the emperor, saying that more than one hundred thousand people 
were living outside the palisade and had already claimed 96,000 xiang of land. His 
conclusion was that illegal settlers were now too numerous to be forcibly removed; 
the only possible solution was to “expand the perimeter of the palisade and legal-
ize settlement in this region.”24 The Qing court finally had to figure out what to do 
with this supposedly vacant but actually inhabited land.
Du-xing-a’s suggestion to move the palisade toward the Yalu River—that is, 
to develop the land at the Chosŏn boundary—was, in fact, not new at all. As 
discussed in chapter 3, two previous Shengjing military governors, Nasutu and 
Daldangga, had made similar proposals to develop the area near the Yalu River 
by establishing a new guard post outside the perimeter of the Willow Palisade, 
but both of their plans had been rejected. But in contrast to the Yongzheng and 
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Qianlong emperors, who had decided to acquiesce to the Chosŏn request not to 
develop the Yalu River region, the Guangxu emperor decided to invalidate the 
long-standing Qing agreement with the Chosŏn court regarding the management 
of their boundary. In 1875, the emperor imposed taxation on the already reclaimed 
land in Dadonggou, located at the mouth of the Yalu River, and also permitted 
household registration for illegal settlers, whether they were civilians or banner-
men: “Small people have long settled in the relevant lands and are now volunteer-
ing to pay taxes. The court is willing to show them mercy and forgive their past 
crimes, helping them make their living.”25
The next year, in 1876, the Chosŏn court was informed of an imminent plan 
for the Qing authorities to open new administrative offices near the Yalu River. 
Not surprisingly, the Chosŏn voiced strong opposition to the plan, as it had to the 
proposal to establish a military post at Mangniushao in 1746. The court stressed, 
once again, that development around the Yalu River had long been prohibited and 
that if offices were built in this land, “people from here and there could easily sneak 
in, and goods could be freely exchanged, which would soon lead to trouble.”26 
Prompted by the Chosŏn court’s opposition, the Guangxu emperor ordered local 
officials to investigate the situation, just as the Yongzheng and Qianlong emper-
ors had done earlier. In his report of 1877, the acting Shengjing military governor, 
Chong-hou, explained that settlement at the Yalu River was rampant and immi-
gration into the region could no longer be halted. From his point of view, state 
sanction of development in the area was inevitable.27 For the purpose of dealing 
with civilian affairs related to Chinese immigrants in the region, in 1876 and 1877 
Chong-hou established new county offices in Xiu’am, Fenghua, Kuandian, Tong-
hua, and Huairen, many of which were located outside the palisade.28 The Chosŏn 
court’s wish that the Qing and the Chosŏn preserve the empty buffer zone between 
them in order to protect the territory of each had become unrealistic under the 
strong pressures from Chinese immigration and settlement.
Once the land at the Yalu River was opened for settlement, prohibitions on 
inhabitation in the Tumen River region were lifted as well. Since being appointed 
as the acting Jilin military governor in 1877, Ming-an followed the precedents in 
Shengjing and reformed the Jilin government to build new civil offices and open 
land for Chinese immigrants. By 1881, administrative offices were newly opened 
in Dunhua and Yitong near the Tumen River. In addition to the Jilin military 
governor, the Guangxu emperor dispatched a Han Chinese official, Wu Dacheng 
(1835–1902), with the special mission of strengthening military defense and devel-
oping land in the regions of Sanxing, Ningguta, and Hunchun. First, promoting 
the military rank of Hunchun regiment colonel (xieling) to garrison lieutenant 
general (fudutong), Wu also built an office for land development (zhaokenju) in 
Hunchun, and enforced an active recruitment of Chinese farmers in Shandong to 
settle and cultivate land in this northeastern margin. Furthermore, he ordered his 
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men to investigate the land north of the Tumen River.29 In order to support Wu’s 
efforts to develop land near the Chosŏn boundary, the Qing court also sent a letter 
to the Chosŏn court, saying, “This development is led by the [Qing] authorities, 
and therefore [the Chosŏn] local officials should not be worried.”30 By the 1880s, 
the areas around the Yalu and Tumen Rivers, which had for so long been closed off 
to civilian access, were formally opened for settlement and cultivation. The gates 
of the Willow Palisade lost their designated function of controlling people’s move-
ments in the restricted area. With the rapidly increasing number of immigrants, 
the last remainders of the empty space at the boundary between the Qing and the 
Chosŏn gradually disappeared.
It was not only Chinese farmers who searched for land near the Yalu and Tu-
men Rivers: a growing number of Koreans crossed the rivers and settled in the area 
north of the rivers. People living east of Changbaishan, in areas such as Musan, 
Hoeryŏng, Chongsŏng, and Onsŏng, crossed the Tumen River; those living on 
the west side of the mountains, especially in the Four Closed Counties, crossed 
the Yalu River. The Chosŏn court continued to prohibit its Korean subjects from 
crossing the Yalu and Tumen Rivers without state permission, and local officials 
were not allowed to get involved with affairs taking place across the rivers unless 
they were given an order from Seoul.31 However, reports of Korean trespassing and 
illegal settlement north of the rivers continued. In 1866, a group of seventy men 
and women in Kyŏngwŏn crossed the Tumen before getting arrested and sent back 
by the Qing soldiers; as many as two hundred Koreans were reported to cross the 
Tumen and pass through Hunchun to the Russian territory. The Hunchun regi-
ment colonel witnessed that growing number of Koreans immigrants coming to 
cross the Tumen:
Many guard posts have reported that Koreans in a small group of three to five, or in 
a big group of several dozens with families, continue to come passing guard posts 
[in the Hunchun area]. They are heading to the south of Hunchun in search of gold 
or cultivable land. . . . [So far] no civilians have lived in Hunchun; no order to open 
land has been received. If they are not evicted now, it will be difficult to get rid of 
them later.32
Despite such warnings from local Qing officials, illegal Korean incursions and 
settlement remained on the rise. It was in the late nineteenth century that references 
to the so-called Kando (C. Jiandao)—a name indicating contemporary Yanbian in 
Jilin—first appeared. The Kando region was sometimes used to refer to all of Man-
churia, but more typically the region north of the Yalu River was called Western 
Kando and the region north of the Tumen Northern Kando.33 It has been said that 
Korean immigration towns in Western Kando appeared in the 1860s and 1870s.34 
The visible presence of Korean settlements north of the Yalu River was, in fact, offi-
cially recognized by the local Chosŏn authorities. In 1871, Cho Wihyŏn, the Chosŏn 
From Borderland to Border    139
county magistrate (K. kunsu) of Huch’ang in P’yŏngan Province, sent his troops 
to evict Qing intruders who had entered Chosŏn territory illegally in order to log 
timber in Samsu and Kapsan. The next year, he dispatched three military agents 
north of the Yalu River to collect information about the areas of Ji’an, Tonghua, and 
the Hun River, also known as the Tunggiya River during the period when Möngke 
Temür had lived. Their travel report for July 5 to August 13, 1872—later titled Diary 
of North of the River (K. Kangbuk ilgi)—shows the conditions of Korean immigrants 
in Qing territory at that time.35 According to the diary, six to seven thousand Kore-
ans had crossed over to the north side of the Yalu and settled in the area around the 
Hun River outside the Willow Palisade. Most of the Korean immigrants who settled 
in Qing territory during the famine of 1869 to 1870 came to be called “false Qing 
subjects” (K. kaho), because they adopted Qing hairstyles and clothing.36
The north of the Tumen was also gradually filled with Korean immigrants. 
When the famine devastated Hamgyŏng Province, many people were forced to 
look for a source of livelihood elsewhere and crossed the Tumen River on search 
of land to cultivate. In addition to natural disasters, tax increases by corrupt lo-
cal officials were another reason cited to explain why people had to leave their 
homes.37 By this time, the punishments imposed by the Chosŏn court on trespass-
ers became more lenient, creating yet another incentive for people to cross the 
river. A trespasser arrested in 1867, for example, was exempted from punishment 
altogether, and in general, if arrested intruders regretted their wrongdoing, they 
were simply released. In 1868, the Chosŏn court reduced the degree of punishment 
imposed on officials who overlooked transgressions within their jurisdictions, and 
by 1871, such officials were not disciplined at all, even if people under their direct 
command were caught crossing the river illegally.38 In fact, there was a well-known 
case that the Chosŏn local authorities openly encouraged Koreans to cultivate land 
north of the river. In 1880, Hong Namju, a local official of Hoeryŏng, pointed out 
that the lands north of the Tumen, long empty and off-limits, were now opened 
for Chinese immigrants, while Korean entrances were still regrettably restricted. 
Hong argued that since the Hoeryŏng people suffered from severe famine, they 
should be allowed to cross the river for cultivation and settlement. Eventually, dur-
ing the years 1880 to 1881, dozens of thousands of Korean farmers developed land, 
“hundreds li in length and dozens li in width,” north of the Tumen. It was reported 
that people crossed the river every day as if the region to its north was not “out-
side” (K. oeji); more surprisingly, even Korean officials were dispatched to the area 
across the river to register land and collect taxes.39 This remarkable phenomenon 
of Korean immigration to the north of the Tumen was soon to be recognized in 
both Beijing and Seoul.
Korean immigrants who settled north of the Yalu and Tumen Rivers in the 
late nineteenth century did so for several reasons: domestic pressures due to 
population growth, the shortage of land in the Chosŏn northern region, and the 
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attraction of new settlements in Qing Manchuria.40 Most of all, it was the change 
in Qing policy in the northeast that made Koreans see the previously prohibited 
land as a settlement opportunity. As the Qing lifted its restrictions on access to 
the northeastern region, the area at the boundary with the Chosŏn was also ex-
posed to the increased flow of migrants. People from both sides of the Yalu and 
Tumen Rivers had always crossed the rivers, and trespassing was a topic that the 
Qing and the Chosŏn had discussed throughout their long history. However, the 
wave of trespassing and settlement that took place in the late nineteenth century 
was a wholly new phenomenon. While previous illegal incursions had generally 
been limited in duration, undertaken mostly for the purposes of ginseng poach-
ing and hunting, the late nineteenth-century intruders entered the areas near the 
Yalu and Tumen Rivers with the intention of staying for the long term.
KOREAN SUBJECT S NORTH OF THE RIVER
It was primarily the growing influence of the Western powers and Japan in the 
late nineteenth century that initiated the change in Qing perceptions of neighbor 
Chosŏn, which the Qing had always seen as subordinate. When European ships 
appeared at Korean shores, the Qing and Chosŏn courts were asked to explain the 
exact nature of their relationship. The process that ensued was surely confusing 
for all concerned. In the 1860s, when French and American ships were involved 
in skirmishes off the coast of Korea, they assumed that the Qing, as the suzerain 
power, rather than the subordinate Chosŏn court, would take responsibility for 
the incidents. This assumption was supported by the Chosŏn court: it admitted its 
lack of experience and knowledge in foreign relations and asked the Qing to deal 
with the French in order to help the Chosŏn “live in eternal peace and reverently 
fulfill its tributary duties.”41 However, the Qing government responded, “Even 
though it is surely subordinate to us, the Chosŏn is independent in its national af-
fairs.”42 In this confusing situation, Okamoto Takashi explains, both the Qing and 
the Chosŏn courts refused to take responsibility for dealing with the European 
powers, indicating that they understood their relationship differently from one 
another. The Chosŏn believed that its subordinate king was not allowed to estab-
lish relations with foreign countries without the recognition of the suzerain, while 
the Qing did not want to intervene in Chosŏn affairs, mostly to avoid trouble with 
the Western powers.43 However, the Japanese attack on Taiwan in 1874 and Japan’s 
annexation of the Ryukyu Islands in 1879 prompted the Qing court to take the 
Chosŏn issue more seriously. In 1881, while negotiating the establishment of of-
ficial diplomatic relations between the Chosŏn and European countries, the Qing 
diplomat Li Hongzhang (1823–1901) attempted to legalize Korea’s subordinate 
status vis-à-vis Qing China and obtain international recognition of this special 
relationship. By this time, Qing policymakers sought to change the traditional 
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Qing-Chosŏn relationship to include and accommodate more intervention of this 
kind. More than anything, as Kirk Larsen stresses, “Qing informal imperialism” 
was the outcome of the recognition that Qing-Chosŏn relations in the late nine-
teenth century had become multilateral, rather than bilateral, as they had been in 
the eighteenth century.44
Now, the issue of Korean immigrants north of the Tumen began to attract 
the attention of the Qing court. Before the early 1880s, the court seemed to pay 
little mind to reports of large numbers of Korean immigrants settling north of 
the Tumen River. Nor was there much of a response from the Shengjing or Jilin 
military governors, such as dispatching officials to evict the Korean trespassers or 
making an effort to send them back to the Chosŏn. However, soon after the land 
near the Tumen was open for Chinese farmers to settle, the Qing officials realized 
it had been already occupied by Korean immigrants. In the fall of 1881, acting upon 
Wu Dacheng's order, Hunchun officials investigated the areas around two hundred 
li north of the Tumen River and realized that several thousands of Korean farmers 
had developed as much as two thousand xiang of land. They also found that the 
number of Korean immigrants was continuing to grow, and that the Chosŏn of-
ficials of Hamgyŏng Province were even issuing land certificates to people in the 
area around Hunchun.45
Upon receiving such reports, the Jilin military governor Ming-an insisted that 
Chosŏn officials had no standing to discuss property matters in areas north of the 
Tumen River. He stressed that Korean immigrants were “children of the Heavenly 
Court” and therefore should be permitted to settle in Qing territory, instead of be-
ing sent back to the Chosŏn. He further claimed that these Koreans were China’s 
subjects (Zhongguo zhi min), since they had settled on and cultivated China’s land, 
and that they should be allowed to pay taxes to the Qing government and wear 
Chinese clothes. This following comment from the Board of Rites shows how the 
Qing court viewed Korean immigrants at this time:
The people now under discussion have already cultivated China’s land; therefore, 
they should be considered China’s subjects. According to the report of the military 
governor [Ming-an], they should be allowed to receive land certificates and pay tax-
es. In addition, following a designated period of time they should be included in our 
territory and taught to follow our rules and wear our clothing. They can be given 
temporary permission to keep their customs for a while, just as people in Yunnan 
and Guizhou were allowed to do.46
Agreeing with his officials’ suggestions, the Guangxu emperor ordered that 
Korean settlers be issued land certificates and allowed to pay taxes. He further 
concluded that the Korean immigrants should be placed under the jurisdiction of 
Hunchun and Dunhua. This decision implied that Korean settlers to the north of 
the Tumen River would be regarded as Qing subjects.47
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This plan of naturalizing immigrant Koreans as Qing subjects was met with 
strong opposition from the Chosŏn court, which found it unacceptable. If it con-
doned such a practice on the part of the Qing, the Chosŏn court reasoned, the 
Russians and the Japanese would be likely to raise similar demands:
[Chinese and Korean people] have different customs and cultures. Those people who 
crossed and settled in [Qing territory] were born and raised in our country [the 
Chosŏn]. It would be a problem on both sides of the boundary if these illegal settlers, 
after being assimilated with [the Qing people], did not observe [Qing] regulations 
and made trouble instead. The Chosŏn shares boundaries with Russia in the north 
and with Japan in the east; there are also some local people who trespassed [in these 
neighbors’ territories] just like those who crossed the Tumen River. If these countries 
try to apply this precedent of the Heavenly Court [to their own boundaries], they will 
face the same troubles.48
Because of these concerns, the Chosŏn court insisted that the Guangxu emperor 
should order Qing officials in Hunchun and Dunhua to send the Korean immi-
grants back to their own country. The emperor eventually agreed to send Korean 
settlers back to the Chosŏn within a year: “It is proper that Korean wanderers who 
settled in Jilin should be sent back to their country. However, if they are imme-
diately removed, they may not be able to make a living. Let them go back home 
within a year as a sign of my benevolence.”49
Nonetheless, Guangxu’s decision to send Korean immigrants back to the 
Chosŏn did not mean that the Qing government simply gave up its efforts to ex-
tend its administrative authority to Koreans living in Qing territory. On the con-
trary, it began to issue new regulations applicable to Korean immigrants. In 1885, 
the Bureau of Trade and Commerce of Jilin and Korea (Ji Han tongshangju) was 
established and given charge of all affairs involving trade, taxation, and cultivation. 
The Qing government also built new offices at several locations north of the Tu-
men River, especially those that lay across the river from the locations of Chosŏn 
administrative offices, such as Hoeryŏng, Chongsŏng, and Onsŏng. The primary 
job of these new offices was to “govern the Korean immigrants [Hanmin] and set-
tle disputes between Koreans and Chinese [Huamin].” Qing officials designated an 
area of land as wide as seven hundred li north of the Tumen River exclusively for 
Korean immigrants, who were granted a tax exemption for five years. These poli-
cies to authorize Korean settlement north of the river caused rapid growth in the 
number of Koreans emigrating across the Tumen River, so that by 1886 as many as 
12,490 Koreans in 2,350 households had moved to the Hunchun area.50
Meanwhile, the Chosŏn court’s opposition to the Qing government’s efforts to 
naturalize Korean immigrants as Qing subjects and its subsequent appeal to have 
such immigrants sent back to the Chosŏn did not necessarily reflect the interests 
of the actual people who were the subject of these discussions between Beijing and 
From Borderland to Border    143
Seoul. The Korean settlers north of the river believed that they had been forced to 
risk their lives and cross the river because of the long-lasting famine and perpetual 
hunger back home, and that they had had to endure many difficulties before set-
tling down in the area. Not surprisingly, they did not want to give up their new 
homes. In 1883, when Qing officials in Dunhua informed Korean immigrants that 
they should go back to their own country after that year’s harvest, the newcomers 
decided to “challenge the assumption inherent in the Qing demand,” namely, that 
the area where they had settled lay outside Chosŏn territory.51 They made the claim 
that this area was, in fact, part of Chosŏn territory.
This argument was first addressed in 1883 by the local people in Chongsŏng, 
who wrote a petition to the Qing officials in Dunhua. It was an extremely un-
usual action, in that no local Korean had ever made direct contact with the Qing 
authorities. Their letter explained that there were actually two different rivers, 
both called “Tumen” in Chinese pronunciation but written in different charac-
ters; these two rivers were, in fact, distinguished from one another in Korean 
pronunciation as “T’omun” and “Tuman.” They further argued that the Qing and 
Chosŏn territories were separated by the T’omun, not the Tuman, and that the 
land between the two rivers belonged to the Chosŏn. Their evidence was the stone 
marker of Mu-ke-deng, which had been erected in 1712 as a part of the inves-
tigation of Changbaishan and which proclaimed that the boundary of the two 
countries was demarcated by the Yalu River in the west and by the Tumen River 
in the east. The local Koreans asserted that the “Tumen River” inscribed in the 
stele was actually the T’omun River, not the Tuman.52 Two months later, following 
the local residents’ petition, the Chongsŏng prefect sent an official letter to the 
Qing counterpart in Dunhua, repeating the same argument that the T’omun and 
the Tuman were two different rivers. Based on this claim, the Chongsŏng prefect 
refused to cooperate with the Qing government’s plan to send Korean immigrants 
back to the Chosŏn.53 Korean immigrants and the local Chosŏn authorities, for 
their part, firmly contended that the Tumen mentioned on the Mu-ke-deng’s stele 
was the Hailanhe (K. Haeran’gang), another river located farther north from the 
Tuman, and that the land they settled in, therefore, was within Chosŏn territory. 
Finally, in 1885, the Chosŏn court proposed a boundary investigation to the Qing 
Board of Rites and the new office of foreign affairs, the Zongli yamen, asking that 
Qing officials be sent to the Tumen River.54 Attaching a copy of the old map of the 
area and a rubbing of the stele to a letter to the Qing court, the Korean officials 
proposed a joint field investigation to check the stele and the origin of the Tumen 
and to clarify the boundary of the two countries.55
Were the Tuman and T’omun in fact different rivers? The Songs of Flying Drag-
ons (K. Yongbi ŏch’ŏn’ga), published by the Chosŏn court in 1447, provides an ex-
planation of the location of “T’omun,” saying that “T’omun is the name of place 
north of the Tuman River, sixty li away from Kyŏngwŏn.”56 This explanation shows 
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that in the fifteenth century the Chosŏn court distinguished between “T’omun” 
and “Tuman.” During the investigation of Changbaishan in 1712, however, Chosŏn 
officials used the names “T’omun” and “Tuman” interchangeably. Pak Kwŏn, the 
Chosŏn counterpart of Mu-ke-deng, recognized the “Tuman” as the boundary, 
while the Manchu official called it the “Tumen,” but they did not disagree regard-
ing which river the names denoted. The Chosŏn court officials were also well 
aware that “the so-called T’omun River in the letter [from the Qing] is the Chinese 
pronunciation of the Tuman (K. T’omun’gang chŭk hwaŭm Tuman’gang).”57 By the 
middle of the eighteenth century, the Chosŏn court was fully aware that the two 
rivers, the Tuman and the T’omun, were in reality one and the same river being 
called by two different names. In 1757, when the Qing court asked the Chosŏn 
court about the “Tuman” while investigating Korean trespassers, the latter court 
provided a detailed answer:
The names of the Tuman and T’omun Rivers are very close. The river in the north 
of the small country is called Tuman by [Korean] people. The Tuman that those 
criminals referred to is nothing but the T’omun, a name used by the great country. 
Han Sanglim [one of the trespassers] said “T’omun,” while Cho Chayŏng [the other 
trespasser] said “Tuman,” but it is the same river with two names.58
In addition, a Korean map, officially commissioned by the Chosŏn court during 
the years 1777 to 1791 and titled “Map of the Northwestern Boundary” (K. Sŏbuk 
kyedo), demonstrates the contemporaneous Korean understanding that the T’omun 
and the Tuman were the same river.59
By the late nineteenth century, however, when the location of the Tumen River 
became a source of conflict with the Qing, the Chosŏn court either forgot or ig-
nored the geographic knowledge that it had possessed in the eighteenth century 
and decided to accept the arguments made by the local residents in the area. In-
terestingly, this shows that the Koreans selected, recalled, and reinterpreted their 
own geographic knowledge of their territory in accordance with the new situation 
that they faced in the late nineteenth century. The Chosŏn court in the early eigh-
teenth century had been willing to ignore the fact that the imperial emissary had 
located the Tumen riverhead in the wrong place, whereas the Koreans in the late 
nineteenth century endeavored to find the exact location of the same riverhead. 
The eighteenth-century Chosŏn court had been reluctant to share geographic in-
formation about the boundary with the Qing; by contrast, the late nineteenth-
century Koreans took the initiative to clarify the boundary. The dramatic shift 
in the Chosŏn attitude shows that Korean ideas about territorial boundaries had 
undergone a profound change by the late nineteenth century, the era in which 
both parties’ willingness to tolerate the existence of the borderland—that is, the 
ambiguity of the exact location of the boundary and the uninhabited buffer zone 
around it—was about to end.
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It was the stone stele of Mu-ke-deng that provided the two sides with the 
source of their disputes over the exact location of the boundary. Officials from 
the two countries held very different interpretations of the stone marker built 
in 1712. Chosŏn officials stressed that Mu-ke-deng, the imperial emissary of the 
Kangxi emperor, had investigated the origins of the rivers specifically in order to 
clarify the Qing-Chosŏn boundary, and they maintained that the stele was the 
outcome of his research. Therefore, if there was any uncertainty about the bound-
ary, Koreans claimed, the stele should be used as the standard of judgment. In 
contrast to the Chosŏn officials, who were firmly convinced of the authority of the 
stele, Qing officials did not think that the stele provided indisputable evidence of 
the location of the boundary.60 While Chosŏn court officials were widely aware of 
Mu-ke-deng’s investigation and the resulting stele, only a few individuals at the 
Qing court had paid attention to the stele’s erection. The stele was not well known 
or much discussed among Qing scholars of geography, and this lack of informa-
tion explains, in part, why Qing officials gave so little credence to it. Furthermore, 
most of the documents related to Mu-ke-deng’s travels and investigation had al-
ready been lost, so that Qing officials did not have much evidence with which to 
verify the legitimacy of the stele. The Qing officials also emphasized that the name 
Tumen came from a Manchu word tumen, which means “ten thousand,” and the 
river happened to be known by two names thanks to the use of different Chinese 
characters. From the Qing point of view, then, the boundary should be established 
on the basis of the origin of the river, not on the basis of an old, unreliable stone 
marker.61
DEMARCATING THE B ORDER
It took two years before the Qing and Chosŏn governments finally launched a joint 
survey of the boundary. The question about the exact location of the Tumen river-
head was first raised by local Koreans, then shared with the Chosŏn local officials, 
and finally reached Seoul and Beijing. The Chosŏn authorities of Chongsŏng had 
first proposed such a survey to their Qing counterpart in Dunhua in July 1883; 
then, in August 1885, the Chosŏn court sent an official letter to the Qing Board of 
Rites and the Zongli yamen arguing that the Tuman and the T’omun were two dif-
ferent rivers and thus it was necessary to investigate the area. Finally, in September 
1885, Li Hongzhang responded to the Chosŏn court, agreeing to conduct a joint 
Qing-Chosŏn survey.62 Two months later, November 6, 1885, Qing inspectors went 
to Hoeryŏng to meet with their Chosŏn counterparts. The main issue to resolve 
was the question of whether the Tuman and the T’omun were in fact one and the 
same river. The Qing officials argued that they were, but their Chosŏn counter-
parts disagreed. Another disagreement concerned the question of what should be 
the reference point for determining the location of the boundary: the river or the 
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stele. The Qing officials claimed that since the stream that passed east of the stele 
flowed into the Sungari River, not into the Tumen, the stele of Mu-ke-deng failed 
to provide accurate geographical information. In response, the Korean inspectors 
referred to the official documents exchanged between the two courts at the time 
when the stele was erected and insisted that Mu-ke-deng’s investigation and stele 
were legitimate and reliable criteria for locating the boundary. Despite two months 
of surveying and discussions, the two sides did not reach an agreement: the nego-
tiations failed, and the officials returned to their respective countries.63
Two years later, on April 29, 1887, the Qing and Chosŏn courts resumed the 
boundary survey. This time it was the Jilin military governor who insisted on the 
urgency of the survey, as Korean immigration and settlement had continued after 
the failure of the earlier survey effort and conflicts were increasing between Chi-
nese and Korean residents over land cultivation, causing serious tensions in lo-
cal societies.64 In this second round of discussions, the Chosŏn officials withdrew 
their initial assertion that the T’omun and the Tuman were distinct rivers. In fact, 
the Korean inspector, Yi Chungha (1846–1917), had been aware that it was the 
same river during his first investigation of 1885. Eventually the Chosŏn court of-
ficial, Kim Yunsik (1835–1922), sent a letter to the Yuan Shikai (1859–1916) as early 
as October 1886 admitting that “the T’omun and the Tuman were the same river 
with different names.”65 Instead, what became the main issue in the second bound-
ary survey was the location of the Tumen River’s source. The Chosŏn officials 
identified Hongtushan shui (K. Hongt’osan su), one of the streams flowing from 
Changbaishan, as the origin of the Tumen River, while the Qing counterproposed 
Shiyishui (K. Sŏgŭlsu), another stream from the mountain, as the source—a choice 
that, if used to determine the boundary, would allow the Qing to claim the entire 
Changbaishan range and, as the Qing official pointed out, “the sacred birthplace 
[faxiang zhi ben] will not be violated.”66 The Chosŏn refused to accept Shiyishui 
as the origin of the Tumen, asserting that “there is no evidence to prove it in any 
document.” In the end, after another one and a half months of surveys and debates, 
the two sides again failed to reach an agreement about the boundary.67
The Qing and Chosŏn officials were all well aware of the significance of ter-
ritorial boundaries and sovereignty, an issue that was newly raised in modern 
international relations. While Yi Chungha knew that Hongtushan shui was only a 
few li away from Shiyishui and the land between them was actually useless, he still 
insisted that Hongtushan shui be the boundary, because “even a tiny piece of state 
territory is so important.”68 The fact that the Chosŏn court demanded field inves-
tigations in order to demarcate the boundary demonstrates that the Koreans had 
begun to recognize the system of international relations in which a country is de-
fined by distinct boundaries and territorial sovereignty. These changes in Korean 
views of the Qing are well reflected in a memorial from Chi Kyŏngyong, a local 
official in the northern region, to the Chosŏn court in 1884. First stating that the 
Figure 12. Changbaishan and the Tumen riverhead. Detail from Paektusan chŏnggyebi chido 
(maps of the stele of Changbaishan), 1887. Manuscript, 54.2 × 99 cm. Kyujanggak Institute for 
Korean Studies of Seoul National University, no. ko-ch’uk 26675. Used with permission.
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Qing-Chosŏn boundary lay along the Hailanhe, not the Tumen River, Chi then 
contended that the Chosŏn should make an open claim to the Qing, especially 
since at the time “all the states in the world are in discussion with one another, 
whether they are big or small.”69
Among Korean intellectuals, various conflicting ideas—strong nationalism, 
traditional Sinocentrism, and a limited understanding of the international world 
order—were held in an uneven fashion. As Andre Schmid stresses, Qing-Chosŏn 
boundary negotiations in the late 1880s demonstrate how the tributary relation-
ship maintained its unique features, as well as how it was challenged and ulti-
mately collapsed. Both sides frequently used old terms, such as “great country” 
(C. daguo; K.  taeguk) and “small country” (C. xiaobang; K. sobang).70 Using the 
same methods by which the Chosŏn kings had long appealed to the Qing em-
peror—emphasizing the old traditions of the tributary relationship between the 
two countries—the Korean inspector argued that all of the characters inscribed on 
the stele were included in the documents of the “Heavenly Court,” representing an 
absolute verification that should not be disputed or disrespected.71 As a representa-
tive of the Chosŏn court, Yi Chungha tried to challenge Qing authority to dispute 
the Chosŏn state’s territorial sovereignty, but what he relied on in his negotiations 
with the neighboring country was the age-old rhetoric of the special relationship 
of the Chosŏn with the Qing. The expectation of imperial benevolence toward the 
Chosŏn was clearly revealed in Kim Yunsik’s petition to Yuan Shikai for “borrow-
ing [Qing] land for [Korean] settlement” (K. ch’aji anch’i), which asked the Qing for 
permission for the Korean farmers north of the Tumen to stay, while the Chosŏn 
authorities be given the right to collect tax from them. The tradition of asymmetri-
cal relations between the Qing and the Chosŏn, and the recognition of territorial 
sovereignty, coexisted in Kim’s impractical suggestion to borrow the Qing land 
for the Korean immigrants.72 As Akizuki Nozomi points out, “By the 1880s, the 
Chosŏn court did not fully understand that the modern system of international 
relations was more or less in conflict with the tradition of Sinocentricism.”73
During the 1880s and 1890s, the Qing court continued to undertake a major 
change in policy toward people and territory in the northeast. The new policy 
of encouraging people to settle at the northeastern margins eventually led to the 
invitation of Korean farmers into Qing territory north of the Tumen, a plan that 
was believed to benefit the Qing government through the collection of taxes and 
the improvement of security at the boundary. During the boundary surveys and 
discussions of the late 1880s, the Qing continued to invite Korean immigrants to 
Qing territory, making them into Qing subjects and requiring them to adopt Qing 
customs of dress and appearance.74 As Yi Chiyŏng points out, the Qing at first con-
sidered Korean immigrants “foreigners living in our territory,” while the Chosŏn 
regarded them as “our subjects living in foreign territory.” Later, both sides argued 
that these Korean settlers were “our subjects in our territory.”75 These changes in 
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the respective views of the Qing and the Chosŏn regarding the Korean immigrants 
in the area north of the rivers are another indicator of the transformation of their 
ideas about territory and sovereignty. The two states were no longer willing to ac-
cept the existence of an unclear buffer zone; instead, they sought to claim the right 
to rule both the people and the territory demarcated by a clear border. The Qing 
authorities tried to turn Korean immigrants into Qing subjects by listing them 
in Qing registers. For their part, the Chosŏn endeavored to resolve the problem 
of Korean settlers north of the Tumen, first, by claiming the territory as part of 
the Chosŏn realm, and later, by borrowing the land from the Qing for Korean 
immigrants. The series of Qing-Chosŏn boundary negotiations was provoked by 
illegal Korean immigration in the area that the two states had agreed to keep unin-
habited, a phenomenon that led them to reconsider the empty buffer zone laying 
between them—more precisely, territorial sovereignty. This transition was clearly 
related to the emergence of the modern notion of national space as the core of a 
state’s sovereignty. The empty buffer zone that blurred the exact limits of the two 
states’ territories suddenly was undermining their power and authority and was 
thus no longer acceptable: “Sovereignty was something to be performed, and bor-
ders were to be implemented.”76
It was the Sino-Japanese War of 1895 that officially ended the traditional tribu-
tary relationship between the Qing and the Chosŏn. The Qing army was defeated 
by Japanese troops, a clear affirmation that the Qing had no military or legal power 
to claim continued suzerainty over the Chosŏn. With the end of the war, the Qing 
court lost all of the exclusive privileges it had commanded from the Chosŏn court, 
including Korean tributary missions to the Qing emperor. The practices that had 
both embodied and symbolized the hierarchical relationship between the Qing 
and Chosŏn courts thus officially came to an end.77 Four years after the end of 
Sino-Japanese War, in 1899, the Qing and Chosŏn courts reached the Treaty of 
Seoul, the twelfth article of which prohibited any further Korean trespassing in 
Qing territory, while guaranteeing the security of those Koreans who had already 
settled there.78 In the meantime, the repatriation of Korean immigrants living 
north of the Tumen back to the Chosŏn was continuously delayed.
The Boxer Rebellion of 1900 expedited the fall of the Qing dynasty and prompt-
ed foreign expansion into China proper as well as into its peripheries. Taking ad-
vantage of the crisis, Russia quickly occupied Manchuria, including several loca-
tions near the Korean boundary. The Russian occupation of Manchuria provided 
Korea with an opportunity to extend its authority in the Kando region north of 
the Tumen River, as the Qing forces were largely constrained by Russian troops 
and Russia wanted to act favorably toward Korea in order to check Japanese 
movements in the Korean peninsula. The Korean government hoped to settle 
its boundary dispute with the Qing court by negotiating with Russia.79 In an at-
tempt to consolidate its rule over the Kando region, the Korean government sent 
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a special inspector in 1902 to investigate the number of Korean households and 
people living there. However, the increasing competition between Russia and 
Japan in Manchuria dashed Korea’s hopes of expanding its territory northward. 
By defeating Russia in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904 and making Korea into a 
Japanese protectorate in 1905, Japan took the lead in the boundary negotiations 
between China and Korea.80
In 1906, the Japanese established a police substation in Longjing and an-
nounced that Kando should be included in Korean territory; the following year, 
Japan further claimed that the Koreans had no obligation to follow Qing regula-
tions. The Qing court rejected the Japanese claim that Kando was Korean territory, 
insisting on its exclusive right to rule the people and territory north of the Tu-
men River. On September 4, 1909, after several years of negotiations, China finally 
signed what became known as the “six treaties on the Three Eastern Provinces” 
(Dong sansheng liu’an), which allowed Japan to build railways and develop mines 
in Manchuria. One of the treaties was the “arrangement on the Tumen boundary 
between China and Korea” (Tumenjiang Zhong Han jiewu tiaokuan), also widely 
known as the Agreement of Kando, which secured China’s territorial claims to the 
Kando region. This arrangement stated in its first article that “the China-Korean 
boundary is the Tumen and the origin of the river is Shiyishui,” further explain-
ing in following articles that Korean immigrants north of the Tumen should be 
governed by Chinese laws and included within the jurisdictions of Chinese offi-
cials.81 By the time the Chinese-Korean boundary was finally confirmed, however, 
both the Qing and the Chosŏn courts were doomed. As the borderland they had 
shared for so long was replaced by a border, the old Qing and Chosŏn states were 
destined to disappear. The Qing empire and the Chosŏn kingdom could tolerate 
the existence of a borderland, but modern China and Korea needed a clear border 
between them.
• • •
Ginseng in Manchuria had been carefully managed throughout the Qing period 
by a well-developed system of imperial foraging. Such systemic exploitations of 
ginseng for centuries eventually brought about the depletion of wild ginseng to 
the extent that the state could not maintain its ginseng monopoly. And as ginseng 
disappeared in the Manchurian mountains, it was no longer ginseng poachers or 
illegal sable hunters who violated the restrictions on entering the region; instead, 
Chinese farmers came in search of land. Once providing wealth and prestige 
for the Manchus, Manchuria gradually came under the plow of Chinese farm-
ers. As the Qing decided to open the northeastern margins to civilian settlement 
for the purpose of protecting their territory from foreign aggression, the flow of 
Chinese immigration reached the Yalu and Tumen Rivers, once a ginseng produc-
ing area that had been closed to civilian settlement. Under the strong pressure of 
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immigrants, the agreement between the Qing and the Chosŏn for the uninhab-
ited empty zone at the boundary—one feature of the borderland—was no longer 
maintained. Even as the Qing authorities tried to develop the land near the Tumen 
River, they found it already occupied by Korean immigrants. Given the competi-
tion for land and people, they had to solve the ambiguity of the exact location 
of the boundary—the other feature of the borderland. The joint investigations 
of the Tumen riverhead in the 1880s were an announcement that the Qing and 
the Chosŏn could no longer maintain the borderland that they had shared for 
centuries. As the ideas and practices of territory and sovereignty transformed, the 
borderland was replaced by a border.
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Geography textbooks teach us that the Yalu and Tumen Rivers are the boundary 
between China and Korea. This seemingly straightforward fact was anything but 
clear during most of the long history of Chinese-Korean relations, because the 
territorial boundaries of these two countries, as well as their political relations, 
were subject to interpretation and negotiation. Just as the meanings of “China” 
and “Korea” have changed throughout history, so have perceptions of the bound-
aries between these two political entities evolved over time. The Chinese-Korean 
boundary has always been a place of encounters where people come into con-
tact as well as conflict; simultaneously, their constant movements and interactions 
have led to the repeated rearrangement and redefinition of their countries’ mutual 
relations. At some times, the boundary was a thick line, consisting of a vaguely 
defined zone within which the limits of territory and sovereignty were ambigu-
ous and often overlapped. In other times, the two states sought to draw a sharp 
line to clearly divide their respective realms, a task that they found far from easy. 
Depending on the circumstances in which the neighbors found themselves, their 
boundary took the form of a frontier, a borderland, or a border. In this sense, the 
conceptions and practices of boundary between China and Korea are a reflection 
of their domestic politics and foreign relations. The Yalu and Tumen Rivers have 
been in the same place since time immemorial, but the Chinese and Korean ideas 
about them have been subject to continuous change.
Ginseng production in the region near the Yalu and Tumen Rivers and Chang-
baishan helps us trace the development of the boundary from frontier to border-
land and finally to border. This precious root growing in the wildness of Manchu-
ria and the Korean peninsula was an object of reverence due to its medical efficacy 
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and commercial value. The Jurchens and the Koreans had an equal interest in the 
ginseng growing at their shared boundary. Once the Manchus established their 
state in Liaodong and claimed control over their territorial realm, the Yalu and 
Tumen Rivers became the boundary between the Jurchen/Manchu state and the 
Chosŏn. The natural resource of ginseng, as well as the territory in which it grew, 
became off-limits for the Koreans south of the rivers. The Jurchen-Chosŏn fron-
tier, a vaguely defined zone where crossing the nominal boundary for the purpose 
of ginseng collection might have been overlooked, was more clearly demarcated, 
and trespassing for ginseng poaching in the neighboring state’s territory began to 
be severely punished. The interest of the Qing in protecting the ginseng reserves 
around the Yalu and Tumen Rivers and their commitment to the strategic and 
cultural importance of Manchuria are clearly revealed in two separate projects 
regarding the boundary with the Chosŏn: the Changbaishan investigation and the 
military guard post at the Yalu River. These projects were initiated by the Qing 
court and promoted by Manchu officials for the goal of curbing unauthorized 
access to ginseng near the two rivers. After extensive examinations and discus-
sions, the solution agreed upon by the two states was not the establishment of 
a clearly defined dividing line—a border—between their spatial realms. Instead, 
they decided to create and maintain a borderland, in which some parts of the 
boundary remained undefined and others were kept uninhabited by force. After 
centuries of unconstrained exploitation of the limited ginseng resources in Man-
churia, ginseng became scarce. Trespassing for ginseng gradually disappeared at 
the boundary, but growing numbers of people began to settle in the land near the 
Yalu and Tumen Rivers. Instead of the privileged Manchus and ginseng hunters, 
Han Chinese settlers occupied Manchuria as well as the Chosŏn boundary. As the 
supposedly prohibited land at the boundary was occupied by illegal settlers, the 
Qing and the Chosŏn faced a serious challenge, compelling them to redefine their 
boundary as a clearly drawn line. Ginseng and people’s movements in search of it 
thus shaped the nature of the Qing-Chosŏn boundary, causing its transformation 
from frontier to borderland to border.
Before the Manchus claimed rulership over Liaodong, the Ming, the Jurchens, 
and the Chosŏn had vague and porous frontiers. The history of the Jurchens is best 
illustrated through their close relations with the Ming and Chosŏn governments, 
with each of whom they intermingled politically and economically. While the 
Jurchens and the Koreans both paid tribute to the Ming court and acknowledged 
the superiority of the Son of Heaven in China, the Chosŏn claimed a status higher 
than that of the Jurchen “barbarians” by virtue of the official titles and trading 
opportunities they were granted. The Jurchen economy, based as it was primar-
ily on hunting and gathering, made the Jurchens dependent on frontier markets 
with neighboring agricultural societies and eventually placed them in a vulnerable 
position in relation to the Ming and Chosŏn courts. The rise of the Jurchens in the 
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late sixteenth century, however, caused a major rift in the three-sided relationship 
centered on Liaodong. Nurhaci began to challenge Ming authority after his suc-
cessful unification of various Jurchen tribes and rival groups near his homeland. 
By the time Hong Taiji succeeded Nurhaci as the leader of the Aisin Gurun, it 
became obvious that the Jurchens no longer intended to regard their state’s bound-
aries with Ming China and Chosŏn Korea as vague and porous. Instead, Hong 
Taiji wanted to protect his people and territory, preserve economic benefits for the 
Aisin Gurun, and enhance his authority even beyond the territorial realm of his 
Manchu state.
In order to accomplish these multiple goals, Hong Taiji focused on wild ginseng, 
a highly valuable natural resource growing near the boundaries with his neighbors 
and an essential element in the saga of the Jurchen people. The Jurchens had a long 
history of trading ginseng with the Ming Chinese at frontier markets, which pro-
vided them with a commercial opportunity to build their power in Liaodong. As 
they began to challenge Ming authority in Liaodong during the early seventeenth 
century, the areas in which this precious root grew came to serve as signposts di-
viding Jurchen territory from the neighboring Ming and Chosŏn states. Hong Taiji 
complained about Ming Chinese entering his territory and poaching ginseng, a 
carefully calculated action that made the plant off-limits to anyone other than the 
Manchus and helped the Aisin Gurun exploit the power of ginseng as a physical 
and cultural marker symbolizing Manchuness. But Ming China was not the only 
neighbor against whom Hong Taiji employed ginseng: the Jurchen ruler’s most 
strenuous efforts were aimed at protecting this valuable commodity from Chosŏn 
Koreans. He made numerous complaints to the Chosŏn court about Korean en-
croachments for the purpose of ginseng poaching, claims that he then used to 
justify the attacks of 1627 and 1637 on the Chosŏn state. Hong Taiji thus protected 
the exclusive right of the Manchus to gather ginseng and succeeded in asserting 
his authority against the Chosŏn by redefining the nature of the boundary with the 
Chosŏn away from an ambiguous frontier. However, he did not succeed in draw-
ing a clear-cut line to separate the two realms. The tributary relationship, achieved 
through Hong Taiji’s two military campaigns, allowed his successors to create a 
borderland with the Chosŏn—more definite than the previous frontier, but still 
retaining elements of ambiguity.
The Qing-Chosŏn borderland rested on two principles: the asymmetrical tribu-
tary relationship, and the Qing restrictive policy on Manchuria. Ginseng continued 
to claim a special status in the Qing empire after the 1644 conquest of China. Ac-
cess to ginseng was authorized only for Manchu aristocrats and banner members, 
and the profits from the ginseng harvest were reserved exclusively for the imperial 
court. The natural resources of Manchuria, as well as the hallowed land itself, were 
carefully preserved as symbols of the Manchus through a series of rules and regu-
lations. One of the biggest threats to Manchuria and ginseng was, in fact, Korean 
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trespassing in Qing territory. The tributary relationship established between the 
Qing and Chosŏn courts as a result of Hong Taiji’s military campaigns did not stop 
local Koreans from crossing the Yalu and Tumen Rivers in search of ginseng. To 
the contrary, trespassing continued to disrupt relations between the two neighbors 
until the end of the nineteenth century. Korean trespassers were decapitated on 
the Yalu River in order to deter future criminals; Chosŏn officials were dismissed 
or demoted for failing to ensure adequate patrols at the boundary; and the Chosŏn 
king himself was blamed for neglecting his duty to serve the Qing emperor when 
cases of trespassing were discovered. In the early seventeenth century, as a part 
of a broader project of mapping the homeland of the Manchu imperial court, the 
Kangxi emperor proposed a joint survey with the Chosŏn authorities to establish 
the location of the origin of the Yalu and Tumen Rivers. This Qing survey initiative 
was not, however, well received by the Chosŏn court, which still held anti-Qing 
sentiments stemming from memories of inferior Manchu “barbarians” and dev-
astating military defeats more than seventy years earlier. Despite their arduous 
surveying efforts in Changbaishan, Manchu and Korean officials ultimately failed 
to locate the origin of the Tumen River and ended up leaving the boundary at the 
upper Tumen River under-defined and unclear.
The process of the Changbaishan investigation and the debates surrounding 
it reveal the unique features of the respective conceptions of territory and sov-
ereignty held by the Qing and the Chosŏn. The Qing reaction to the results of 
the investigation—namely, the incorrectly identified location of the Tumen River’s 
source—tells us that the Kangxi emperor did not necessarily aim at clarifying the 
territorial boundary with the Chosŏn state. Instead, his primary interest in the 
northeast at the time, especially after the 1689 Treaty of Nerchinsk, lay in bringing 
the various tribal groups living there under Qing control and preventing further 
Russian influence over them. Kangxi’s efforts to determine the boundaries of the 
empire and to fix them visually on maps were not necessarily aimed at contain-
ing Chosŏn Korea, a small neighbor who, in the early eighteenth century, was 
not regarded as posing any serious threat to Qing power. It was the loyalty of the 
Chosŏn, not a clear-cut demarcation of territorial limits, that the Qing sought to 
secure with the investigation of Changbaishan. However, the Chosŏn response 
to the investigation and to the resulting stone marker shows that Koreans had a 
very different perspective on their territory and sovereignty. The Chosŏn court’s 
suspicions arose from its hostility toward the Manchus as well as from a desire to 
protect its lands from its powerful neighbor. Taking advantage of the relative lack 
of interest on the part of the Qing in territorial limits—based on the attitude that a 
superior power would not deign to fight with an inferior neighbor for a small piece 
of land—the Chosŏn decided to overlook the incorrect location of the Tumen riv-
erhead. In other words, it was precisely the special relationship between the Qing 
and Chosŏn states, that is, their tributary relationship, that led the two neighbors 
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to tolerate the unclear demarcation of their territories at the upper Tumen River. 
This ambiguity, intentionally left between their territories and authorized by the 
tributary relationship, was one of the key features of the Qing-Chosŏn borderland.
If the boundary at the upper Tumen River in the east was unclear, at the Yalu 
River in the west it remained empty, cleared of inhabitation. In the early eigh-
teenth century, Qing officials in Shengjing in charge of inspecting the boundary 
with the Chosŏn attempted several times to station soldiers at a guard post near 
the Yalu River in order to deter both Qing and Chosŏn trespassers. However, the 
Chosŏn government launched an all-out effort to stop Qing officials and their sol-
diers from approaching Korean territory. After much discussion and debate, the 
Yongzheng and Qianlong emperors decided to accept the Chosŏn king’s appeal 
not to station soldiers at the Yalu River, a conclusion that contrasted dramatical-
ly with the cruel attitudes of Qing rulers in the previous century toward Korean 
trespassers. As much as the Qing emperors desired to establish their claim to the 
Mandate of Heaven, they also wished to present themselves as benevolent, em-
bracing rulers of all of their domestic and foreign subjects. For eighteenth-century 
Qing rulers, security at the boundary with an unintimidating neighbor was less 
important than gaining and maintaining the respect of an old tributary state. Here, 
again, the tributary relationship between the Qing and the Chosŏn was the defin-
ing factor behind the maintenance of an empty buffer zone at the Yalu River—the 
second key feature of the Qing-Chosŏn borderland.
In addition to the Qing emperor’s desire to present himself to his subjects as a 
universal ruler, there was another reason the Qing agreed to retain the empty zone 
at the boundary with the Chosŏn: the primary goal of Qing policy in Manchu-
ria was the protection of the northeastern region from Han Chinese. Throughout 
the Qing period, Jilin and Heilongjiang were kept off-limits to Han civilians in 
order to preserve the region as the sacred birthplace of the imperial court and 
the last bastion of the Manchus. Within the vast territory of Manchuria, access 
to the Yalu River and Changbaishan—the specific homeland of the Aisin Gioro 
family and the richest source of ginseng—was thoroughly restricted as early as the 
seventeenth century. Between the Willow Palisade—a physical array of gates and 
outposts enforcing the ban on unauthorized access to the northeastern region—
and the region north of the Yalu River there remained a wide swath of empty 
land where people were not allowed to settle. Such a buffer zone allowed the Qing 
government to avoid contact and conflict with neighboring people; it also required 
the Chosŏn court to control and punish its own trespassing subjects, another way 
that the Qing showed the generosity of the great power to the tributary state. The 
Chosŏn authorities, in turn, made every effort to uphold the Qing regulations by 
striving to leave the areas around the Yalu and Tumen Rivers undisturbed. Restric-
tions of movement into Manchuria and the Chosŏn boundary were successfully 
enforced as long as Qing authority was absolutely dominant in the northeast and 
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unconditionally respected by the Chosŏn court. Once Qing supremacy began to 
be challenged in the late nineteenth century, the idea of the untouched land at the 
boundary with Chosŏn territory came under pressure.
The empty zone at the Yalu River was never vacant in reality, however; instead, 
it continuously attracted people who engaged in a range of economic activities in 
the region. Ever since the complete surrender of the Chosŏn to the Manchus in 
1637, the Chosŏn court took pains to observe the Qing demand to send tributary 
missions to the Son of Heaven in Beijing. Under various titles and within differ-
ent types of missions, a great number of people joined the official embassy every 
year and crossed the Yalu River to enter Qing territory. During the journey from 
the last location in Chosŏn territory, Ŭiju, to the first entry point into Qing ter-
ritory, Fenghuangcheng, several hundred Korean visitors participated in official 
rituals enacting Qing-Chosŏn relations and took advantage of a variety of trading 
opportunities with Qing merchants. In the remote areas at the empire’s margin, 
where the Qing state sought to enforce a strict prohibition on entry and settle-
ment, the Chosŏn visitors had to find forms of assistance other than the limited 
services provided by the Qing authorities in order to deliver their numerous trib-
ute packages for the emperor and to transport necessities for themselves. As a 
result, the supposedly restricted zone unexpectedly gave a great number of Korean 
merchants an opportunity to cross the Yalu River under the excuse of assisting the 
embassy. In addition, local Qing people were eventually hired by the Chosŏn trav-
elers as horsemen, cart drivers, innkeepers, and porters. Despite the state’s efforts 
to limit contact between Qing and Chosŏn people, the Chosŏn tribute missions 
transformed this remote area into a lively place of trade and other forms of inter-
action. The growth of trading opportunities and transportation services and the 
subsequent debates and disputes show that the tributary relationship both defined 
the nature of the Qing-Chosŏn boundary and simultaneously provided enabling 
conditions for the contacts that occurred there. In short, the tributary relationship 
created the Qing-Chosŏn borderland as well as commercialized it.
A series of changes in Qing domestic politics and foreign relations in the late 
nineteenth century caused the disappearance of the Qing-Chosŏn borderland. For 
centuries, the Qing government had sought to maintain Manchuria and the area 
at the Yalu and Tumen Rivers as vacant and untainted, a goal that required im-
mense state power in this distant location far away from the center of the empire. 
However, the vast, uninhabited territory at the boundary attracted from both sides 
increasing numbers of people hungry for land. In the late nineteenth century, by 
which time a huge number of civilian settlers had moved from China proper to the 
northeast and the threat of Russian encroachment in Manchuria was growing, the 
Qing relinquished the old governing principles of its Manchuria policy—the pres-
ervation of Manchuria as off-limits and the maintenance of an uninhabited buffer 
zone at the boundary with the Chosŏn. Subsequently, the Qing government began 
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to encourage civilian settlement at the empire’s margin to protect its territorial sov-
ereignty against foreign powers. With the influx of people from both China proper 
and the Korean peninsula, the Qing-Chosŏn boundary became, for a while, a vague 
and porous contact zone—the distinctive feature of a frontier—in which a variety 
of people interacted. This change in the nature of the Qing-Chosŏn boundary oc-
curred simultaneously with the rearrangement of the traditional hierarchy between 
the old neighbors. As Qing dominance was challenged by a series of military losses 
inflicted by foreign powers, Qing influence over Seoul and over the Yalu and Tumen 
Rivers also waned. The Qing court now had to frame its authority to control the 
boundary with the Chosŏn in the terms of modern international relations based on 
sovereign equality, rather than those of the traditional suzerainty envisioned by the 
Chinese world order. The transition from traditional tributary relations to modern 
international relations required the two neighbors to reenvision their borderland as 
a clear border.
The efforts of the two states to demarcate their boundaries and to build modern 
nation-states were, however, in conflict with the desires of the people crossing the 
rivers in search of land, wealth, and freedom, and they thus ended up creating an-
other frontier between the nation-states. The most obvious evidence of the ethnic 
and cultural frontier between modern China and Korea, which emerged amid the 
clear-cut political borders drawn in the twentieth century, may be the existence of 
the contemporary population of Korean-Chinese (Chaoxianzu), who highlight the 
complicated history of Chinese and Korean boundaries and territorial sovereignty. 
Throughout their long relationship, then, the Qing and the Chosŏn saw frontiers, 
borderlands, and borders emerge between them, and this history lives on in mod-
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Da Ming huidian 大明會典
Da Ming yitongzhi 大明一統志
Da Qing yitongzhi 大淸一統志
Dasheng Wula zongguan 打牲烏喇總管
dasheng zhuangding 打牲壯丁



















faxiang zhi ben 發祥之本
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Huangyu quanlan tu 皇輿全覽圖
huguo jiangjun 護國將軍
hulie zongguan 護獵總管
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jiangjun 將軍
Jianzhou dengchu difang guowang Tong 建州等處地方國王佟
Jianzhou zuowei 建州左衛
jierang difang 接壤地方





























Liaodong duzhihui shisi 遼東都指揮使司
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Paektusan chŏnggyebi chido 白頭山定界碑地圖
























Qing Taizu shilu 淸太祖實錄
qinwang 親王
qiren 旗人
























Shengjing Shangsanqi baoyi zuoling 盛京上三旗包衣佐領
Shengjing tongzhi 盛京通志
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Sŏbuk kyedo 西北界圖















T’omun’gang chŭk hwaŭm Tuman’gang 土門江卽華音豆滿江































yi Zhongguo zhi kuangtu, ju Zhongguo zhi minren, li zhi suozai 以中國之曠土, 居中國
之民人, 利之所在
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